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Studies on the nonprofit pay differential find that nonprofit workers in the child daycare 
industry earn more than comparable for-profit workers (Ben-Ner, Ren, & Paulson, 2011; Preston, 
1988), whereas nonprofit lawyers earn less than lawyers in for-profit firms (Frank, 1996; 
Weisbrod, 1983). Are nonprofit daycare center workers less altruistic than for-profit daycare 
workers or nonprofit lawyers? What is the meaning of a positive or negative nonprofit pay 
differential from various studies? This dissertation reframes the sectoral pay differential question 
and examines whether there is a donative labor effect for nonprofit workers relative to the for-
profit workers.  
Current empirical studies examining one or several industries produce a range of 
conflicting results, which makes comparison impossible and becomes a barrier to understanding 
the nature and magnitude of the nonprofit wage differential. Is there a relationship between 
industries and the sectoral pay differential? I develop measures to explain the relationship 
between the industry and the variability of the cross-sectoral pay differential based on the 
literature of commercialism on the industry level. 
 
 
Prevailing theories, including donative labor theory, attenuated property rights theory, 
compensating wage theory, and efficiency wage theory, predict different outcomes. It remains 
unanswered what is the relationship of these theories, and why the conflicting theories find 
support in various studies. I employ the multilevel modeling approach to integrate research 
questions on different levels in one model to examine hypotheses developed from theories on 
different levels.  
In the dissertation, I use nationally representative datasets and apply multilevel random 
effects modeling to answer two important questions: (1) Do nonprofits pay differently? And (2) 
what is the effect of commercialism? My analysis finds support for seemingly contradictory 
theories. The dissertation establishes an exhaustive inventory of nonprofit pay differentials for 
industries and occupations. The findings leave food for thought. Altruism motivation leads to 
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Chapter I. Introduction  
The nonprofit sector plays an important role in the US economy. The number of 
organizations with tax-exempt status is around 1.56 million in 2015, and 1.09 million of them 
were public charity organizations (McKeever, 2018). The actual number of nonprofits in the US 
is unknown because religious congregations and organizations with less than $5,000 receipts are 
not required to register (McKeever, 2018). Although nonprofit employment is only a portion of 
the for-profit employment (Hirsch, Macpherson, & Preston, 2018), the growth of the nonprofit 
employment outpaced that of business and government (McKeever & Gaddy, 2017; Salamon & 
Newhouse, 2019). Nonprofits employed 10.2 percent of the private workforce, and a total of 639 
billion dollars was paid as annual wage in the nonprofit sector in 2016 (Salamon & Newhouse, 
2019). Healthcare is the largest nonprofit employer offering jobs to 55 percent of nonprofit 
workers, followed by 14 percent in education and 12 percent in social assistance areas (Salamon 
& Newhouse, 2019). Given the scale of nonprofit employment and its labor-intensive nature of 
services, compensation is an important avenue to understand the nonprofit sector.  
The nonprofit pay differential relative to the for-profit sector signals whether nonprofits 
differ from the for-profit sector in the aspect of human resources, that is, whether tax-exempt 
status is justified or nonprofits are just “for-profits in disguise” (Weisbrod, 1988). The 
meaningfulness of the topic intrigued extensive studies. However, the findings are inconclusive. 
Using administrative data with no control of individual information, Salamon and Newhouse 
(2019) find that nonprofits pay higher weekly wages than for-profits in nonprofit concentrate 
industries such as social assistance, education institutions, ambulance healthcare, hospitals, and 
nursing homes. Without control of human capital, it is hard to know whether the ostensible pay 
premium in the nonprofit sector reflects competitive and fair wage with the for-profit sector 
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because many studies also find that nonprofit workers have more years of education and work 
experience, for instance.  
Labor economists have proposed a series of theories in the 1980s predicting different 
outcomes in nonprofit wages. Donative labor theory predicts that nonprofit workers earn less 
than for-profit workers due to their altruistic motivation (Handy & Katz, 1998; Preston, 1989; 
Weisbrod, 1983). Attenuated property rights theorists that maintain nonprofit workers earn more 
than for-profit workers because nonprofit managers do not have the incentive to accumulate 
profits (Preston, 1988). Compensating wage theory proponents expect nonprofit workers to earn 
less than for-profit workers because the working conditions are better in nonprofits than the for-
profits (Smith, 1979). Lastly, efficiency wage theory supports that firms pay more to increase the 
production of services if the work quality is hard to measure (Akerlof, 1984). Studies find 
negative nonprofit pay differentials, which provide support to donative labor theory (Handy, 
Mook, Ginieniewicz, & Quarter, 2007; Weisbrod, 1983). Others find that nonprofits pay equally 
or even slightly higher than for-profit firms, and thus conclude that there does not exist labor 
donation. Rather, it is the competition mechanism that works (Ben-Ner et al., 2011; Ruhm & 
Borkoski, 2003). The competition conclusion essentially rejects all theories that predict either 
positive or negative outcomes. 
Findings from current studies are inconclusive, partly because they examine different 
industries (Preston, 1988) or occupations (King & Lewis, 2017; Weisbrod, 1983), or different 
mix of industries (Ben-Ner et al., 2011; Jones, 2015; Ruhm & Borkoski, 2003) and occupations 
(Frank, 1996; Handy et al., 2007), which makes it hard to compare the results. In an economy-
wide study, Leete (2000) acknowledges that the overall pay parity is a sum of the significantly 
positive nonprofit differential in some industries and significantly negative differential in others. 
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A logical question to ask is why nonprofit workers are not the same. Presumably, they should be 
similar because they are all “nonprofit” workers. The question boils down to what makes a day-
care center nonprofit worker differ from a hospital nonprofit worker, or what makes a lawyer 
nonprofit worker differ from a registered nurse nonprofit worker. 
Conflicting findings send a mixed message concerning practical and policy implications. 
The answer is crucial to assure stakeholders who trust or distrust voluntary values. Nonprofit 
organizations are exempt from property, sales, and corporate income taxes (Hansmann, 1987). 
When nonprofit workers earn more than for-profit, it arouses concerns. On the one hand, if the 
nonprofit is not different from the for-profit sector, then the tax-exempt status puts nonprofits in 
an unfair competitive advantage over the for-profits. One the other hand, why nonprofits, without 
striving to make profits, can pay more than the for-profit sector. Do they distribute the surplus to 
owners and workers that are not allowed by law? It challenges the legitimacy of the sector 
(Salamon, 1999).  
Conflicting findings make theories irrelevant. When findings on the nonprofit pay 
differential diverge and explanations depart from each other, we are left to wonder whether 
theories are wrong or whether there is poor correspondence between the theory and the concepts 
under study. “Nonprofit” might refer to altruistic motivation (donative labor theory), the lack of 
ownership of organizations (attenuated property rights theory), better working conditions 
(compensating wage theory), or less measurable production (efficiency wage theory). What is the 
referent for “nonprofit” in various studies?  
The study of the sectoral pay differential needs to be situated in the overall backdrop, 
where nonprofits are one type of service provider in many industries, together with governments 
and for-profit service providers. Nonprofits, as a decentralized system, can better meet diverse 
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and heterogeneous demands from the community (Weisbrod, 1988). Compared with the for-
profits, nonprofit organizations have more trust and less information asymmetry problems 
because of non-distribution constraints (Hansmann, 1980). However, the nonprofit sector has its 
Achilles’ heel, the voluntary failure (Salamon, 1987), encapsulated as “philanthropic 
insufficiency” – the inability to generate sufficient and reliable resources to scale up services; 
“philanthropic amateurism” – the inability to hire professionals to provide professionalized 
services; “philanthropic particularism” – only focus on particular subgroups of  the population; 
and "philanthropic paternalism” – community needs are defined by those who have resources. 
The first two failures are particularly relevant to compensation and human resource management. 
Nonprofits have the motivation to solve the insufficiency and amateurism through marketing 
services and replacing volunteers with professionals (Maier, Meyer, & Steinbereithner, 2016). 
Philanthropic insufficiency pushes nonprofits internally to devote more efforts to 
resource development. Externally, the call for doing more with less and increasing efficiency 
justifies commercialism: reliance on commercial revenue (James, 1998) and adopting business-
like approaches (Maier et al., 2016). Therefore, commercialism has made its way into the 
nonprofit sector (Eikenberry & Kluver, 2004).  
Commercialism embraces profits and efficiency, which might erode values, encourage 
over-consumption, and bias education, among numerous evils as elaborated by Jacobson and 
Mazur (1995). The nonprofit sector is co-opted by commercialism, which goes against the 
essential role of the nonprofit sector as value guardians, service providers, advocates, and 
builders of social capital (Salamon, 1999). Critical school scholars articulate that marketization 
approaches are detrimental to democracy and erosive to the value of civil society (Eikenberry & 
Kluver, 2004).  Numerous studies have depicted that commercialism takes hold in the nonprofit 
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sector, and commercial revenue grows dramatically (Child, 2010; Eikenberry & Kluver, 2004; 
Kerlin & Pollak, 2011; Salamon, 1999, 2015).  The argument that commercialism can change 
organizational behavior is established, but empirical evidence about the impact of 
commercialism on pay to workers is sparse. 
The dissertation examines two broad questions: 1. Does the nonprofit sector pay 
differently than the for-profit sector? 2. What is the effect of commercialism on the nonprofit 
pay? It examines the nature of nonprofit wage differential and the consequence of 
commercialism.  
Compensation and pay are complex, as they are jointly determined by factors on the 
individual, organization, occupation, industry, and state levels (Werner & Gemeinhardt, 1995). 
Individuals have heterogeneous preferences and motivations. Organizations have different 
behaviors and decisions about their allocation of resources and profits. Different occupations 
have different requirements for job skills and human capital. Industries are differentiated by how 
collective is the nature of the goods or services they provide. Finally, states might be different in 
policies and regulations.  
Mirroring the different levels of the compensation decisions, prevailing theories explain 
the phenomenon on different levels. To answer the question on the individual level, I draw on 
social psychology explanation of altruistic motivation, which precedes the donative labor theory 
in the nonprofit pay study. To answer the industry level question, I adopt compensating wage 




Figure 1. Research questions and data needs 
 
The multilevel nature of research questions corresponding to the theoretical frameworks 
on discrete levels requires data on corresponding levels. Cross-Classified Random Effects 
Modeling (CCREM) can fulfill the needs because it can decompose variance components on 
different levels and properly represent the variability and effects from different sources (Kreft, 
Leeuw, & Aiken, 1995; Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). In other words, CCREM can estimate 
unbiased and efficient estimates of fixed coefficients while modeling the variability of interest 
variables on the macro/contextual level (Kreft et al., 1995; Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002).  
I use nationally representative data pooled from Census 2000 and the American 
Community Survey (ACS) 2005-2016. The data is merged with Statistics of Income from the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Merging the data with detailed individual-level information to 
the organizational finance information has closed the gap of compensation studies based solely 
on either individual data or administrative data.  
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Level-1 includes 3,017,110 observations with detailed human capital and demographic 
information as well as sectors.  Level-2 includes 38 industries, 303 occupations, and 50 states 
and DC. Modeling for fixed effects is essentially regression analysis. Random effects of 
nonprofit pay differential on industry and occupation levels are modeled as a probability 
distribution of nonprofit pay differential. Before drawing the conclusion, I check the robustness 
and sensitivity of the estimation. I use different structures on Level-2, including the interaction 
level of industry and occupation, and adding the state level.  Then I use different datasets, 
including dropping higher education and hospital industries, using Census 2000 only, having 
different industry categories, and including part-time workers on Level-2.  
The results show that nonprofit workers earn 5.7 percent less on average than comparable 
for-profit workers. This effect is conditional on the industry and occupation effects. In other 
words, a negative 5.7 percent on Level-1 is the donative labor effects. In industries where 
nonprofits have pay advantages, the sectoral pay differential will be less negative than -5.7 
percent. In industries with pay disadvantage for nonprofits, the sectoral pay differential will be 
more negative than -5.7 percent.  It is a similar situation with occupations. My second research 
question is to examine the effects of commercialism on pay in the nonprofit sector. 
Commercialism is measured both as a compositional effect of the for-profit share of workers and 
as a substantive measure of an inverse of fundraising efforts. Both measures show that 
commercialism increases pay. Commercialism, an indicator of profit focus and cost 
minimization, increases the salary as a result of compensating the changed working conditions. 




My research provides an economy-wide estimate of nonprofit/for-profit sectoral wage 
differential that is composed of donative labor effect, industry effect, and occupation effect. I 
contribute to a consolidated explanation of theories by laying them on corresponding levels with 
corresponding data. The multilevel modeling of economy-wide data analysis gives equal 
importance to the random effects of various industries and occupations, which has improved the 
situation where some industries are studied repeatedly, and others are totally out of radar. 
Therefore, I also contribute to having established an exhaustive inventory of nonprofit pay 
differentials across industry and occupation levels. This inventory can serve as a reference and 
corroboration for future studies.  
In chapter 2, I review the literature on nonprofit wage differential under four prevailing 
theories. In Chapter 3, I deconstruct theories on their corresponding levels and build hypotheses 
accordingly. Chapter 4 describes detailed data sources, data cleaning processes, analytical tools, 
and model specifications. Chapter 5 presents the results, and Chapter 6 discusses the findings, 
contribution and limitations of my research.     
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Chapter II. Literature Review 
All paid jobs belong to a particular industry and a particular occupation. Employees are 
nested in a higher-level structure when they are members of units such as organizations, 
industries, and occupations. The pay for employees not only reflects their work efforts and 
abilities but also manifests features of the industry and occupation that they work for. Industries 
are classified in the North American Industry Code System (NAICS), and occupations are 
classified in the Standard Occupational Classification (SOC). The extensive lists suggest that 
industries and occupations have boundaries, and there are differences between these categories. 
Nonprofit and for-profit sectors share most industries and occupations, which imposes an 
additional complexity to sectoral pay differential studies, because the sectoral pay differential 
may catch the features of industries and occupations that are varying themselves.   
Despite the importance of linkage between pay and structures on the macro level, 
prevailing studies on the nonprofit wage differential apply a micro view and an individualist 
approach. They treat industries and occupations as background variables without further 
scrutiny, with a few exceptions such as Leete (2001) and Krueger and Summers (1988). To lay a 
foundation for multilevel conceptualization and analysis, I bring together two strands of 
literature: nonprofit pay studies and nonprofit industries and occupations. In this chapter, I 
review nonprofit pay differential literature guided by major compensation theories. Then I 
examine the literature on industry and occupation pertaining to nonprofits, based on which I 




2.1 Salary and Compensation in the Nonprofit Sector 
Major theories on nonprofit compensation include donative labor theory, compensating 
wage theory, attenuated property rights theory, and efficiency wage theory. Donative labor 
theory and compensating wage theory predict nonprofits to pay less than for-profit firms, 
whereas attenuated property rights theory and efficiency wage theory predict nonprofits to pay 
more than for-profits. In this part, I review what empirical studies on the cross-sectoral pay 
differential tell us about the major theories.  
Donative labor theory. 
Donation and volunteering are an essential part of American life. Around 63 million 
people volunteered 8.7 billion hours to their communities in 2014, which is equal to 5 million 
full-time jobs (America’s Nonprofit Sector - Revenues, 2016). In 2015, the total charitable giving 
amounted to $373.25 billion, and 70 percent came from individuals (America’s Nonprofit Sector 
- Impact, 2016).  
Accepting low pay to work for nonprofit organizations is another form of donation 
(Lewis, 2010; Preston, 1989; Weisbrod, 1983). Donative labor theory argues that altruistically 
motivated individuals are willing to accept a low pay in order to have the opportunity to serve 
the underrepresented (Weisbrod, 1983), or reify their religious or political commitment to social 
change (Lewis, 2010; Rose-Ackerman, 1996), among other possible values such as liberalism 
(Lewis, 2010).  
Weisbrod (1983) first proposed donative labor theory in a study that found public interest 
lawyers earned 20 percent less than comparable attorneys working in for-profit firms. 
Subsequent questions in his research revealed that 45 percent of the lawyers knew beforehand 
that they would not be better off financially from being public interest lawyers.  They did not 
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regret their choices. Furthermore, the public interest lawyers did not expect to use their nonprofit 
experience as an investment for better-paying jobs in the future, which means their sacrifice is 
the end instead of the means. Also, these lawyers seem to favor positions that can contribute to 
social good rather than monetary gain. Weisbrod (1983) finds that 43 percent of public interest 
lawyers choose to work for schools or governments that usually pay lower than private firms. In 
short, he argues that altruistic motivation leads to negative wage differential for lawyers in 
nonprofit organizations.   
With the main missions of serving the public good and producing positive social 
externalities (E. Brown & Slivinski, 2018; Preston, 1989; Rose-Ackerman, 1996), nonprofit 
organizations provide a better platform than government or for-profits to attract individuals with 
altruistic motivations to materialize their own values or ideology in a bigger social context (E. 
Brown & Slivinski, 2018; Cassar & Meier, 2018; Handy & Katz, 1998; Rose-Ackerman, 1996; 
Weisbrod, 1983). Lewis (2010) finds that the overrepresentation of lesbians and gay men in 
nonprofit organizations is attributable to their altruistic motivation.  
Handy et al. (2007) concur that nonprofit executives choose nonprofit jobs because they 
identify with the mission of the organizations that reflect their values and beliefs, despite the 
lower pay than their for-profit counterparts. Ideological nonprofit entrepreneurs prefer managers 
and workers who share their vision (Rose-Ackerman, 1996).  Smart nonprofit managers thus 
might use a lower salary to filter for employees with altruistic motivation (Handy & Katz, 1998) 
because altruistically motivated individuals can be more productive with less supervision. For 
example, nonprofit hospitals use performance-based bonus reward structures less than for-profit 
hospitals (Roomkin & Weisbrod, 1999) to screen managers who share the organizational goal.  
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Altruistic workers select jobs based on the meaningfulness of work rather than the 
monetary incentive (Cassar & Meier, 2018). The meaningfulness of work includes competence, 
autonomy, and relatedness (Ryan & Deci, 2000). Cassar and Meier (2018) explain that people 
develop joy and satisfaction from their competence to solve problems or intellectual challenges, 
which explains why scientists commit their weekends to research and innovation. Arguably, 
when nonprofit workers can solve some social issues or help disadvantaged groups, the process 
of being able to help is a source of satisfaction. 
Autonomy and relatedness also enrich the meaning of work (Cassar & Meier, 2018). 
When people have a sense of belongingness or connectedness, they are more likely to work 
harder and like the job better (Ryan & Deci, 2000). Benz and Frey (2008) find that people 
working with smaller firms are more satisfied because the structures of small firms are less 
hierarchical than large organizations. Nonprofit jobs are generally interdependent (Ben-Ner et 
al., 2011), less hierarchical with more equality, such as narrower pay gap and less discrimination 
(Ben-Ner et al., 2011; Cassar & Meier, 2018; Faulk, Edwards, Lewis, & McGinnis, 2012). 
Therefore, nonprofit jobs might be meaningful to altruistic workers. 
Considering the dimensions of competence, autonomy, and relatedness (Cassar & Meier, 
2018; Ryan & Deci, 2000), the meaning of jobs might have implications on different occupation 
ranks. Using the 1979 Current Population Survey data, Preston (1989) finds that clerical workers 
earned comparable wages in two sectors, but managers and professionals earned 5 to 20 percent 
less in nonprofits than in for-profits after accounting for human capital, industries, occupations, 
and selected job characteristics. Preston (1989) explains, although nonprofit workers choose to 
participate in “socially worthwhile organizations” that produce social benefits, nonprofit 
managers are more closely tied to social benefits provision than the blue-collar workers. 
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Nonprofit managers have the power and autonomy to decide social programs, which concurs the 
explanation that autonomy is related to the meaning of work (Cassar & Meier, 2018; Ryan & 
Deci, 2000). Thus, the willingness to donate labor probably varies by occupation. 
Donation is a gift-giving behavior. Donative labor theory indicates that nonprofit workers 
donate part of their salary or labor to nonprofit organizations (Lewis & Ng, 2013) as gifts. Adloff 
(2016) distinguishes altruistic giving behavior as different from the giving behavior with self-
interests and reciprocal purposes. Altruistic behavior is "motivated mainly out of consideration 
for another's needs rather than one's own" (Piliavin & Charng, 1990, p. 30), whereas reciprocity 
happens when “the giving of a gift initiates a cycle of receiving and reciprocating with a counter-
gift” (Barman, 2017, p. 274).  
If giving, or labor donation, is reciprocal, it can be compensated. Economists in this line 
argue that nonprofit workers enjoy more satisfaction than comparable workers in the for-profit 
sector because the lower pay is compensated by satisfaction (Benz, 2005; Handy et al., 2007; 
Jones, 2015; Leete, 2001; Lewis & Frank, 2002; Mirvis & Hackett, 1983; Preston, 1989). 
Andreoni (1990) indicates that satisfaction as a type of utility and impure altruism since donors 
experience “warm-glow.” Any utility has to be compensated, according to the assumption of the 
economic man who tries to maximize the utility. Evren and Minardi (2017) define warm-glow as 
“prosocial behavior that causes the actor to experience positive feelings, apart from its social 
implications” (p.1381).  It might be either intrinsically motivated as "pleasure of social acclaim" 
or extrinsically motivated, such as improving one’s social image or avoiding guilt (Evren & 
Minardi, 2017).  
Scholars from disciplines other than economics have questioned interpreting satisfaction 
and warm-glow as a compensable utility. Friedland and Alford (1991) argue that the utility is 
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volatile and "socially and historically structured" (p. 234), and thus the maximization is resistant 
to computation. No one can compensate things incomputable even if s/he intends to. Therefore, 
warm-glow is not pecuniary (Elster, 2011) nor reciprocal (Barman, 2017), no matter whether it is 
intrinsically or extrinsically motived. The non-reciprocity distinguishes donative labor theory 
without anticipation of return from the compensating wage theory with anticipation of return. 
Compensating wage theory.  
Compensating wage theory is about matching the worker’s preference with job 
characteristics (Ehrenberg & Smith, 2018). The essence of the compensating wage theory is that 
"jobs with disagreeable characteristics will command higher wages" (Smith, 1979, p. 339). 
Therefore, jobs with higher risks of injuries, lower occupational safety, or less desirable are paid 
better. However, an empirical test of compensating wage theory encounters obstacles due to 
heterogeneous tastes of workers and difficulty in specifying a priori disagreeable job 
characteristics. Nonetheless, a common-sense list of job characteristics might include strenuous 
physical work, repetitive or stressful jobs, fast pace, location, lack of freedom or security, 
commuting time, and work shifts (Borjas, 2007; Krueger & Summers, 1988; Smith, 1979).  
Nonprofit organizations generally offer working conditions with pleasant amenities 
(Hallock, 2000; Handy et al., 2007; Ruhm & Borkoski, 2003). The known nonprofit work 
amenities include family-supportive policies, a more egalitarian workplace, flexibility in work 
schedules, less rigid environment, greater job stability, autonomy, more control over the work 
performed, building a reputation for a public career, interesting and challenging jobs, not 
working toward a financial bottom line, and shorter work hours (Ben-Ner et al., 2011; Hallock, 
2000; Handy & Katz, 1998; Handy et al., 2007; Leete, 2000; Preston & Sacks, 2010; Ruhm & 
Borkoski, 2003). If workers care about those agreeable amenities, they should be willing to pay 
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for them by accepting lower pay (Mas & Pallais, 2016). Conversely, they would require a higher 
wage for jobs without such amenities, or if jobs have conflicts with the strong values and beliefs 
held by ideological workers (Ben-Ner et al., 2011; Frank, 1996).   
Both donative labor theory and compensating wage theory predict a negative outcome of 
the nonprofit wage differential. However, they are different in several aspects. Donative labor 
theory is built on altruistic and intrinsic motivation that working itself is a source of satisfaction, 
whereas compensating wage theory implies exchange and tradeoff between salary and working 
conditions, which is related to the extrinsic motivation. Therefore, donative labor theory based 
on altruism is more about individual characteristics, while compensating wage theory is 
contingent on the external monetary return and related to job characteristics. The distinction 
between intrinsic and extrinsic orientation leads to potential motivation sorting for jobs.   
Attenuated property rights.  
Economic analyses of property rights assume that top decision-makers have private 
property rights to the profits or surplus of the firm (Borjas, Frech, & Ginsburg, 1983), and “any 
reduction in the rights of the top decision-maker leads to attenuated property rights, … [and] the 
attenuation of property rights leads to higher costs” (p. 4).  Attenuated property rights theory is 
relevant to the nonprofit sector because of the non-distribution constraints. Nonprofit 
organizations are often exempt from property, sales, and corporate income taxes (Hansmann, 
1980, 1987). In return for the tax advantages, nonprofits are subject to the non-distribution 
constraints. Nonprofits are not allowed to distribute the profits or surplus among board members, 
managers, or staff, beyond a reasonable salary (Hansmann, 1980). Therefore, nonprofits do not 
have the incentive to reduce the cost by lowering salaries to workers. What is more, nonprofit 
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managers might derive utility in paying high wages to employees, such as enhanced loyalty and 
increased working efforts. 
Paying a higher salary is possible. Although the nonprofit corporation law prohibits 
distribution of profits, it is hard for the law to control unnecessarily high wages because the 
enforcement of non-distribution constraints is "placed exclusively in the hands of the state’s 
attorney general” (Hansmann, 1980, p. 873). Furthermore, the law might apply to top-earning 
management but not so much to the mid-or-low-rank staff since their salaries are not high 
enough to touch the ceiling. Therefore, nonprofit managers might choose to pay higher wages to 
employees (Preston, 1988) as a result of not being able to share the profits of the organization.    
Borjas et al. (1983) study the nursing home industry with four types of ownership: for-
profit, government, nonprofit-secular, church-related. For-profit organizations have private 
property rights and are allowed to make and distribute profits. The other three types are not 
allowed to distribute profits to managers. They find that the pay rate in government is 
significantly higher than for-profits, but the difference in pay between the nonprofits and for-
profits is not significant. The insignificance between for-profits and nonprofits remains true in 
three larger occupation groups in this industry: licensed practical nurses, registered nurses, aides 
and orderlies. Their finding of for-profit/government pay differential seems to support the 
attenuated property rights theory, but the result on for-profit/nonprofit pay differential does not 
support the theory. 
Preston (1988) studies the child-care industry with only nonprofit and for-profit service 
providers. Part of the industry is unregulated and owner-controlled, where small firms compete 
to provide services with low fixed costs and free entry. They are mostly for-profit organizations. 
The other part is regulated and manager-controlled with no ownership. They are mainly large 
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nonprofit organizations seeking federal funds, which impedes entry and competition in the 
industry. Preston (1988) finds that non-regulation and free competition leads to insignificant 
sectoral pay difference. By contrast, in the regulated branch, nonprofit workers earn 5 to 10 
percent higher than comparable for-profit workers. Preston (1988) argues that less competition 
and more barriers to entry of new firms lead nonprofit managers to pay higher wages.  However, 
Preston (1988) also mentions that the non-federally regulated is full of small private firms, and 
the regulated part has many large nonprofits. Studies show that large organizations pay more 
(Brown & Medoff, 1989; Krueger & Summers, 1988), and this potential relationship between 
size and pay is not excluded from the study.  
Mediating effects of service quality.  
No incentive to accumulate surplus does not necessarily mean that nonprofit managers 
will choose to pay higher salaries. They might use the surplus to increase service quality 
(Holtmann & Idson, 1993; King & Lewis, 2017). Nonprofits are often founded to provide 
collective goods or trust goods that clients have information disadvantage (Weisbrod, 1988).  
The non-distribution constraints reduce the incentive to cut corners of services (Hansmann, 
1987), which is a competitive advantage for nonprofits (Glaeser & Shleifer, 2001).  Glaeser and 
Shleifer (2001) argue that inferior quality services will bring “non-cash reputational cost” to 
nonprofits (p. 107). It is to the benefit of nonprofits to provide services of quality because 
services of better quality could not only retain the service prices and profits in the future but also 
protect the prestige of donors for the organization. 
Nonprofits’ pursuit of better quality services and value for serving the disadvantaged 
stand in sharp contrast with for-profit practices of cherry-picking and creaming the clients 
(Frumkin & Andre-Clark, 2000). In nursing home industries, Weisbrod (1988) find that 
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nonprofits have more service workers and fewer administrators than for-profit service providers. 
Even in ostensibly similar services, nonprofits might provide different clients services with 
subtle attributes such as "humanness" or "encouragement" (Weisbrod, 1988). Higher service 
quality could explain higher nonprofit pay (Holtmann & Idson, 1993; King & Lewis, 2017; 
Preston & Sacks, 2010) because higher-quality services may require staff with higher human 
capital. However, the difficulty in sufficiently controlling the service quality in an empirical 
analysis may inflate the estimate of the nonprofit pay differential. 
Efficiency wage hypothesis. 
Efficiency wage theory argues that firms pay above-market rate wages can save costs for 
firms (Akerlof, 1984; Fields & Wolff, 1995; Krueger & Summers, 1988; Thaler, 1989; Yellen, 
1984). The implication of efficiency wage theory on pay is related to the supervision of the 
production process and employees. When the production is easy to quantify and the product 
quality is easy to track, competitive wages based on piece-rate are the best way to measure the 
ability of workers (Borjas, 2007). Competitive wage happens when “firms pay a wage that is just 
sufficient to attract workers of the quality they desire and no higher” (Krueger & Summers, 
1988, p. 259). The more unmeasurable the product quality is, or the more difficult supervision is, 
the more likely firms will use efficiency wages to increase production and efficiency. If we 
conceive attenuated property rights as the feasibility of positive nonprofit pay differential, 
efficiency wage theory offers an explanation of motivation on the firm level.   
Four models explicate why it is to the firms’ benefit to pay non-competitive rents 
(Akerlof, 1984; Fields & Wolff, 1995). The first one is the shirking model. When service quality 
is hard to monitor, firms may choose to pay above-market rate wages to prevent workers from 
shirking. Sociological studies find that even the most elaborated division of labor, such as the 
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piecework machine shop, cannot guarantee productivity because supervision is always 
incomplete (Akerlof, 1984). The second model is the turnover model.  Excessive turnover might 
incur high costs of training, capacity building, recruiting and interrupted production. Efficiency 
wage on the industry level is associated with long tenure and low turnover rate (Krueger & 
Summers, 1988). The third model is the selection model. Firms can pay higher wages to attract 
more capable workers at the expense of profits. Preston (1988) regards recruiting over-qualified 
personnel as inefficiencies in the nonprofits. The fourth model, the fair wage model, is related to 
the equity theory from social psychology. Equity theory explains that people perceive a 
relationship to be fair and equitable if what they get is commensurate with what they contribute 
(Hatfield, Rapson, & Bensman, 2012). “Overpaid” workers might produce more because they 
might attempt to increase the quantity of production to match the overpaid part of the salary 
(Akerlof, 1984). Therefore, efficiency wage can raise worker’s effort level, induce loyalty, and 
minimize turnover, eventually increase productivity and reduce related costs (Akerlof, 1984; 
Krueger & Summers, 1988). 
The efficiency wage theory is also explained on the organization level. Efficiency wage 
was found to be positively related to the company size and negative related to the turnover rate 
(Krueger & Summers, 1988). Kruse (1992) concurs that adding human capital and occupations 
brings negligible change on the coefficient of establishment size in wage estimates, and he 
further excludes the explanation of the working condition. Numerous studies find that nonprofit 
executive pay is positively related to organization size measured as total revenue (Grasse, Davis, 
& Ihrke, 2014; Oster, 1998), total number of employees (Grasse et al., 2014), and total assets 
(Frumkin & Andre-Clark, 1999; Yan & Sloan, 2016). Larger organizations tend to pay more 
because larger organizations are more complex with more hierarchies, which makes it harder to 
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supervise the employee. The scale of the economy of large organizations might bring more 
operational efficiency so that they can afford to pay more (Grasse et al., 2014).  
Efficiency wage theory mirrors the shift from scientific management to human 
relationship management. To increase production, firms may choose to boost workers' morale by 
paying more rather than controlling them through close supervision. The use of an efficiency 
wage should not be uncommon because actual production in the real world is more likely to be a 
social process than a completely rational process. Since nonprofits generally provide services 
rather than products, and the quality of services is harder to measure than the quality of products, 
nonprofit workers are likely to benefit from the efficiency wage. Very few studies explore the 
efficiency wage theory in the nonprofit sector. The only study with peripheral relevance is Ito 
and Domian (1987) study of the symphony orchestras because they find that guaranteed pay is 
related to budget size, better team production, and reduced shirking. Other researchers also made 
similar conjectures that nonprofit managers might derive utility from paying employees higher 
salaries (Leete, 2001; Preston, 1988) when their finding of nonprofit wage differential is positive.  
Economy-wide.  
Most studies on nonprofit wage differential are based on discrete industries or 
occupations. Findings vary study by study, which suggests the industry effect or occupation 
effect on the nonprofit pay differential. In the frequently studied industries, including hospitals, 
social services, residential care, childcare, and nursing homes, studies find positive nonprofit 
wage differential (Ben-Ner et al., 2011; Leete, 2001; Preston, 1988; Ruhm & Borkoski, 2003). In 
other industries such as group homes, housing services, and vocational rehabilitation industries, 
nonprofits pay less than for-profits (Ben-Ner et al., 2011).   
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As a contrast to the inconclusive findings based on discrete industry or occupation 
studies, economy-wide (Hirsch et al., 2018; Leete, 2001; Ruhm & Borkoski, 2003) or multiple-
industry (Ben-Ner et al., 2011) studies conclude that the sectoral wage difference is not 
significant. Leete (2001) finds that nonprofit employees earn almost 1 percent less than 
comparable for-profit employees. The cross-sector pay differential is so small that the literature 
examining job switching between the for-profit and nonprofit sectors finds insignificant 
differential between the two sectors (Hirsch et al., 2018; Ruhm & Borkoski, 2003). The findings 
lead to the conclusion that it is a result of a competitive labor market (Ruhm & Borkoski, 2003).  
In the meantime, scholars are cautious about this general conclusion of pay parity. Ben-
Ner and associates (2011) note that nonprofits pay more in nursing homes and childcare centers 
than for-profits but pay less in group homes. Ruhm and Borkoski (2003) mark a nonprofit 
premium in five of the eight poorly-paid industries where nonprofit employment is concentrated. 
Leete (2001) acknowledges the findings from discrete industry and occupation studies and 
speculates that “the economy-wide finding here could represent an average of differentials that 
occur with different strengths and magnitudes across different occupations and industries” (p. 
156). Her following disaggregated industry analysis reveals that statistically significant 
differences occur in 34 of the 91 industries in her study. In the 34 industries, 9 of them have a 
positive nonprofit differential. 
Despite acknowledging the significance of industrial level differences (Ben-Ner et al., 
2011; Leete, 2000; Oster, 1998), few studies attempted to explicitly model the reason for such 
variation. Jones (2015) tries to reconcile these inconsistencies in findings based on discrete 




as long as there are enough motivated workers to meet their labor demands, nonprofits 
can minimize costs by offering a low wage (thereby, only attracting motivated 
applicants). However, if nonprofit labor demand is high relative to for-profit firms, the 
nonprofit cannot rely on motivated workers alone to fill their demand and must offer 
wages comparable to that of for-profits in order to attract standard workers. (p. 2) 
The supply and demand mechanisms determine that nonprofits will not pay higher than 
for-profits because nonprofits pay either lower when the supply of motivated worker is above the 
demand, or just equal as for-profits when the supply is lower than the demand. Then nonprofits 
compete with for-profits for standard workers. Therefore, it cannot explain why nonprofit-
dominant industries such as the childcare industry pay more than for-profits. Furthermore, 
Jones's (2015) operationalization of the market share based on the industry/locality-specific 
nonprofit shares of labor assumes that there is no mobility of workers across locality and 
industries, which goes against the assumption of free labor mobility in the market mechanism.    
Summary  
While studies focusing on discrete industries or occupations make important 
contributions to our understanding of the nonprofit wage differential, the isolation of industry 
and occupation makes it impossible to understand the integral context where nonprofit wage 
differential happens. As Lewis (2010) correctly states, “industry and occupation are the most 
important predictors of nonprofit employment, followed by location” (p. 20). The economy-wide 
studies include industries and occupations, but industries and occupations are treated as invariant 
to the nonprofit wage differential.   
Aggregating effects from different sources lead to a sweeping conclusion of cross-sector 
pay parity, which inappropriately simplifies the nonprofit sector as homogeneous and overlooks 
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that the nonprofit sector is hugely diverse and expansive in industries, that universities are 
different from daycare centers and homeless shelters, and that some nonprofits are self-help 
groups while others are public charities. After controlling human capital, unmeasured worker 
characteristics (through fixed effects models), and a variety of job characteristics such as weekly 
hours, hazard, work shift, commuting time (which aim to exclude compensating wage 
explanation),  Krueger and Summers (1988) find significant and substantial dispersion of wage 
across industries. Specifically, they find that industries that pay one occupation higher than other 
industries also tend to pay other occupations higher than other industries, which consolidates the 
industry-specific effect on wages. Citing an earlier source, Krueger and Summers (1988) concur 
that "industry and geographic variables are significant in individual earnings functions... This 
significance, itself, constitutes a deviation from the norms of a competitive market" (p. 262). 
2.2 Why industry matters 
An industry is “a group of firms producing products that are close substitutes for one 
another” (Forbes & Kirsch, 2011, p. 591). DiMaggio and Powell (1983) highlight that using 
industry as the unit of analysis shifts the focus of analysis from competing firms or interacting 
networks to “the totality of relevant actors” (p. 148). Within the industry, firms share suppliers, 
resources, consumers, and regulatory agencies, which form the environment constraining all 
organizations within the industry. Organizations within industry categories are similar with 
production techniques and technologies. "Similar organizations may provide resources to each 
other and develop mutual dependencies of long duration" (Child & Aldrich, 1988, p. 15). The 
feedback from the same pool of clients pushes organizations to imitate the leaders. 
Organizational actors within the industry adopt mainstream practices for reasons of legitimacy or 
performance improvement (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Within-industry similarities suggest 
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between-industry differences. Industries are different in aspects of regulatory requirements, 
barriers to entry, capital intensity, production technologies, consumers, profitability level, the 
intensity of competition (Ben-Ner et al., 2011; Preston, 1988).  
Differences between industries dominated by nonprofits and for-profits. Economy-wide, 
most industries have both for-profit and nonprofit firms and employers, with varying 
composition proportion of the two sectors (Hirsch et al., 2018; Ruhm & Borkoski, 2003). 
Nonprofit organizations tend to provide goods with the collective attribute (Ben-Ner & 
Hoomissen, 1992) “because of the legal restrictions guiding them, [nonprofits] generally will 
provide a good whose benefits are more heavily weighted towards social benefits” (Preston, 
1989, p. 440). Thus, industries dominated by nonprofits also tend to provide collective goods 
with positive social externalities, such as public radio and public health (Chang & Tuckman, 
1996; Fischer, Wilsker, & Young, 2011). By contrast, industries dominated by the for-profit 
firms tend to provide goods that are of more private nature, more excludable, and easier to 
commercialize than products of nonprofit dominated industries.  
Evidence below suggests that using sector composition to characterize industries is valid. 
With no reported information of nonprofits, Preston (1989) had to use industry composition to 
infer nonprofit status for workers. Leete (2001) checked the reliability of inferred nonprofit 
status from industry information, and she confirmed that “Preston’s constructed variable for 
nonprofit status does not perform too differently from the status of nonprofit workers as reported 
on the PUMS” (p.150).  
Implications of the nature of the goods on revenue sources. Nonprofits generate revenue 
from multiple sources. Contrary to the general perception that nonprofits rely on donative 
revenue, revenue from philanthropy only accounts for 9 percent of total revenue in nonprofits, 
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whereas revenue from government comprises 35 percent, and the remaining 56 percent is from 
fees and charges (Salamon, 2015). The revenue streams are related to the nature of services 
nonprofits provide (Fischer et al., 2011; Wilsker & Young, 2010; Young, 2017). Organizations 
providing “private” services, where the benefits accrue to identifiable individuals, such as 
nursing homes, are more likely to earn income from fees and service charges (Fischer et al., 
2011). Nonprofits providing “public” services, such as public health, are more likely to rely on 
donations. Based on the composition of revenue sources, nonprofits have a different degree of 
publicness on the spectrum of the collectiveness index (Fischer et al., 2011; Weisbrod, 1988; 
Young, 2017).   
Implications of revenue sources on nonprofit salary. Nonprofit organizations are 
dependent on resource suppliers for survival. The degree of dependence is determined by the 
importance and concentration of the resource streams (Froelich, 1999; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). 
Organizations relying on donative funding are susceptible to donor and social expectations 
(Carman, 2011). Donors expect their donations to be used for augmented social benefits rather 
than high salaries for employees (Carman, 2011). Nonprofits relying on contributions and 
donations are more likely to report a lower ratio of management (including salary) expenses to 
the total expense (Cordes & Weisbrod, 1998). 
In contrast to donative nonprofits, nonprofits relying on commercial revenue earn income 
from individual clients or consumers based on provided services, which shifts the locus of 
control from several major donors to very diffused individuals (Froelich, 1999; Frumkin & 
Keating, 2010). Furthermore, these nonprofits may have more abilities and opportunities to 
generate revenue from different sources. Thus, commercialized nonprofits have greater 
autonomy and flexibility to decide the use and allocation of their revenues. Guo (2006) reports 
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that nonprofit managers with more commercial revenue have the ability to increase pay to attract 
and retain qualified staff. 
Industries and Commercialism in Nonprofits.  
Nonprofits commercialize if they decide to “produce goods or services with the explicit 
intent of earning a profit” (Tuckman, 1998, p. 26). Underlying reasons are multifold (Cortis, 
2017; Guo, 2006; James, 1998; Salamon, 2015). One reason is the “financial squeeze,” where 
governments cut funding for nonprofits as a response to the conservative ideology to boost the 
volunteerism of nonprofits (Salamon, 1993, 1999, 2015). The second reason is that the 
government transferred funding mechanisms from producer subsidies to consumer subsidies, 
such as tax expenditures and vouchers, so that clients can choose between for-profit or nonprofit 
service providers (Salamon, 2015). As a result, nonprofit service providers have to engage in 
market behaviors in order to compete for clients. The third reason is that with more involvement 
of the for-profit sector in government contracts, nonprofits need to compete with for-profits and 
learn how to market their services (Salamon, 2015). The above reasons indicate that nonprofits 
commercialize to respond to the changing environment and reduced donative revenue, to cross-
subsidize their services, and to enhance financial sustainability. Additionally, studies on 
universities suggest that organizations might also commercialize to exploit the funding 
opportunities rather than responding to the scarcity of resources (Powell & Owen-Smith, 1998), 
or a result of a long-time effect of external pressure and environmental influence (Foster & 
Bradach, 2005; Kerlin & Pollak, 2011).   
James (1998) defines commercialism as "the degree of reliance on sales revenue rather 
than donations or government grants" (p. 27). Based on the definition, industries dominated by 
for-profits are more commercialized than industries dominated by nonprofits from the 
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perspective of sources of revenue. Surprisingly, A Dictionary of Nonprofit Terms & Concepts 
published in 2006 does not include commercialism. Instead, it introduces commercialization as a 
process for generating commercial revenue and as a process of competition between for-profits 
and nonprofits (Smith, Stebbins, & Dover, 2006).  
As a comparison, other dictionary definitions of commercialism emphasize the attitude 
and intent toward profit-making. Commercialism is defined neutrally as "commercial spirit, 
institutions, or methods" by the Merriam-Webster dictionary, or it is “an attitude or philosophy 
devoted to supplying goods and services and make profits.”1 Collins dictionary defines it with a 
pejorative sense as "the practice of making a lot of money from things without caring about the 
quality." Cambridge dictionary defines it as "principles and activities of commerce, especially 
those connected with profit rather than quality or doing good."  
These definitions echo Grønbjerg (2001)’s lament that the overreliance on effectiveness 
and efficiency forces nonprofits “to downplay their traditional pride in quality of services (the 
argument for why they should be preferred service providers) and good faith efforts (the 
explanation for what they were paid) in favor of market-like behavior” (p. 293). The differences 
in the definitions between the intent and the revenue have implications on the operationalization 
of the concept of commercialism. An organization has to have an intention to commercialize 
before it starts the process of commercialization to generate commercial revenue. In this sense, 
the intent to commercialize should be the antecedent of the commercial revenue.  
The way for nonprofits to commercialize is to adopt a commercialism ideology and for-
profit business management strategies (Tuckman, 1998) through embracing efficiency and cost-




benefits mentality (Froelich, 1999). The intent and strategy of commercialism bring fundamental 
changes to nonprofit organizations’ operations and practices. Powell and Owen-Smith (1998) 
explain that universities engaging in commercialized Research & Development made 
institutional arrangements to facilitate external linkages and internal administration. The 
increased hierarchy and bureaucracy of nonprofit organizations as a result of commercialism go 
against the “soul” of America’s nonprofit sector (Salamon, 2015, p. 1) by compromising the 
democracy and equity values traditional nonprofits embrace.  
The resultant changes from commercialism also manifest in human resource practices. 
Commercialized nonprofits are more instrumental and purposive and have stronger convictions 
for managerialism and professionalism (Hwang & Powell, 2009; Maier et al., 2016). Hwang and 
Powell (2009) note a decline in professionals in substantive fields (such as lawyers and doctors) 
and an increase in management professionals with administrative expertise as nonprofit 
organizations get more rationalized or commercialized. Other researchers concur that arts 
organizations favor professional managers over technical experts even though those managers 
know little about art forms, an example cited by Froelich (1999).  
Unlike professionals in substantive disciplinary areas such as lawyers, social workers, or 
medical doctors who align themselves with normative orthodoxy and who are less affected by 
environmental pressures, managerial professionals are more vigilant to environmental changes. 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) have discussed the crucial role of managerial professionals in 
disseminating the norms and standards that eventually lead to isomorphic structures and practices 
of organizations. They use their widely applicable organizational intelligence to rationalize the 
organization through socialization and diffusion (Hwang & Powell, 2009). The more managerial 
professionals diffuse the management practice and industry standards through their mobility 
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among different organizations (Hwang & Powell, 2009), the more likely an isomorphic result 
occurs: organizations within the same industry are similar in practices and organization 
structures (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
Accompanying the managerialism in commercialized nonprofits is professionalization 
through replacing volunteers with full-time staff (Maier et al., 2016). Over-professionalization is 
detrimental to the nonprofit sector because it implies “alienating people from the helping 
relationships they could establish with their neighbors and kin … by redefining basic human 
needs as ‘problems’ that only professionals can resolve” (Salamon, 1999, p. 13).  
2.3 Why occupation matters  
As a classifier for jobs, occupations reflect ability and skill attainment, earning levels, 
and socioeconomic status. The distinction of occupations makes it an interesting area in pay 
studies, such as lawyers (Weisbrod, 1983), registered nurses (King & Lewis, 2017), or 
occupation pay comparison studies (Lewis, 2018). Occupations have different structures and 
conditions, including hazards, union status, and environmental amenities (Macpherson & Hirsch, 
1995). Nonprofit jobs spread across most occupations but ten of them, including clergy, social 
service managers, health technicians, and educators, account for the majority of the nonprofit 
employment (Addison, Ozturk, & Wang, 2018; Hirsch et al., 2018; Ruhm & Borkoski, 2003).   
Scholars examined the cross-sector wage differential caused by occupations. Production, 
maintenance, and material moving workers tend to concentrate on for-profit organizations 
(Bishow & Monaco, 2016). In contrast, nonprofits employ more managers, professionals, service 
workers, and female workers (Bishow & Monaco, 2016). Controlling for these occupational 
characteristics in the nonprofit sector, studies reveal less dispersion in cross-sectoral pay 
differential (Leete, 2000; Preston, 1990b).  Particularly, nonprofit wage structure has more 
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gender pay parity, lower racial discrimination, lower gay-straight pay differences, and more 
wage equity between ranks than for-profit firms (Faulk et al., 2012; Hallock, 2002; Hirsch et al., 
2018; Leete, 2000, 2006; Lewis, 2010; Preston, 1989; Ruhm & Borkoski, 2003).  
Nonetheless, women earn less than men in both the nonprofit and for-profit sectors 
(Lanfranchi & Narcy, 2015; Leete, 2001; Macpherson & Hirsch, 1995; Preston, 1990). The 
gender pay gap gets wider with persistent “Glass Ceiling” that Gibelman (2000) defines as 
“transparent but real barriers, based on discriminatory attitudes or organizational bias, that 
impede or prevent qualified individuals, including (but not limited to) women, racial and ethnic 
minorities, and disabled persons, from advancing into management positions” (p. 251). 
Glass ceiling hides the discriminatory nature of pay because, for instance, the gender pay 
gap may appear to be caused by the difference in positions. Sampson and Moore (2008) 
document a persistent male pay advantage due to the "glass ceiling": senior management 
positions are predominantly owned by men, "women account for 47 percent of U.S. workforce 
and less than 8 percent of its top managers." Even in similar senior management positions, 
female managers earned 72 percent of male managers' salaries in 2005. Furthermore, the gender 
pay gap is larger for older workers than for younger employees (Sampson & Moore, 2008). 
The nonprofit sector experiences the same situation. In the study of fundraising 
professionals in Northeast, Sampson and Moore (2008) find that women dominate a large 
number of low-paying jobs, women earn less in the same position, fewer women get pension 
plans than men, women tend to work for smaller organizations who generally pay less than larger 
organizations, more women take their time off from the career than men mainly for reasons of 




One aspect of occupational effect on wage is the female dominance in the nonprofit 
sector (Boris & Steuerle, 2017; Faulk et al., 2012; Hirsch et al., 2018; Lanfranchi & Narcy, 2015; 
Leete, 2006; Mirvis & Hackett, 1983; Onyx & Maclean, 1996). Men and women differ in their 
preference for working conditions. Preston (1990b)  find that nonprofit wage structure largely 
explains the female dominance in the nonprofit sector. Mas and Pallais (2016) find that women, 
especially those with young children, are more likely to choose jobs with flexible schedules than 
men. The nonprofit occupation structure and job characteristics are featured with family-friendly 
practices, flexible work schedules, and sick leave, all of which are especially attractive to women 
who have more family duties (Handy et al., 2007; Mirvis & Hackett, 1983; Preston, 1990b). 
Therefore, employees might sort themselves in nonprofit jobs due to altruistic motivation 
or occupation structure in the nonprofits, as discussed previously. Alternatively, they might sort 
to nonprofits due to other reasons such as the ability. Several studies acknowledge that the 
inability to exclude ability sorting is one of their study limitations (Jones, 2015; Leete, 2001; 
Preston, 1989). Macpherson and Hirsch (1995) address this issue by explaining the composition 
effect where historical gender discrimination against women leads women to crowd into low-
paying occupations. Over time, the female proportion evolves into an ability indicator, as women 
with more ability to move out and men with less ability to move into lower-paying occupations. 
Macpherson and Hirsch (1995) argue that the female proportion on the occupation level stands 
for job preference and tastes for women, but it is an indicator of the ability of men. The study 
concludes that models without controlling female proportion might lead to biased estimates on 




Discrete industry and occupation studies produce negative, non-significant, and positive 
nonprofit wage differentials. Scholars of economy-wide studies are cautious about drawing a 
definitive conclusion by acknowledging the significant inter-industry difference in the nonprofit 
pay differential. Leete (2001) speculates that there might be several different forces leading to 
sectoral wage differential in addition to donative labor theory. Two major problems cause 
conflicts among findings. The first problem is mixing the explanatory level of theories, and the 
second is confounding the industry and occupation effects in the estimates.  
Theories on different levels have their boundaries and explain different mechanisms: 
there is no grand theory explaining whether nonprofits pay higher or lower as an aggregate of 
individual, industry, and occupation effects. Donative labor theory built on altruism explains 
individual behavior and preference. Attenuated property rights theory expounds on the 
behavioral differences between organizations that have property rights and limited property 
rights. Lastly, efficiency wage theory, a much less studied one in the nonprofit sector, predicts 
that the above-market-rate wage is helpful to save costs for organizations.  
Based on their inter-industry study results, Krueger and Summers (1988) conclude that 
“the sources of wage differentials need to be isolated” (p. 281). More importantly, these theories 
predict different results. Without articulating the level of analysis, we cannot anticipate the sign 
of the estimate of the cross-sectoral wage differential. Without disentangling effects from 
different levels, we are not clear whether the estimates stand for individual nonprofit workers, 
nonprofit organizations, or industries dominated by nonprofits.   
The second problem concerns how to appropriately control and model the effects of 
industries and occupations. Krueger and Summers (1988) argue that the combination of 
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industries and occupations is more important than other structural characteristics, such as 
location and union status. Warren (2008) highlights the relationship between industries and 
occupations: “an establishment's industry is a major determinant of its occupational composition, 
comparing for-profit and not-for-profit establishments within the same industry provide the best 
means of examining the effects of profit status on occupational staffing patterns” (p. 16). Kim 
and Charbonneau (2018) argue that cross-sector wage differentials “should be made for similar 
workers and jobs between the sectors” (p. 5). When controlling for more than 40,000 interactions 
between industries and occupations, Leete (2001) finds occupations and industries explain 
significant variation in pay. She explains that instead of the difference between nonprofit and 
for-profit sectors per se, the wage differential reflects “the public good content of the product 
produced” (p. 163).  
If industry and occupation play such an important role in cross-sector wage differentials, 
they should not just be controlled. Instead, industry and occupation should take a more active 
role as the context for cross-sectoral wage differential analysis. Although individual behavior 
offers observable convenience, individual actions are not independent of the social context 
(Friedland & Alford, 1991).  
Beyond the need to actively model the wage dispersion on industry and occupation 
levels, it is necessary to explain the dispersion. To summarize, it is compelling to consider 
multiple levels so that we can reinstitute the explanatory power of theories on different levels, 





Chapter III. Integrated Theories and Hypotheses 
As reviewed in the previous chapter, empirical evidence on whether nonprofit workers 
donate their labor to the organizations shows that nonprofit wage differentials differ by industries 
and occupations. Theories explain nonprofit wage differentials from different levels. Donative 
labor theory illustrates that altruistically motivated individuals tend to select to work for 
nonprofit organizations for lower pay (Handy & Katz, 1998; Weisbrod, 1983). Compensating 
wage theory predicts the effect of pleasant working conditions on pay between organizations or 
industries(Borjas, 2007; Smith, 1979). Efficiency wage theory explains that firms producing 
goods with less measurable qualities or organizations with larger sizes tend to pay more than 
needed to boost work morale and increase productivity (Akerlof, 1984; Krueger & Summers, 
1988). Lastly, attenuated property rights theory on the sector level differentiates the ownership of 
the organizations and their consequences. Accordingly, I develop research hypotheses based on 
different levels and then incorporate moderating effects across the individual level and industry 
level. Due to the lack of organizational-level data, I will not develop any hypothesis related to 
attenuated property rights theory. Therefore, I have three units of analysis: individual, industry, 
and occupation.   
Altruism is part of human nature, with some people being more altruistic than others 
(Piliavin & Charng, 1990). Altruists feel that they have a moral obligation or commitment to 
contributing to charitable services (Rose-Ackerman, 1996). Thus, they are more likely to engage 
in philanthropic behaviors, such as donating their labor as volunteers or donating money to the 
causes they support. Producing positive social benefits and increasing social welfare make 
altruistic individuals feel happy and satisfied (Handy et al., 2007; Preston, 1989; Weisbrod, 
1983). Cassar and Meier (2018) find that altruistic workers prefer meaningful jobs to monetary 
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rewards. Nonprofit organizations provide a space for altruistically motivated workers to 
contribute their efforts (E. Brown & Slivinski, 2018), because nonprofit missions, such as 
promoting equality and democracy, building social capital, or engaging in associations and 
advocacy, are more meaningful than for-profit jobs with the sole goal to maximize profits.  
Furthermore, nonprofit jobs seldom involve manufacturing that is characterized as 
repetitive work, fixed schedule, and rigid environment. Nonprofit jobs tend to be more service-
oriented and require frequent interactions with clients and customers, which is often refreshing 
and challenging. When nonprofit workers are able to help clients to solve their problems, the 
positive reinforcement of accomplishment can enhance their sense of competence. 
Furthermore, nonprofits are often founded by ideological entrepreneurs who have strong 
beliefs about how and to whom services should be provided (Rose-Ackerman, 1986). Scholars 
theorize that nonprofit managers might utilize the lower pay as a screening device to filter for 
intrinsically motivated workers because intrinsic motivation can guarantee nonprofit product 
quality, which is especially important in social, medical, and educational services (Handy & 
Katz, 1998; Hansmann, 1980). Managers’ screening for workers with intrinsic motivation can 
bring multiple benefits to the organization. Nonprofits can pay low salaries to them, and they still 
have a high commitment to jobs.  Self-selection of employees and selection of managers thus 
formulate a bi-directional selection, which makes employment in nonprofit organizations a valid 
proxy for altruistic motivation. Based on donative labor hypothesis,  
Hypothesis 1. Although circumstances of industries and occupations might be different, 
on average, nonprofit workers earn less than comparable for-profit workers.  
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Job amenities and working conditions are important determinants of acceptable pay for 
workers, as argued by compensating wage theory. In the dissertation, I conceptualize differences 
in working conditions to be associated with commercialism on the industry level. 
Commercialism, either defined as reliance on commercial revenue or as an attitude toward 
profit-making, implies changes in behaviors of organizations toward rationalization, efficiency, 
and cost reduction (Hwang & Powell, 2009; Maier et al., 2016). More commercialized 
organizations, or organizations in more commercialized industries, are more rationalized. They 
tend to have forward-looking strategic plans, financial audit systems, and quantitative 
performance measures (Hwang & Powell, 2009), probably clear profit-making goals as well. 
These differences can cascade to human resource management practices. Efficiency focus and 
cost-benefit mindset of commercialism (Froelich, 1999) might make the working environments 
and conditions less desirable, such as reducing family-friendly practices and the flexibility of 
work schedules. If workers are willing to pay for good working amenities, the less pleasant 
working conditions associated with commercialism will lead to their requests for higher 
compensation.  Lastly, more commercialized organizations are more likely to design the reward 
system based on extrinsic motivations (Ben-Ner et al., 2011), which might attract extrinsically 
motivated workers. As a contrast, intrinsically motivated workers who appreciate associative 
and expressive functions (Frumkin, 2002) tend to sort themselves into traditional nonprofits 
(Handy & Katz, 1998; Leete, 2000; Mirvis & Hackett, 1983; Steinberg, 1990). Even if 
altruistically motivated workers choose to work for commercialized nonprofits, they might 
require higher pay for doing things they do not like (Ben-Ner et al., 2011; Frank, 1996). 
Therefore, changed working conditions results in the effect of commercialism on pay. 
Hypothesis 2. Commercialism will increase salary.  
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Commercialism is not a dichotomous metric. It is a continuum where organizations align 
with different levels of commercialism. Nonprofits are founded to either respond to government 
failure (Weisbrod, 1988) or to materialize ideological entrepreneurs’ vision for social and 
political changes (Rose-Ackerman, 1996). In the case of government failure, nonprofits provide 
collective or redistributive goods that bear “public-good-intensive” (Leete, 2001, p.159), and 
they have a large portion of donative revenue. Other nonprofits producing private services have 
greater potential to commercialize and generate more commercial income than nonprofits 
providing public goods. Accordingly, they have more opportunities to charge for services.  
In the case of achieving social and political changes, Rose-Ackerman (1986, 1996) 
argues that ideological entrepreneurs believe certain ways are better for the clients than others. 
Due to the particular way they insist on delivering the service or on maintaining the service 
quality, they might not be willing or able to meet the demand from all clients. They have to 
select more worthy clients and put others on the waiting list rather than using price rationing 
(Rose-Ackerman, 1986, 1996; Weisbrod, 1988).   
Consequentially, nonprofit persistence of specific quality or a specific type of services 
(maybe at a higher price) and the unserved clients creates a market niche for for-profits to fill. 
For-profit firms in the same industry might provide differentiated services (possibly at a lower 
price and quality) to cater to the needs of the rest of the market (Rose-Ackerman, 1986). Or, for-
profits might charge more for a similar service for those who can afford it. Either practice will 
give for-profit organizations or industries dominated by for-profits to accumulate more financial 
slack to pay high salaries at their own discretion. In a study of nonprofit executive pay, Frumkin 
and Keating (2010) find that commercial revenue or earned income from individuals are less 
subject to monitoring because individual donors are dispersed. It is a different scenario if the 
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funding is from large donors like the United Way. The administrative cost needs to be justified, 
and fund-using is subject to close monitoring and financial reporting (Frumkin & Keating, 2010).  
In short, nonprofits in less commercialized industries should differ from nonprofits in 
more commercialized industries in aspects of their potential to generate and autonomy to 
distribute the surplus. Therefore, commercialism should moderate the sector effect on pay. 
Hypothesis 3. Commercialism raises pay, but it increases pay slower in nonprofits than 
for-profits.  
Managers and non-managerial staff are different in their cross-sectoral pay differential 
due to their proximity in producing positive social externalities (Preston, 1989). This difference 
will be further moderated by the commercialism on the industry level due to the sectoral 
composition of both sectors. Ideological managers sort themselves into nonprofits founded to 
achieve social or political commitment. Hansmann (1980) and Handy and Katz (1998) argue that 
the cunning nonprofit board of trustees can design and offer a compensation package that 
facilitates self-selection (Kreps, 1997) of nonprofit managers to attract intrinsically motivated 
and truly committed managers. Therefore, they are more likely to concentrate on industries 
dominated by nonprofits with less commercialism.   
In contrast, managerial professionals who care about extrinsic rewards will be more 
likely to work for-profit firms or commercialized nonprofits (Rose-Ackerman, 1996; Weisbrod, 
1988). Commercialized nonprofits prefer professional managers who are trained with business-
oriented skills and are good at strategic planning, identifying market niches, and designing 
measurable targets (Rose-Ackerman, 1996; Salamon, 2015). Managerial sorting, in turn, shape 
and consolidate organization objectives and missions (Hwang & Powell, 2009) and make the 
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nonprofits they lead more entrepreneurial or more ideological. Managers have a narrower cross-
sector pay gap than clerical workers. For clerical workers, studies explain that their narrower 
sectoral pay gap is because they are far from the realization of organizational goals and missions  
(Preston, 1989; Roomkin & Weisbrod, 1999), and they share fewer responsibilities than the 
managers. If this is true, then the difference in commercialism industries should have less impact 
on clerical workers than managers. In sum, the motivation sorting of managers is likely to create 
a larger pay gap between managers and non-manager staff in more commercialized nonprofits 
than traditional nonprofits.  
Hypothesis 4. Commercialism will increase the pay of managers more than non-
managerial staff. 
The gender pay gap is narrower in nonprofits than in the for-profits, everything else equal 
(Addison et al., 2018; Faulk et al., 2012; Lewis, 2018; Preston, 1990b). Due to the different 
levels of commercialism in each industry, the sectoral effect on the gender pay gap will be 
moderated by the commercialism.   
Gender pay equity is positively related to the female proportion by occupation. In 
occupations with more females, the pay gap narrows down because men endure more wage 
penalty, not because females gain in earnings (Addison et al., 2018; de Ruijter & Huffman, 2003; 
Faulk et al., 2012; Macpherson & Hirsch, 1995). Macpherson and Hirsch (1995) argue that 
occupation selection is a matter of preference for women. Handy and associates (2007) concur 
that job characteristics are good predictors for women’s job selection with nonprofits. 
The gender pay gap is narrower in the nonprofit sector than the for-profit sector (Leete, 
2000; Preston, 1990b; Ruhm & Borkoski, 2003). One reason is the female overrepresentation in 
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the nonprofit sector because featured services and occupations in the nonprofit are more suitable 
for women (Handy et al., 2007; Preston, 1990b). Another reason is related to the nonprofit values 
of "humanitarianism, charity, human rights, human well-being," which make them more likely to 
adhere to affirmative actions for employment and wage-setting (Gibelman, 2000, p. 254).  
As commercialism increases the efficiency focus and profit maximization, working 
conditions will become less pleasant. Changed working conditions might change job decisions 
for women who care about the amenities. More females might choose less commercialized 
organizations and industries that offer desirable conditions than males because women need to 
fulfill more social and familial responsibilities. Gender sorting thus leads to a compositional 
effect. Faulk et al. (2012) find that in industries dominated by nonprofits, the gender pay gap is 
narrower.  
In more commercialized organizations and industries, changed working conditions will 
trigger workers to require higher pay, as argued in the compensating wage theory. The external 
incentives and reward system in commercialized nonprofits will attract more males, whereas 
women are less responsive to monetary motivation than men (Handy et al., 2007). Therefore, 
gender concentration based on the sectoral difference depends on the industry where the 
nonprofit is located. Then, the compositional effect on pay resulting from commercialism will 
also follow.  
Hypothesis 5. Commercialism increases the pay for men more than women. 
In this chapter, I have developed hypotheses based on donative labor theory and 
commercialism effect. Altruistic motivation and labor donation are fundamental in the nonprofit 
sector. I argue that controlling for industry and occupation effects, nonprofit workers earn less 
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than for-profit workers. Compensating wage theory hinges on the working conditions. Literature 
suggests that commercialism causes changes in the behavior of organizations. Therefore, 






Chapter IV. Methodology 
The dissertation examines how contextual factors affect the pay gap between nonprofit 
workers and for-profit workers. With three units of analysis: individual, industry, and occupation, 
I apply multilevel modeling to estimate the effect of individual nonprofit status on the pay as 
well as this effect’s variability on industry and occupation levels while controlling for the state 
level and other variables. In this chapter, I first articulate the choice of cross-classified random 
effects modeling (CCREM) based on the data structure and unique features of CCREM. Then I 
describe the variables and data cleaning process. Lastly, I specify models for hypothesis testing.  
4.1 Cross-classified random effects modeling (CCREM) 
Workers are affiliated to, or nest in, certain industries and occupations. Thus, 
observations under the same industry or the same occupation are not independent due to the 
same contexts they share. With a different context of industry or occupation, comparable workers 
experience different effects. For example, the industry effects are similar for hospital workers but 
different for hospital and daycare center workers, even if workers have the same work 
experience, race, and educational attainment. In a study of five human service industries where 
“all types of organizations produce the same service, recruit employees with similar job titles, 
compete in the same labor markets, and face similar regulations,” Ben-Ner and associates (2011, 
p. 609) find that nonprofit wage differential varies across industries. Similarly, considering how 
occupations differ in human capital, such as education and vocational skills, occupation 
categories impose within-group homogeneous effects and between-group heterogeneous effects 
on workers.  
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Given the presence of clustering effects from industry and occupation levels2, ignoring 
them is problematic because it violates the assumption of independence of observations in the 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models (Bliese & Hanges, 2004; Hox, 2010; Woltman, 
Feldstain, Mackay, & Rocchi, 2012). Clustering effects imply heteroscedasticity or non-constant 
errors that are composed of errors associated with the individual level, errors associated with the 
industry level, errors associated with the occupation level, and errors associated with the state 
level.  Models that do not deal with the non-independent error suffer from aggregation bias, 
misestimated standard errors, and heterogeneity of regression3 (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). 
Scholars paying attention to the effects of the industry and the occupation apply different 
statistical approaches to these categories. Some choose one category to study (King & Lewis, 
2017; Preston, 1988; Weisbrod, 1983). Others control industry and occupation effects or 
interaction terms between the two categories (Faulk et al., 2012; Leete, 2001). Still others model 
the dispersion of inter-industry wage and how the pay on industry level differs from each other. 
Scholars constantly find, and mostly agree, that dispersion of industry wage is stable over a long 
period (Allen, 1995; Fields & Wolff, 1995; Haisken-Denew & Schmidt, 1991; Krueger & 
Summers, 1988). The following table summarizes the major approaches used to deal with 
industry effects.   
 
 
 Research Question Methods Comments 
                                                          
2 In the multilevel analysis, a level is "a design factor with random effects" (Snijders, 2005).  
3 “Heterogeneity of regression occurs when the relationships between individual characteristics and outcomes vary 
across organizations… Hierarchical linear models enable the investigator to estimate a separate set of regression 
coefficients for each organizational unit, and then to model variation among the organizations in their sets of 
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Step 2: normalize the estimated 
industry wage differentials as 
deviations from the (weighted) 
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Not considering sample 
size and number of 





    
Leete (2001) Nonprofit pay 
differential  
1. 10,432 occupation/ industry 
cells in which both sectors are 
represented – as a control 
variable in OLS; 
 
2. disaggregated analysis of 91 
three-digit industries.  
Clustered error presence 
increases Type I Error 
(de Ruijter & Huffman, 
2003; Raudenbush & 
Bryk, 2002). 
    
Faulk et al. 
(2012)  
The gender pay gap 
in the nonprofit 
sector 
HLM, 250 industries and 845 
occupations generating 16,538 
cells 
Clustered errors are 
decomposed; 
Level-2 cells are mixed 




The three methods have different purposes. Krueger and Summers (1988) seek to analyze 
the inter-industry wage dispersion. They include industry dummies in the regression model and 
then normalize the wage differentials as the deviation from the mean. Haisken-Denew and 
Schmidt (1991) comment that including sample size and the number of categories of industries 
can improve the models. Leete (2001) aims to model the nonprofit wage differential while 
controlling industry and occupation variables. Her first analysis controlled for interactions of 
industry and occupation variables, and the second analysis analyzed disaggregated industries. 
Disaggregate analysis is no different from discrete industry or occupation studies. Controlling 
interaction terms does not solve the problem of heterogeneous error terms that lead to 
inconsistent outcomes. As a result, the study shows that significant positive or negative wage 
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differentials in discrete industries sum up to an insignificant overall wage differential (Leete, 
2001). Neglecting industry effects can lead us to draw a wrong conclusion that nonprofit workers 
earn the same wages as for-profit workers even though there is a difference in pay between 
nonprofit and for-profit workers. 
Faulk and associates (2012) put the interaction of industry and occupation on Level-2 as a 
classification factor. The statistical treatment of industry and occupation decomposes the errors 
that associate with the industry-occupation cells and improves the consistency of fixed 
coefficients. However, cells combined of industries and occupations as a unit on Level-2 makes 
it impossible to separate industry effects from occupation effects.  
Hierarchical linear modeling is designed to decompose error terms associated to different 
structural-level units in clustered data, and to model random effects of Level-1variables across 
Level-2 units, with an ultimate goal to produce consistent estimates while taking non-
independent observations and random effects into consideration (Kreft & Leeuw, 1998; 
Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002; Woltman et al., 2012). The phenomenon that individual outcomes 
vary across groups is not just a methodological nuisance that we need to fix (Raudenbush & 
Bryk, 2002) because “the heterogeneity is not a technical problem but a symptom of something 
deeper” (Deaton, 2010, p. 451). Therefore, beyond a methodological fix, multilevel modeling 
also means a shift in the conceptual view on social problems in research.  
In my dissertation, groups on Level-2 include industry, occupation, and state. Individuals 
nest in industries and occupations, but industries and occupations do not nest in each other. Any 
industry includes many different occupations, and many occupations expand across different 
industries. The data structure is thus not hierarchical. Instead, industry and occupation cross-





Figure 2. Network graph 
 
 
The dissertation uses cross-classified random effects modeling (CCREM) (Beretvas, 
2008a; Hox, 2010; Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002) because CCREM can achieve the following 
analysis goals. First, it improves the estimation through properly decomposing variance 
components4 after taking into account observable characteristics of individuals, industries, 
occupations, and states. It can specify and model random effects to estimate the unobserved 
influences attributable to industries and occupations. Specifically, the random coefficient5 model 
can assess the extent to which the association between nonprofit status and annual wage varies 
                                                          
4 Variance components refer to the variances and covariances of the residual errors (Hox & Maas, 2005). They can 
be decomposed into variance within and between groups (Diez Roux, 2002).  
5 Random coefficients are allowed to vary randomly around the overall mean across higher level units, that is, are 
assumed to be realizations of values from a probability distribution (Diez Roux, 2002).  
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across industries and occupations. Thus, it can estimate the unique effects associated with 
particular industries or occupations after adjusting for explanatory variables.  
This dissertation examines how commercialism affects the cross-sector pay differential. 
In terms of nonprofit pay differential, CCREM outputs include the fixed part containing group-
invariant regression coefficients and the random part containing the group-variant residual error 
terms (Hox & Maas, 2005). The fixed effect of nonprofit wage differential is the partially6 pooled 
nonprofit pay differential in the sample, and random effects are differences of the nonprofit wage 
differential across industries and occupations (Bell & Jones, 2015; Snijders, 2005). CCREM 
estimates the consistent nonprofit wage differential by taking into account Level-2 random 
effects. Based on prevailing nonprofit pay empirical studies, random effects modeling is an 
important component in the dissertation because it can reflect the social reality that nonprofit pay 
differential varies across industries and occupations.   
The effect of commercialism on pay implicates the analysis of the contextual effects7 of 
industries. The contextual analysis allows the “simultaneous examination of how individual-level 
and group-level variables are related to individual-level outcomes” (Diez Roux, 2002, p. 588). To 
achieve this, there is a need to control for effects of occupations as another Level-2 classification 
factor and the standard list of variables on human capital and demographic information.  
In addition to levels of industry and occupation, compensation varies by state (Biggs & 
Richwine, 2014). King and Lewis (2017) find that public hospitals are more likely than nonprofit 
hospitals to concentrate in high-paying states. Furthermore, state-level legislation may affect 
                                                          
6 Standard “pooled” linear regression models assume that residuals are independently and identically distributed 
(Bell & Jones, 2015). 
7 Compositional or contextual effects occur when the aggregate of a person-level characteristic is related to the 
outcome even after controlling for the effect of individual characteristic (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002, P. 139-141). 
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industrial-level factors, such as barriers to entry and competition (Preston, 1988), and states vary 
in their economic development, which has effects on employee wages. Although there are no 
state-level predictors in this dissertation, omitting states in the model might lead to bias in the 
estimation (Leroux, 2019; Moerbeek, 2004; Tranmer & Steel, 2001; Van Den Noortgate, 
Opdenakker, & Onghena, 2005) of the nonprofit wage differential. Therefore, I put the state as a 
third cross-classifying unit to avoid potentially estimating the model parameters with bias. 
4.2 Measures 
Dependent Variable. 
The annual salary for employees is the dependent variable. Some studies use hourly 
wages (Hirsch et al., 2018). Still others use weekly wages (Ruhm & Borkoski, 2003). Since I 
only keep full-time workers who work at least 35 hours per week and 50-52 weeks per year 
(reasons to be discussed later), using hourly income or annual income is just a difference in the 
unit. So, I use annual salary and control for work hours per week. Because I use pooled cross-
sectional data in 13 years, the annual salary is converted to constant dollars based on the 
Consumer Price Index in 2016.  According to human capital theory, earning is a function of 
investment in ability measured by education and experience. Mincer (1958) found that the ability 
effect on earning is multiplicative rather than additive. Thus, earning is transformed to the 
natural logarithm. 
Independent Variables. 
Commercialism is a measure on the industry level. With a focus on profit-making and 
cost-reduction, organizations in an industry with more commercialism behave differently from 
organizations in another industry with less commercialism. The degree of commercialism is thus 
a contextual effect. I propose four measures for commercialism.  
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For-profit share of workers. It is the percentage of for-profit workers by industry from 
ACS 2005-2016 and Census 2000 data8. Industries dominated by profit-making organizations 
will have more focus on efficiency. In contrast, industries dominated by nonprofit organizations 
have less efficiency focus and gravitate toward producing positive social externalities (Frumkin, 
2002; Leete, 2001; Preston, 1989; Salamon, 1999).  
 The other three measures are generated from the Internal Revenue Services' (IRS) 
Statistics of Income (SOI) database. SOI data is the organization-level data for nonprofit 
organizations with detailed revenue and expense information in discrete lines. But it does not 
have individual-level information.  
Commercialism can be defined as results of commercializing behavior – relying on 
commercial revenue (James, 1998), measured by the percentage of commercial revenue or the 
percentage of program service revenue. Commercial revenue of nonprofits stands for the 
conventional and classical measure of nonprofit commercialization (Child, 2010; Kerlin & 
Pollak, 2011; Tuckman, 1998; Weisbrod, 1998b).  The Benefits Theory explains that nonprofit 
organizations providing public benefits rely more on donative revenue, and those providing 
private benefits rely more on commercial revenue (Fischer et al., 2011; Young, 2017). As such, 
the percentage of revenue from different sources functions to measure the nature of the goods or 
services that nonprofits produce (Chang & Tuckman, 1996). 
Commercial revenue.  The percentage of commercial revenue is the aggregated 
commercial revenue divided by the total revenue on the industry level (Child, 2010). I aggregate 
industry-level data in SOI data from 2000 to 2012. SOI data have somewhat different variables 
                                                          
8 The data is pooled cross-sectional data. To check if there are trends in the for-profit share, I generated a variable 
trend: (𝑓𝑝𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒2016 − 𝑓𝑝𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒2000)/(
𝑓𝑝𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒2000+𝑓𝑝𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒2016
2
). Testing trend variable in the model shows it is not 
significant (Model 4 in Appendix C). I dropped the trend variable. 
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before and after 2008. Since 2008, there are more detailed categories of commercial revenue 
information such as royalties, tax-exempt bonds, income from gaming, and the total number of 
volunteers. These categories do not exist before 2008. Following Kerlin and Pollak (2011), 
commercial revenue only includes program service revenue (prior year), investment income 
(prior year), gross rents, gross sales of inventory, and dues and assessments from members9. 
Unrelated business income is not considered because it is only around one percent or less in the 
aggregated total revenue. 
Using revenue percentage to measure commercialism assumes the complementary 
relationship of donative revenue and earned income revenue. While some empirical studies find 
negative relationships between donative revenue and commercial revenue in human service 
organizations (Guo, 2006), substantial debates prevail on whether the two sources crowd in or 
crowd out each other (Tinkelman & Neely, 2018). Using a vector autoregression model, 
Weisbrod (1998a) finds that when the nonprofit goal is to cross-subsidize, commercial revenue 
will crowd out donative revenue. However, when the nonprofit goal is to maximize profits, 
commercial revenue will crowd in donative revenue, such as in universities and hospitals. If 
crowd-in happens, the revenue percentage may not be a good measure because the source of the 
increased percentage is mixed. 
Program Service Revenue (PSR). It is the aggregated PSR divided by the total revenue 
on the industry level. Classification of nonprofit revenue streams is notoriously confusing 
because the financial data collection tool is designed for tax purposes rather than economic 
analysis purposes. For instance, the purpose and mechanism of government grants are different 
from that of government contracts in their implications on the organization's behavior, but they 
                                                          
9 https://nccs-data.urban.org/dd2.php?close=1&form=SOI+2012+990+c3  
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are not differentiated in the financial data. Government grants aim for the development of 
recipient organizations, whereas government contracts require service delivery and performance 
indicators (Salamon, 2002). So, government contracts involve market behavior more than 
government grants. As a comparison to commercial revenue, program service revenue (PSR) 
only includes fees and service charges and hence has a better-defined scope of revenue and 
becomes an alternative measure for commercializing results (Child, 2010; Foster & Bradach, 
2005). Furthermore, PSR provides a more direct indication of the exchange of services, such as 
the scenario where hospitals depend on Medicare or Medicaid and education nonprofits rely on 
Head Start programs (Rose-Ackerman, 1996). Activities involving market exchange may push 
nonprofits to adopt business-like approaches, which is related to the change of organization 
behaviors. 
Fundraising Efforts. An additional measure is the aggregated fundraising expense 
divided by the total expenses on the industry level. Commercialism can also be conceptualized as 
the intention, defined by dictionaries. An intention to commercialize is an antecedent of the 
commercialization outcome associated with commercial revenue. Thus, the level of efforts 
invested in revenue-generating strategies might be a better indicator of organization behaviors. If 
an organization prioritizes generating revenue from commercial sources, it is less likely to divert 
a lot of efforts to a conflicting strategy for generating donative revenue through fundraising. The 
expense of fundraising inversely indicates the nonprofit’s intention to commercialize.  
Fundraising cost is one of the three categories of expenses together with program expense 
and administrative expense (Hager, 2003; Krishnan, Yetman, & Yetman, 2006). The ratio of 
expenses has an important implication on nonprofits' efficiency and effectiveness to the eye of 
donors and stakeholders. High ratios of fundraising expense and administrative expenses are not 
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desirable, but a high ratio of program expense is desirable because of their relationship with 
efficiency. Therefore, nonprofits have the incentive to report lower fundraising costs. 
Researchers continuously find empirical evidence of lower reporting of fundraising costs 
because lower fundraising ratio implies higher fundraising efficiency (Krishnan et al., 2006; 
Lecy & Searing, 2015). Underreported fundraising cost ratio might lead to overestimating the 
commercialism contextual effects in nonprofits. Therefore, there are pros and cons to each of the 
four measures for commercialism.  
Nonprofit. In Census and ACS data, the variable “class of worker” have seven categories 
including self-employed, unpaid family workers, federal, state and local government workers, 
private worker, and nonprofit worker. I have kept categories of private workers and nonprofit 
categories for analysis.  
Occupation type.  I code occupation type in three categories with the white-collar 
workers as the reference category. “Managerial professional” refers to the OCC1990 category of 
executive, administrative, and managerial occupations under the three-digit occupation 
classification of 003-022. OCC1990 023-391 are coded as “white-collar workers,” including 
categories of management-related occupations, professional specialty occupations, technical, 
sales, and administrative support occupations. OCC1990 405-890 are coded as “blue-collar 
workers,” including service occupations, farming, forestry, and fishing occupations, precision 
production, craft, and repair occupations, and operators, fabricators, and laborers. 
Female. It is a dummy variable with female coded as 1 and male coded as 0.  
Control Variables. 
Age and work experience. Learning and experience are a function of time measured by 
age. Age also reflects the trajectory of biological development (Mincer, 1958). Work experience 
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is operationalized as age minus six then minus years of education.  Due to their perfect 
collinearity, work experience is used because it is a better predictor than age for compensation 
study. The models also include work experience squared because wage results from diminishing 
returns to work experience as the work experience increases.  
Education years. The education attainment variable in ACS data is a variable in 24 
categories with each category corresponding to certain years, and I recode it to be a continuous 
variable in years.  
Work hours per week. It is a variable reported as usual hours worked per week in Census 
2000 and ACS. 
Race. It is a categorical variable coded in five dummy variables: White, Black, Latino, 
Asian, and other races. White is the reference group.   
English ability level. The variable is recoded into an ordinal-level variable and treated as 
an interval-level variable:  1. Does not speak English; 2. Yes, but not well; 3. Yes, speak well; 4. 
Yes, speak only English.  
Fem_pct. It is the percentage of females by occupation. The female percentage is a proxy 
for unmeasured or unobserved personal ability and preference to adjust for estimation bias.  
Volunteer. It is the natural log of the total number of volunteers by industry. Information 
of volunteers comes from the only question on the IRS 990-form: “total number of volunteers 
(estimate if necessary).” Volunteers are important to the nonprofit sector. Many researchers 
discuss how commercialism might lead to the replacement of volunteers (Lundström, 2001; 
Maier et al., 2016; Salamon, 1999). However, the information on volunteers is not very reliable 
due to the fluid definition of volunteer work (Bania & Leete, 2018). The volunteer variable only 
exists in 2008 and later.  
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Table 1. Variables 
 Variables Operationalization 
Dependent 
variable  
Wage  Natural log of annual salary in constant dollars based on 
CPI in 2016 
Levels  Individual-level  
Industry-level  38 categories 
Occupation-level 308 categories 









(1) fpshare: For-profit share of workers by industry 
(2) commprop: Percentage of commercial revenue in 
total revenue 
(3) psrprop: Percentage of PSR in total revenue 
(4) fndrs_efft: Percentage of fundraising expense in 
total expense 
Level-1:  
Nonprofit Nonprofit=1, for-profit= 0 
Female Female=1, male = 0 











Percentage of females by occupation  
Level-1:  
Years of education  Numeric (0 – 20) 
Work experience Equal to age – education years – 6, and then squared  
Work hours per week Numeric (35-99) 
English ability level 1-4 from low to high  
Race 
 
Dummy variables: White, Black, Latino, Asian, and 
Other, White is the reference group 
White-collar worker Yes=1, no= 0 




Data used in the dissertation come from two sources. First, pooled cross-sectional data 
from the 5% Public Use Microdata Sample of the Census 2000, plus the American Community 
Survey (ACS) from 2005 to 2016, provides comprehensive information on individuals, 
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industries, and occupations. The ACS is a mandatory survey collecting data from one-twelfth of 
the sample each month. It covers 3,141 counties in the 50 states, DC, and Puerto Rico 
(“American Community Survey Design and Methodology,” 2009). Between the years 2001-
2004, ACS was tested only in 36 selected counties and did not include group quarters population, 
covering only 800,000 addresses rather than 3 million in the full implementation.   
Second, Statistics of Income (SOI) from the National Center for Charitable Statistics 
(NCCS) serves as the complementary dataset providing finance and revenue information for 
alternative measures of commercialism. SOI data are only collected from the annual filing of 
990-form of nonprofit organizations. SOI data has better accuracy, but it oversamples large 
organizations (Kerlin & Pollak, 2011). I use the information on the industry level. So, the 
problem might not be as serious as used on the organizational level analysis.  Since all SOI 
information is from nonprofit organizations, I only use measures generated from SOI for the 
subset of data for nonprofit workers.   
Data cleaning and summary for ACS. 
Government employees are dropped because the focus of the study is on the difference in 
pay between nonprofit and for-profit workers. Individuals with missing and imputed data on all 
relevant variables are dropped, as Census Bureau’s imputation process assumes all sectors pay 
equally, which might level off the wage differentials between the two sectors (Bollinger, Hirsch, 
Hokayem, & Ziliak, forthcoming).    
I restrict the analysis to full-time workers aged 16-65 who work 35 hours or above per 
week (Hirsch et al., 2018) and 50-52 weeks10 per year. The restriction to full-time workers is 
critical to my hypothesis of altruistic motivation. Part-time workers might have several different 
                                                          
10 Weeks of working per year is in 7 categories: n/a, 1-13 weeks, 14-26 weeks, 27-39 weeks, 40-47 weeks, 48-49 
weeks, and 50-52 weeks. 
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jobs. If these jobs are from both nonprofit organizations and for-profit organizations, their 
multiple job holding will make their altruistic motivation ambiguous. In addition, it is likely that 
part-time employees have a different pension, fringe benefits, insurance plans, etc., from full-
time employees. Different packages of non-wage benefits might increase or decrease the reported 
annual income. It is unknown whether part-time workers require higher pay because of the 
absence of fringe benefits or whether employers employ part-time workers just because they 
want to reduce the cost of fringe benefits. Cut-off at 35 hours per week and 50-52 weeks per year 
may reduce but cannot exclude the difference in benefit packages across sectors. Studies find that 
part of the negative nonprofit wage differential is due to fewer hours of nonprofit workers 
(Preston, 1990a; Ruhm & Borkoski, 2003). So, I control for hours of working per week. 
Industries, occupations, and states are the Level-2 classification factors. ACS “indnaics” 
variable has a list of 268 industries11 in major categories of agriculture, forestry, fishing and 
hunting (with first 2 digits of 11), mining (first 2 digits of 21), utilities (22), construction (23), 
manufacturing (31-33), wholesale trade (42), retail trade (44-45), transportation and warehousing 
(48), information and communications (51), finance, insurance, real estates (52-53), professional, 
scientific, management, administrative, and wage management services (54-56), educational, 
health and social services (61-62), art, entertainment, recreation, accommodations and food 
services (71-72),  other services (except public administration) (81), public administration (92), 
activity duty military (92), and unemployed (99). Except for 92, nonprofit represents in all 
industries.  “indnaics” starting with 813 are pure nonprofit industries with no presence of for-
profits, including religious organizations, labor unions, and civic, social, advocacy organizations 
                                                          
11 IPUMS code for the industry. https://usa.ipums.org/usa/volii/indcross03.shtml 
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and grantmaking and giving services. Excluding categories starting with 813, 92, and 99 still 
leaves more than 200 categories of industries.  
This industry list is much longer than the list from SOI data under the NAICS12 code.  It 
raises the question if all observations classified as nonprofit workers in ACS really work for 
nonprofit organizations. For example, the industry code starting with “3” is an extensive list 
indicating “manufacturing,” and there is no corresponding list of such categories in the SOI data. 
Leete (2006) reports potential misreporting of individual workers that they might not be clear 
about their employer’s incorporation status.  
Nonprofit is the tax-exempt status granted to organizations. SOI is extracted from the IRS 
990 forms filed by organizations based on their tax-exempt status. So, the industry list from SOI 
should be more reliable than the self-reporting list from ACS. I use the SOI list to match the ACS 
list.   
The NAICS code in SOI dataset is more standard following six-digit rule than the ACS 
list with various digits combining with alphabetic letters. The first two digits in the 93 categories 
in the SOI are 11, 22, 48, 51, 52, 54, 61, 62, 71, 81. This list from SOI is a lot more detailed but 
not completely corresponding to the ACS list. So, I compare the two lists and try to match as 
many digits as I can. During matching, I also read the industry title to make sure the 
correspondence between SOI and ACS lists. Some industries from ACS are combined to match 
                                                          
12 1. “NAICS is based on a production-oriented concept, meaning that it groups establishments into industries 
according to the similarity in the processes used to produce goods or services.” It was developed for statistical 
purposes to classify “business establishments for the collection, tabulation, presentation, and analysis of statistical 
data describing the U.S. economy” (U.S. Census Bureau, 2017). 2. The first two digits designate the economic 
sector, the third digit designates the subsector, the fourth digit designates the industry group, the fifth digit 
designates the NAICS industry, and the sixth digit designates the national industry. The 5-digit NAICS code is the 
level at which there is comparability in code and definitions for most of the NAICS sectors across the three countries 
participating in NAICS (the United States, Canada, and Mexico). The 6-digit level allows for the United States, 
Canada, and Mexico each to have country-specific detail. More details see https://www.naics.com/what-is-a-
naics-code-why-do-i-need-one/   
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the SOI list, and some SOI categories are combined to match ACS (Table 26 for details). 
Eventually, 58 ACS categories were combined into 38 analysis categories, and major 
combinations are for utilities, 6 categories into 1, and transportations, 9 categories into 1. The 
histogram of the log of income shows that the data were heavily left-skewed by a few 
observations. The skewness can distort the post-estimation residual diagnosis. I left truncated 








The process leads to the final dataset with 3,017,110 observations nested in 38 industry 
categories and 308 occupations in 50 states and DC. Twenty-two percent of them are nonprofit 
workers, and 78 percent are for-profit workers (see Appendix A for dropped observations). 
Table 2 shows that the size of industries and occupations is very different. In the sample, 
the average industry size for the nonprofit is 17,491, much smaller than that for for-profits. 
Similarly, the average occupation size for nonprofits is also smaller.  Comparatively speaking, 
state difference is not as obvious as industries and occupations.  
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics: observations in Level-2 categories 
  
Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Industry categories (38) Nonprofit  17,491 39,226 274 226,694 
 
For-profit 61,907 75,669 871 293,501 
 
Total  79,398 97,646 3,868 479,007 
      
Occupations (308)  Nonprofit  2,158 6,287 1 78,309 
 
For-profit 10,082 15,981 2 115,120 
 
Total  9,796 20,715 4 193,429 
      
State (51) Nonprofit  13,032 13,538 1,129 57,935 
 
For-profit  46,127 50,634 3,026 248,182 
 
Total  59,159 63,514 4,575 306,100 
 
 
Nonprofits concentrate in several narrowly defined industries. Eleven industries that 




Figure 4. Sector composition of industries 
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The hospital industry (6220) alone employs 34% of nonprofit workers. Elementary and 
secondary schools (6111) and colleges and universities (6112) employ another 23% of nonprofit 
workforce, followed by individual and family services (6241), outpatient care centers (6214), 
nursing facilities and hospices (6231), other health care services (6219), daycare centers (6244), 
insurance providers (5241), credit unions (5221), and research institutes (5417). More 




Figure 5. Market share of workers by industry  
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Figure 5 shows the market share of labor in each sector. Industries with high nonprofit 
share are generally small except for hospitals, elementary and secondary schools, and higher 
education. Seven industries with 50 percent of nonprofit share are community food and housing 
(6242), museums and art galleries (7121), individual and family services (6241), vocational 
counseling and job training (6243), elementary and secondary school (6111), two-year college 
and higher education (6112), and recreational and vacation camps (7212). More than half of the 
industries have an industry share of nonprofits under 20%. 
The list for occupation categories has 320 categories in ACS data, not including the 
unknown and unemployment categories. After dropping industries with only for-profit or 
nonprofit and occupations with only males or females, there left 308 occupation categories.  
Fourteen occupations with 10,000 nonprofit workers or above employ 52 percent of the 
total nonprofit workforce, including registered nurses, primary school teachers, subject 
instructors, managers, social workers, physicians, accountants. In terms of the proportion of 
nonprofit workers by occupation, 18 occupations have more than half of nonprofit share by 
occupation, including archivists and curators, clergy and religious workers, librarians, welfare 
service aides, secondary school teachers, social workers, managers, subject instructors, primary 
school teachers, psychologist, among others. Most nonprofit-dominated occupations have very 
high female representation. Thirty of them have 50 percent of female workers or more.   
Data cleaning and summary for SOI. 
In her economy-wide study, Leete (2001) has used the share of donative revenue 
(including donation and government grants) for a sample limited to corresponding industries, on 
the grounds that  
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public-good-intensive organizations might be expected to receive both more public 
support of their operations as well as more labor donations. Thus, one might expect the 
share of the revenue from public sources (donations and government grants) to be related 
to donations of labor, (Leete, 2001, p. 159)   
but she finds little support for the donative labor hypothesis.  
Measures generated from SOI data are more pertinent to nonprofit workers than for-profit 
workers because the revenue and expenditure information only comes from the nonprofit part of 
the industry. Without information from the for-profit part of the industry, the denominators of the 
revenue proportion or expenditure proportion will be distorted to measure the whole industry. 
Table 3 shows the correlation of variables for all observations, and Table 4 is for nonprofit 
workers. Based on nonprofit literature, fundraising is negatively related to commercial revenue. 
Therefore, the relationship of annual income with the percentage of commercial revenue and 
percentage of PSR should also have an opposite sign with the relationship between income and 
fundraising efforts. Only Table (4) shows this relationship. The evidence informs my decision to 
subset nonprofit workers for measures generated from SOI data.  
 
 
Table 3. Pairwise correlations for all data 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
(1) natural log of annual income 1.000 
(2) for-profit share of workers 0.101* 1.000 
(3) % commercial revenue -0.036* -0.098* 1.000 
(4) % program service revenue -0.008* -0.216* 0.801* 1.000 
(5) % fundraising expense -0.057* -0.355* -0.409* -0.400* 1.000 
(6) natural log of volunteer total  -0.072* -0.754* 0.200* 0.169* 0.292* 1.000 
* shows significance at the .01 level 
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Table 4. Pairwise correlations for nonprofit worker data 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
(1) natural log of annual income 1.000 
(2) for-profit share of workers 0.022* 1.000 
(3) % commercial revenue 0.079* 0.353* 1.000 
(4) % program service revenue 0.100* 0.261* 0.911* 1.000 
(5) % fundraising expense -0.101* -0.496* -0.707* -0.704* 1.000 
(6) natural log of volunteer total  0.098* -0.662* -0.008* 0.039* 0.104* 1.000 
* shows significance at the .01 level 
 
 
Descriptive statistics.  
Table (5) shows the descriptive statistics of the data with full-time workers in the 
dissertation. It includes more female workers than male workers. The nonprofit sector employs 
68% female workers. Consistent with previous studies (Hirsch et al., 2018), the nonprofit sector 
employs more managerial professionals and white-collar workers than the for-profit sector. 
Managerial professionals are more likely to work for nonprofits, whereas blue-collar workers are 
less likely to work for nonprofits than for-profits. Nonprofit workers have more education and 
work experience and work fewer hours per week than for-profit workers. Whites are more likely, 
whereas Blacks, Latinos, and Asians are less likely to work for nonprofits than for-profits.  
  
Table 5. Descriptive statistics: demographic information across sectors 
 
Nonprofit 
(n = 664,646) 
For-profit 
(n = 2,352,464) 
Total 
(n = 3,017,110) 
Male  32% 44% 41% 
Female  68% 56% 59% 
Managerial professional 16% 14% 15% 
White-collar worker 70% 62% 63% 
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Blue-collar worker 14% 24% 22% 
Years of education 15.47 14.40 14.63 
Age  44.21 42.24 42.68 
Work experience 22.74 21.84 22.04 
Work hours per week 43.20 43.99 43.81 
White  80% 75% 76% 
Black  8% 9% 9% 
Latino  6% 9% 9% 
Asian  5% 5% 5% 
Other race 2% 2% 2% 
 
Table (6) shows the correlation of key variables. All variables are significant at the 0.01 
level.  The strongest correlation 0.549 is between males on the individual level and female 
percentage on the occupation level, followed by nonprofit on the individual level and for-profit 
share on the industry level. In the order of importance, years of education, work hours, male, and 
the female percentage have the highest impacts on the annual income.
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Table 6. Pairwise correlations (Total observation: 3, 017,110)  
Variables Mean  Std. Dev (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 (1) annual income (log) 10.83 0.71 1.000 
 (2) nonprofit 0.22 0.41 0.001* 1.000 
 (3) male 0.41 0.49 0.265* -0.105* 1.000 
 (4) years of education 14.63 2.51 0.463* 0.178* 0.070* 1.000 
 (5) speak English 3.94 0.30 0.127* 0.048* -0.021* 0.208* 1.000 
 (6) work experience 22.04 11.83 0.085* 0.031* -0.000 -0.259* -0.072* 1.000 
 (7) experience squared 139.94 139.20 -0.197* -0.011* -0.033* -0.113* -0.034* -0.009* 1.000 
 (8) work hours 43.81 8.07 0.305* -0.040* 0.223* 0.154* 0.034* -0.014* -0.049* 1.000 
 (9) for-profit share 0.78 0.22 0.101* -0.532* 0.202* -0.180* -0.032* 0.001 -0.012* 0.088* 1.000 
(10) female percentage 0.59 0.27 -0.241* 0.153* -0.549* 0.001 0.032* -0.027* 0.034* -0.247* -0.311* 1.000 
  * shows significance at the .01 level  
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4.4 Model Building and Analysis Steps 
The analysis comprises four steps: linearity and normality checking; theory and 
hypotheses testing; residual diagnosis, and sensitivity analysis.  
Cross-classified random effects modeling (CCREM) assumes multivariate normality and 
linearity. After cleaning the data, several variables need transformation. Annual income is 
transformed into the natural logarithm format. One thing to notice is the bump on the right side 
(Figure 3). The reason lies with the top-coded income (Table 7). Otherwise, the bump should 
dilute in the long tail on the right, and the distribution should look more normal.   
 
Table 7. Distribution of top-coded income by year 
Year 
Top-code of 
income in constant dollar # of nonprofit # of for-profit 
2000 385,000 536,777 0 4 
2005 629,000 773,041 1 81 
2006 645,000 767,815 5 69 
2007 666,000 770,951 5 73 
2008 651,000 725,712 4 91 
2009 641,000 717,058 7 90 
2010 569,000 626,380 0 12 
2011 607,000 647,589 1 12 
2012 635,000 663,803 6 99 
2013 660,000 688,058 1 15 
2014 642,000 650,860 4 116 
2015 658,000 666,315 8 116 




I use Locally Weighted Scatterplot smoothing (LOESS) to check the linearity of variables 
of for-profit share or workers, female percentage, and work experience. The LOESS smoothing 
(Jacoby, 2000) makes no assumption on the relationship of variables except for tracing the 
dependence of annual income on the market share. The for-profit share of workers is not strictly 
linear with the annual income (Appendix H).  In industries with lower market share and 
comparatively fewer workers, it is a little curvilinear. Industries with higher for-profit share are 
also large industries where it shows a more linear relationship. I checked in a model with a 
quadratic form of market share (Model 3 in Appendix C). It was not significant.  So, I treated the 
market share as linear. 
Graphing female percentage by occupation in relation to annual earnings shows a slightly 
curvilinear relationship in segments of percentage between 20 percent and 40 percent (Appendix 
I), but the two ends display a negative relationship with the income. To make sure that my visual 
judgment is correct, I tested the squared term of female percentage in a model (Model 2 in 
Appendix C). The model shows that the squared term is not significant.     
Appendix J shows an apparent and consistent quadratic relationship between work 
experience and the annual income, no matter whether it is in the for-profit or nonprofit sector and 
whether it is for males and females. Therefore, all models include work experience and its square 
term.  
Models. 
The model building follows the conventional multilevel modeling process. Unconditional 
models decomposing variance components can inform and justify the use of multilevel 
modeling. Based on the results of unconditional models, I run random intercept models with only 
fixed coefficients to understand the proportional reduction in between-group variance by the 
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variables on Level-1 and Level-2. Then I run random coefficient models, and cross-level 
interaction models to test hypotheses. The subscript notation follows Beretvas (2008b), using 
subscript i for individual, and subscripts j1, j2, and j3 for industry, occupation, and state, 
respectively. Having j1, j2, and j3 in the parentheses has the advantage to emphasize the parallel 
relationship of Level-2 factors, rather than the perception of hierarchical relationships such as 
subscripts j, k, and l.  
4.4.1 Unconditional models13. The equation for Level-1: 
 𝑌𝑖(𝑗1,𝑗2,𝑗3) = 𝛽0(𝑗1,𝑗2,𝑗3) + 𝑒𝑖(𝑗1,𝑗2,𝑗3), (1) 
 
Where  
𝑌𝑖(𝑗1,𝑗2,𝑗3) is the natural log salary for person i in industry j1, occupation j2, and 
state j3;  
𝛽0(𝑗1,𝑗2,𝑗3) is the mean salary for workers in any combination of industry, 
occupation, and state;  
𝑒𝑖(𝑗1,𝑗2,𝑗3) is the unique effect associated with person i in a certain combination of 
industry, occupation, and state. We assume 𝑒𝑖(𝑗1,𝑗2,𝑗3)~𝑁(0, 𝜎
2).  
The variability in earnings can be attributable to industry, occupation, and state. The 
equation for Level-2: 
                                                          
13 It is called one-way ANOVA model. It is a random effects model because the group effects are construed as 
random. It produces a point estimate and confidence interval for the grand mean. More importantly, it provides 
information about the outcome variability at different levels (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002).  
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 𝛽0(𝑗1,𝑗2,𝑗3) = 𝛾0000 + 𝑢0(𝑗1 ) + 𝑢0( 𝑗2) + 𝑢0(𝑗3) 
𝑢0(𝑗1)~𝑁(𝑜, 𝜏0(𝑗1)), 
𝑢0(𝑗2)~𝑁(𝑜, 𝜏0(𝑗2)), 
𝑢0( 𝑗3)~𝑁(𝑜, 𝜏0(𝑗3)), 
(2) 
Where  
𝛾0000 is the grand mean salary of groups combined of industry, occupation, and 
state;  
𝑢0(𝑗1), 𝑢0(𝑗2), and 𝑢0(𝑗3) is the random/unique main effect of industry j1, 
occupation j2, and state j3 on income, respectively.  
Combined model: 
 𝑌𝑖(𝑗1,𝑗2,𝑗3) = 𝛾0000 + 𝑢0(𝑗1) + 𝑢0( 𝑗2) + 𝑢0(𝑗3) + 𝑒𝑖(𝑗1,𝑗2,𝑗3), (3) 
 
Accordingly, there are different kinds of intra-unit correlation coefficients (IUCC). The 
dissertation focuses on the IUCC for industries and occupations.  
1) Correlation between workers in the same industry but in a different occupation 
and state. 
 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑌𝑖(𝑗1,𝑗2,𝑗3), 𝑌𝑖′(𝑗1′,𝑗2,𝑗3)) =  𝜌𝑗1 =  
𝜏0(𝑗1)




2) Correlation between workers in the same occupation but in a different industry 
and state. 
 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑌𝑖(𝑗1,𝑗2,𝑗3), 𝑌𝑖′(𝑗,𝑗2′,𝑗3) =  𝜌𝑗2 =  
𝜏0(𝑗2)






4.4.2 Models for measure 1, the for-profit share of workers. 
Researchers recommend centering to avoid potential multicollinearity due to cross-level 
interactions and to ensure numerical stability in estimating multilevel models (Enders & Tofighi, 
2007; Kreft et al., 1995; McCoach, 2010; Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). Centering can also render 
the intercept more meaningful and facilitate result interpretation because it avoids the impossible 
values in the dataset, such as 0 percentage of for-profit labor. Except for the dependent variable, 
all Level-1 variables are grand-mean-centered. The grand-mean, in this case, is the mean of all 
observations within a combination of industry, occupation, and state. This way of centering 
measures how individual income deviates from the group combination of industry, occupation, 
and state. The for-profit share of workers by industry and the female percentage by occupation 
on Level-2 are also grand-mean-centered. Thus, Level-2 variables measure the contextual effect 
of for-profit share and femaleness. Commercialism measured as for-profit share models how the 
annual income changes if a person (of the same for-profit status) moves from one industry to 
another with a different for-profit share, holding constant individual sector status. Similarly, the 
female percentage measures how one’s income changes from one occupation to another due to 
the different female percentage in these occupations holding constant individual gender status. 
After centering, the mean for each independent variable is close to 0 but not 0 because it takes 
into consideration the group size by taking the mean of the group mean. 
 
Table 8. Descriptive statistics (centered), (Total observations: 3,017,110) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Natural log of annual income 10.83 0.71 8.00 13.56 
Nonprofit  -0.03 0.41 -0.25 0.75 
Female  0.06 0.49 -0.53 0.47 
Market share by industry 0.78 0.22 -0.63 0.23 
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Female percentage by occupation 0.19 0.27 -0.38 0.59 
White  -0.02 0.43 -0.78 0.22 
Black  0.00 0.28 -0.09 0.91 
Latino  0.01 0.28 -0.07 0.93 
Asian  0.02 0.22 -0.04 0.96 
Other race -0.01 0.14 -0.03 0.97 
Managers  0.06 0.35 -0.09 0.91 
White-collar workers  0.03 0.48 -0.61 0.39 
Blue-collar workers  -0.09 0.41 -0.31 0.69 
Work experience  -0.24 11.83 -28.29 36.71 
Experience squared 1.40 1.39 0.00 13.48 
Years of education 0.31 2.51 -14.32 5.68 
Work hours 0.49 7.72 -8.00 55.00 
English speaking level  -0.02 0.14 -2.00 0.00 
 
 
(1) To test Hypothesis 1 that nonprofit workers earn less than for-profit workers on average, I 
use a random slope model (equations 6 and 7) to partial out the random variation of nonprofit 
pay differential on industry and occupation levels. The nonprofit pay coefficient 𝛽1(𝑗1,𝑗2,𝑗3) is 
specified to have a probability distribution on industry and occupation levels (equation 7). 
The coefficient 𝛾1000 in equation (7) is thus the partially pooled nonprofit wage differential 
showing that on average, whether nonprofit workers earn more or less than the for-profit 
workers. To test Hypotheses 2 of commercialism effects on pay, I need to control all Level-1 
variables (equation 6), the female percentage by occupation, and state effects. The coefficient 








 𝑌𝑖(𝑗1,𝑗2,𝑗3) = 𝛽0(𝑗1,𝑗2,𝑗3) + 𝛽1(𝑗1,𝑗2,𝑗3)𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖(𝑗1,𝑗2,𝑗3) +
𝛽2(𝑗1,𝑗2,𝑘3)𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖(𝑗1,𝑗2,𝑗3) + ∑ 𝛽𝑛(𝑗1,𝑗2,𝑗3)𝑋𝑛𝑖(𝑗1,𝑗2,𝑗3)
11




Level-2 equation:   
 𝛽0(𝑗1,𝑗2,𝑗3) = 𝛾0000 + 𝛾0100𝑓𝑝𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑗1 + 𝛾0200𝑓𝑒𝑚_𝑝𝑐𝑡𝑗2 + 𝑟0(𝑗1) + 𝑟0(𝑗2)
+ 𝑟0(𝑗3) 
𝛽1(𝑗1,𝑗2,𝑗3) = 𝛾1000 + 𝑟1(𝑗1) + 𝑟1(𝑗2) 
𝛽2(𝑗1𝑗2,𝑗3) = 𝛾2000 
𝛽3(𝑗1𝑗2,𝑗3) = 𝛾3000 
⋮ 
𝛽11(𝑗1,𝑗2,𝑗3) = 𝛾11000 
(7) 
Where  
𝑟0(𝑗1) and 𝑟1(𝑗1) are residuals of the random intercept and random slope on the industry 
level;  
𝑟0(𝑗2) and 𝑟1(𝑗2) are residuals of the random intercept and random slope on the occupation 
level; 
𝑟0(𝑗3) is the residual of random intercept on the state level; 
X is a vector for control variables, including gender, years of education, work experience, 




(2) To test Hypothesis 3, the Level-1 equation (6) remains the same, and the Level-2 
equation is specified in equation (8). It shows how the Level-2 variable commercialism 
moderates the nonprofit wage differential. The coefficient 𝛾1100 is for Hypothesis 3. 
Level-2 equation:  
 𝛽0(𝑗1,𝑗2,𝑗3) = 𝛾0000 + 𝛾0100𝑓𝑝𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑗1 + 𝛾0200𝑓𝑒𝑚_𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑗2 + 𝑟0(𝑗1) + 𝑟0(𝑗2)
+ 𝑟0(𝑗3) 
𝛽1(𝑗1,𝑗2,𝑗3) = 𝛾1000 + 𝛾1100𝑓𝑝𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑗1 + 𝑟1(𝑗1) + 𝑟1(𝑗2) 
𝛽2(𝑗1𝑗2,𝑗3) = 𝛾2000 
𝛽3(𝑗1𝑗2,𝑗3) = 𝛾3000 
⋮ 
𝛽11(𝑗1,𝑗2,𝑗3) = 𝛾11000 
(8) 
 
(3) To test Hypothesis 4 that commercialism increases the manager-staff pay gap, the Level-1 
equation is equation (9) by adding interaction between nonprofit and occupation type to 
equation (6). The Level-2 equation is specified in equation (10). The coefficients of 𝛾12100 
and 𝛾
13100
 in equation (10) are for hypothesis 3, showing the three-way interaction between 




 𝑌𝑖(𝑗1,𝑗2,𝑗3) = 𝛽0(𝑗1,𝑗2,𝑗3) + 𝛽1(𝑗1,𝑗2,𝑗3)𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖(𝑗1,𝑗2,𝑗3) +
𝛽2(𝑗1,𝑗2,𝑗3)𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖(𝑗1,𝑗2,𝑗3) + ∑ 𝛽𝑛(𝑗1,𝑗2,𝑗3)𝑋𝑛𝑖(𝑗1,𝑗2,𝑗3)
11
𝑛=3 +
𝛽12(𝑗1,𝑗2,𝑗3)𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖(𝑗1,𝑗2,𝑗3) ∗ 𝑚𝑛𝑔𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖(𝑗1,𝑗2,𝑗3) +




Level-2 equation:  
 𝛽0(𝑗1,𝑗2,𝑗3) = 𝛾0000 + 𝛾0100𝑓𝑝𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑗1 + 𝑟0(𝑗1) + 𝑟0(𝑗2) + 𝑟0(𝑗3) 
𝛽1(𝑗1,𝑗2,𝑗3) = 𝛾1000 + 𝑟1(𝑗1) + 𝑟1(𝑗2) 
𝛽2(𝑗1𝑗2,𝑗3) = 𝛾2000 
𝛽3(𝑗1𝑗2,𝑗3) = 𝛾3000 
⋮ 
𝛽11(𝑗1,𝑗2,𝑗3) = 𝛾11000 
𝛽12(𝑗1,𝑗2,𝑗3) = 𝛾12000 + 𝛾12100𝑓𝑝𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑗1  
𝛽13(𝑗1,𝑗2,𝑗3) = 𝛾13000 + 𝛾13100𝑓𝑝𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑗1 
(10) 
 
 (4) To test Hypotheses 5 that commercialism increases the gender pay gap, I add interaction 
between nonprofit and female (equation 11). The Level-2 equation is specified in equation 
(12). The coefficient of 𝛾14100 is for Hypothesis 5.   




  𝑌𝑖(𝑗1,𝑗2,𝑗3) = 𝛽0(𝑗1,𝑗2,𝑗3) + 𝛽1(𝑗1,𝑗2,𝑗3)𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖(𝑗1,𝑗2,𝑗3) +
𝛽2(𝑗1,𝑗2,𝑗3)𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖(𝑗1,𝑗2,𝑗3) + ∑ 𝛽𝑛(𝑗1,𝑗2,𝑗3)𝑋𝑛𝑖(𝑗1,𝑗2,𝑗3)
11
𝑛=3 +




Level-2 equation:  
 𝛽0(𝑗1,𝑗2,𝑗3) = 𝛾0000 + 𝛾0100𝑓𝑝𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑗1 + 𝛾0200𝑓𝑒𝑚_𝑝𝑐𝑡𝑗2 + 𝑟0(𝑗1) + 𝑟0(𝑗2)
+ 𝑟0(𝑗3) 
𝛽1(𝑗1,𝑗2,𝑗3) = 𝛾1000 + 𝑟1(𝑗1) + 𝑟1(𝑗2) 
𝛽2(𝑗1𝑗2,𝑗3) = 𝛾2000 
𝛽3(𝑗1𝑗2,𝑗3) = 𝛾3000 
⋮ 
𝛽11(𝑗1,𝑗2,𝑗3) = 𝛾11000 
𝛽14(𝑗1,𝑗2,𝑗3) = 𝛾14000 + 𝛾14100𝑓𝑝𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑗1  
(12) 
4.4.3 Models for measures 2-4: percentage of commercial revenue, percentage of program 
service revenue, and fundraising efforts.  
The dataset used in this part of the analysis is restricted to nonprofit workers based on the 
correlation table information as well as previous study findings (Leete, 2001). With the subset of 
data, I slightly revise models by deleting the nonprofit variable. Therefore, models in this part do 
not tell the sectoral pay differential. Rather, they are random intercept models testing if 
commercialism increases the annual earnings of nonprofit employees and if commercialism 
increases the manager-staff pay gap and the gender pay gap in the nonprofit sector. 
4.4.4 Sensitivity analysis:  
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I have done two sets of sensitivity analyses to test if the estimate for nonprofit wage 
differential is consistent and robust. The first set is altering the structures on level-2, including 
modeling nonprofit random slope on the interaction level of industry and occupation, and the 
state level. The industry-occupation interaction level is used because there might be a correlation 
between industries and occupations. For instance, physicians are more likely to appear in the 
hospital industry than other industries like vocational training or public utilities; the subject 
instructor occupation is more likely to appear in universities or colleges than credit unions. 
Besides, previous research used industry-occupation interactions in other modeling approaches 
(Faulk et al., 2012; Leete, 2001). The state-level is meant for control, and no empirical evidence 
suggests that the sectoral pay differential varies across the state level. So, I do not plan to run 
random slope models on the state level for hypothesis testing, but I do it as part of the sensitivity 
test to make sure it does not bring dramatic changes to the fixed coefficient.     
The second set is altering datasets. The first comparison dataset is Census 2000 because it 
is for one year and with the sample size larger than other single-year data. The second 
comparison dataset is the overall dataset but dropping hospitals and higher education industries 
based on the advice from Kerlin and Pollak (2011) and Foster and Bradach (2005). They argue 
that these two industries have long, stable, and high-level commercial revenue with a long 
history, which makes them outliers. In the third comparison dataset, I use the original 58 industry 





 Chapter V. Analysis and Results 
This chapter presents the analysis and modeling results based on model specifications in 
Chapter Four. I present my findings in the following order: variance components, hypothesis 
testing, assumption checking, sensitivity analysis, and random effects for nonprofit wage 
differential. I used the “lme4” package in R (Bates et al., 2018; Roberts & Bates, 2010). Cross-
classified models are conceptually straightforward, but its computation is demanding. Roberts 
and Bates (2010) introduce that “lme4” utilizes sparse matrix theory and Cholesky 
decomposition to solve the problem of memory and time needed for computing.  All models use 
Restricted Maximum Likelihood14 (REML) parameter estimation strategy (Beretvas, 2008a; 
McCoach, 2010) because REML estimates of variance components adjust for uncertainty in 
fixed effect estimates (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). So, it can better handle the unbalanced data: 
the size of the industry in the dataset ranges from 3,868 to 479,007 with a mean of 79,398, and 
the size of the occupation ranges from 4 to 193,429 with a mean of 9,796 (Table 2). Output 
tables are formatted through the stargazer package (Hlavac, 2018). 
5.1 Intra Unit Correlation Coefficients (IUCC) 
Multilevel modeling starts with the unconditional model with no predictors to analyze the 
variance between the groups. By decomposing variance components, the unconditional model 
produces “a point estimate and confidence interval for the grand means” (Raudenbush & Bryk, 
2002, p. 24) on different levels or groups (industry, occupation, and state). The IUCC is the ratio 
                                                          
14 In multilevel models, “the distribution of Y [the dependent variable] is assumed to be normal, with a mean 
depending on the regression coefficients and a dispersion depending on the variance components. These are the 
parameters that are estimated by the corresponding technique, which is simply called maximum likelihood, but 
sometimes also full maximum likelihood. Alternatively, we can apply the principle of maximum likelihood to the 
least-squares residuals. This is known as restricted or residual maximum likelihood, or REML. It means we first 
remove the effect of the fixed variables: remember that the residuals are uncorrelated with all the fixed variables in 
the model. The distribution of the residuals is also normal, because computing residuals from Y just involves taking 
weighted sums. But the distribution of the residuals no longer depends on the estimates of the fixed effects, it only 
depends on the variance components” (Kreft & Leeuw, 1998, pp 131-133). 
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of the between-group variability to the total variability based on the unconditional model 
(Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). A large IUCC means that groups are very heterogeneous and group 
effects are salient and cannot be ignored. Thus, IUCC can inform whether multilevel modeling is 
justified.  
To understand the outcome variability on different levels, I ran unconditional models 
with different combinations of Level-2 factors (Table 9). The constant is the grand mean of log 
of annual income. Estimated as an optimally weighted average of the sample means from Level-
2 units, the grand mean is the weighted least squares estimate for the mean salary of Level-2 unit 
combinations. The IUCC in the square brackets is the proportion of variance in the outcome 
explained on different levels, holding other levels constant.  
 
Table 9. Unconditional Models 
 Variance and proportion on each unit 











Industry × Year      
0.03563 
[7.77%] 














Residual  0.4340116 0.3086 0.29543 0.28486 0.28377 
Constant 10.725*** 10.727*** 10.634*** 10.589*** 10.586*** 
 (223.039) (464.072) (288.649) (269.161) (388.870) 
                                                          
15 This is “parameter variance”: the variance of the true group salary around the grand mean. 
16 This is “error variance.” 
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Observations 3,017,110 3,017,110 3,017,110 3,017,110 3,017,110 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 6,044,203 5,017,487 4,885,728 4,776,157 4,767,070 
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 6,044,242 5,017,526 4,885,780 4,776,222 4,767,135 
Note: 
1.*p**p***p<0.01;  
2. IUCC in square brackets;  
3. T-statistics in parentheses. 
 
The observations in the dataset nest in 38 industries, 308 occupations, and 50 states and 
the District of Columbia. Accordingly, there are variance and residuals from each of the three 
sources. Model (1) uses the industry as the Level-2 factor. It shows that 17 percent of the 
variability in annual earnings is attributable to industries without including any predictors. The 
0.08784 is the variance on the industry level, quantifying the heterogeneity of industry mean 
wages. Thus, the standard deviation of the industry sample mean is 0.3017, which means the 
industry with the highest mean salary is expected to be 11.3118, equivalent to $81,634. The 
industry with the lowest estimated mean salary is 10.1419, equivalent to $25,336. Therefore, 
industries are very different in their average salaries. 
Similarly, Model (2) with the occupation as the Level-2 factor shows that occupation 
explains 35 percent of the variance in the annual income. The occupation with the highest mean 
salary is estimated to be 11.52, and the lowest-paying occupation is 9.94, with a difference of 
$79,768 annually. Model (3), with the industry and occupation as identifiers on the Level-2, 
shows that variability on the industry level is reduced by 9 percentage points, and variability on 
the occupation level is reduced by 6 percentage points. It indicates that some occupations are 
                                                          
17 √0.08784 
18 10.725 + 1.96 × √0.08784 
19 10.725 − 1.96 × √0.08784 
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more likely to appear in some industries than others. Comparing Models (1) to (3) suggests that 
neglecting either industry or occupation will result in spurious effects (Beretvas, 2008b). Model 
(4) adds states to the Level-2. The 3 percent variance associated with the state indicates that 
partialling out the variance on the industry and occupation levels, the annual income of 
employees varies across states but not very much. The pure state effect between the highest-
paying state and the lowest-paying state is $17,646. Also, the state as the additional factor has 
very little effect on the variability on industry and occupation levels. Despite the small variance, 
Model (4) provides a better fit based on the information criteria20. The dataset is pooled from 13 
years. There might be the possibility that the industry changes in these many years. Model (5) 
performs a safety check whether the time is related to the variability of the annual income, and 
the result shows that the time effect is negligible. Therefore, Model (4) with industry, 
occupation, and state on Level-2 is selected as the base model for the following models.   
Based on Model (4), the weighted least squares estimate for the grand-mean salary is 
10.589 ($39,396) conditional on the between-group (industry, occupation, state) effects. Given 
the variance of 0.3353 on the industry level, the range of the estimated industry mean salary is 
between 10.23 and 10.9521 after partialling out the variability on occupation and state levels. The 
variance of 0.12664 on the occupation level suggests that the range of the occupation mean 
salary is estimated to be between 9.89 and 11.2922 , holding industry and state effects constant. 
                                                          
20 Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) provides a means for model selection. AIC estimates the relative amount of 
information lost by a given model: the less information a model loses, the higher the quality of that model. In 
estimating the amount of information lost by a model, AIC deals with the trade-off between the goodness of fit of 
the model and the parsimony of the model. Both Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC) and AIC attempt to resolve 
this problem by introducing a penalty term for the number of parameters in the model; the penalty term is larger in 
BIC than in AIC (Burnham & Anderson, 2004). 
21 10.589 ± 1.96 ∗  √0.03353  
22 10.589 ± 1.96 ∗  √0.12664 
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Similarly, excluding industry and occupation effect, the state mean salary is estimated to be 
between 10.37 and 10.8123.  
5.2 Hypotheses Testing: Measure 1 (for-profit share of workers) 
The first measure for commercialism is the for-profit share of workers computed based 
on Census 2000 and 2005-2016 ACS. To test hypotheses 1 and 2, I first assessed how much 
variance is reduced by Level-2 variables (Model 6), and how much is reduced by the full model 
with all Level-1 variables (Model 8). The reduced proportion of variance measures how well the 
predictors explain the outcome, just like R2 in OLS models. Then, the random slope (or random 
coefficient) of the nonprofit is added on industry and occupation levels to test the two 
hypotheses. The random slope is not considered on the state level because no empirical evidence 
indicates nonprofit wage differential variability on the state level, and the unconditional model 
shows that overall variability on the state level is limited.  
Testing Hypothesis 1. 
In fitting the models, I multiplied for-profit share of workers and the female percentage 
by 100 to facilitate interpretation. I also rescaled experience squared by dividing 100. All 
nominal-level variables are dummy coded.  
Level-2 variables in Model (6) reduce the variance by 20 percent24 on the industry level 
and 2 percent25 on the occupation level. It means that for-profit share accounts for some 
variability on the industry level, but the female percentage variable barely explains occupation 
variability despite its statistical significance. Level-1 variables reduce the variance by 28 percent 
on the industry level and 56 percent on the occupation level (Model 7). So, variability on the 
                                                          
23 10.589 ± 1.96 ∗ √0.01265 
24 (0.03353 – 0.02683) / 0.03353 
25 (0.12664 – 0.12395) / 0.12664 
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occupation is more related to individual-level variables. All variables on both levels explain 50 
percent26 of industry variability and 57 percent27 of occupation variability.  
Effects of nonprofit as altruistic motivation (Hypothesis 1). 
To test the hypothesis that nonprofit full-time workers earn less than for-profit full-time 
workers, one can ignore or include variability of the nonprofit wage differential on the industry 
and occupation levels. Models (6) to (8) are random intercept models assuming that no predictors 
randomly vary on industry and occupation levels.  
Alternatively, Model (9), the random slope model, specifies nonprofit to vary across 
industries and occupations based on existing empirical findings (Handy & Katz, 1998; King & 
Lewis, 2017; Leete, 2001; Preston, 1988; Ruhm & Borkoski, 2003; Weisbrod, 1983). It estimates 
the random effects of nonprofit wage differential, which means that the nonprofit wage 
differential is different across industries and occupations. Other variables might also vary across 
industries and occupations, but due to the parsimonious caution on the model convergence as 
well as the theoretical interest of nonprofit, other variables are constrained to the mean in the 
model.  
Model (8) and Model (9) are the same except for the random effects of nonprofit. The 
constant 10.682 in Model (8) is the estimated annual income for a person with an average 
condition on all variables after removing group differences of industry, occupation, and state. 
Model (8) assumes all variables have constant and common effects in all industries, occupations, 
and states (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). For instance, women earn 19 percent less than 
comparable men, and an additional year in education increases annual salary by 7 percent in all 
                                                          
26 (0.03353 - 0.01661) / 0.03353 
27 (0.12664 - 0.05426) / 0.12664 
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industries, occupations, and states. In other words, it assumes all industries and occupations are 
not different in the effects of the predictors.  
Under this assumption, nonprofit workers earn 0.2 percent more than comparable for-
profit workers. The result is consistent with previous economy-wide studies (Hirsch et al., 2018; 
Leete, 2001; Ruhm & Borkoski, 2003). However, it is not consistent with other studies. Studies 
on discrete industries (Ben-Ner et al., 2011; Holtmann & Idson, 1993; Mocan & Tekin, 2003; 
Preston, 1988) or occupations (King & Lewis, 2017; Preston, 1989; Weisbrod, 1983) find 
divergent results of nonprofit wage differentials. Leete (2001) also makes it clear that nonprofit 
wage differential varies across industries. 
 
Table 10. Testing Hypotheses 1 and 2. 
 Natural log of annual income 
Fixed effects part (6) (7) (8) (9) 
For-profit share of workers  0.003***  0.004*** 0.003*** 
 (3.199)  (4.213) (3.537) 
Female percentage -0.002***  -0.001 -0.001 
 (-2.678)  (-1.521) (-1.445) 
Nonprofit   0.002*** 0.002*** -0.057*** 
  (2.868) (2.891) (-3.893) 
Female   -0.187*** -0.187*** -0.185*** 
  (-276.110) (-276.068) (-272.933) 
Years of education  0.073*** 0.073*** 0.073*** 
  (469.254) (469.262) (468.674) 
Latino   -0.065*** -0.065*** -0.063*** 
  (-58.415) (-58.414) (-57.061) 
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Black   -0.095*** -0.095*** -0.093*** 
  (-92.223) (-92.220) (-90.402) 
Asian   -0.030*** -0.030*** -0.029*** 
  (-22.175) (-22.173) (-21.799) 
Other races  -0.067*** -0.067*** -0.066*** 
  (-32.827) (-32.827) (-32.353) 
Speak English  0.046*** 0.046*** 0.045*** 
  (44.992) (44.993) (44.654) 
Work experience   0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 
  (448.688) (448.690) (449.153) 
Work experience squared  -0.053*** -0.053*** -0.053*** 
  (-267.027) (-267.026) (-266.867) 
Work hours per week  0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 
  (345.043) (345.041) (342.442) 
Constant 10.590*** 10.682*** 10.682*** 10.673*** 
 (286.868) (331.190) (368.283) (374.288) 
Random effects part Variance  
Industry (Intercept)  0.02683 0.02413 0.01661 0.015718 
Nonprofit    0.006896 
Occupation (Intercept) 0.12395 0.05456 0.05426 0.052737 
Nonprofit    0.005739 
State (intercept) 0.01265 0.01140 0.01140 0.011391 
Residual  0.28486 0.22603 0.22603 0.225067 
Observations 3,017,110 3,017,110 3,017,110 3,017,110 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 4,776,169 4,078,156 4,078,169 4,066,108 





Thus, the assumption that nonprofit wage differential is constant across industries and 
occupations is questionable. Model (9)28 specifies the nonprofit coefficient to randomly vary over  
Level-2 industries and occupations without the attempt to predict this variation (Raudenbush & 
Bryk, 2002, p. 26).  
In Model (9), both the intercept and slope of nonprofit vary randomly across industries 
and occupations. The random effects of nonprofit wage differential are illustrated as fixed 
effects29 in addition to its random variation on industry and occupation levels. The fixed effects 
and random effects for nonprofit are expressed in equation (7) from Chapter 4: 𝛽1(𝑗1,𝑗2,𝑗3) =
𝛾1000 + 𝑟1(𝑗1) + 𝑟1(𝑗2), which means that the nonprofit wage differential is composed of group-
invariant effect 𝛾1000, industry-variant effects 𝑟1(𝑗1), and occupation-variant effects 𝑟1(𝑗2). 
Untangling the fixed coefficient and random effects makes it possible to develop a theoretical 
understanding of nonprofit pay. 
Corresponding to my theoretical argument and hypothesis, the group-invariant effect 
refers to the donative labor effect because altruistic motivation is part of human nature. Altruistic 
workers tend to select to work for nonprofits. Group-variant effects are effects caused by 
industries and occupations. Model (9) shows that the donative labor effect leads nonprofit 
workers to earn 5.530 percent less than the comparable for-profit workers partialling out the 
industry effect and occupation effect. The negative 5.5 percent translates into a difference of 
                                                          
28 To check if random slope improves model fitting, I performed a Chi-squared test. The result suggests that having 
random slope of nonprofit in the model significantly reduces the residual sum of squares (Appendix F). 
29 “The label fixed effects is reserved for multilevel modeling estimates that are constant across L2 units, and the 
label random effects is used to denote the model estimates that vary across L2 units” (Aguinis, Gottfredson, & 
Culpepper, 2013, p. 1497). 
30 (𝑒−0.057 − 1) × 100 
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$2,392 annually. The result confirms Hypothesis 1, where nonprofit workers donate their labor to 
the employer by accepting lower pay due to their altruistic motivation.  
The random effects part in Table (10) displays the variance components. In Model (8), 
0.01661 is the variance of intercept, meaning that after controlling for all variables, occupation, 
and state effects, wage dispersion on the industry level follows a probability distribution with a 
mean of 0 and variance of 0.01661. Similarly, wage dispersion on the occupation level follows a 
probability distribution with a mean of 0 and a variance of 0.05426 after controlling all other 
variables in the model. In comparison, Model (9) has a random intercept with a mean of 0 and a 
variance of 0.015718, representing the dispersion of industry mean salaries excluding occupation 
and state effects.  Model (9) produces random slopes of nonprofit with mean of 0 and variance of 
0.006896 on the industry level, representing the variability of cross-sector wage differential on 
the industry level after controlling for the fixed part, occupation, and state effects. Similarly, on 
the occupation level, the variability of the intercept is 0.052373, and the variability of the 
nonprofit slope is 0.005739. The random effects for nonprofit range across industries and 
occupations, and they are best illustrated through plotting. I elaborate on the random effects after 
completing all hypothesis tests. 
Testing Hypothesis 2. 
Hypothesis 2 examines the effect of commercialism (the industry-level variable) on pay 
(the individual-level variable). The first measure of commercialism, the percentage of for-profit 
workers by industry, is derived mathematically as a compositional effect (Diez Roux, 2002)  in 
contrast to other measures of commercialism. Compositional effect means that the group-level 
variable adds “incremental prediction to an individual outcome,” above the beyond the 
individual-level predictors (Hofmann & Gavin, 1998).  
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Coefficients for Level-2 variables are quite similar in Model (8) and Model (9). The for-
profit share of workers measures commercialism and efficiency. The coefficients show that more 
commercialized industries pay higher than less commercialized ones. As the for-profit share of 
workers increases by 1 percentage point, the income increases by 0.3 percent31 (Model 9), which 
is around $129. In the dataset, the range of for-profit market share is 85.63 percentage points. 
The expected difference in average salary between industries with the highest and lowest of the 
for-profit share of workers is $10,47532 , holding other variables constant. The results confirm 
Hypothesis 2, where commercialism increases workers’ annual income. By being in an industry 
with a higher for-profit share of workers, one can earn more than a comparable peer in an 
industry with a lower for-profit share of workers. 
Testing Hypothesis 3. 
Hypothesis 3 examines the cross-level interaction effect of whether commercialism 
explains the variability of nonprofit pay differential on the industry level. A cross-level 
interaction occurs “when the random slope of a level-1 predictor is predicted by a level-2 
predictor” (Preacher, Curran, & Bauer, 2006, p. 441). The cross-level interaction can only apply 
when the random effects of nonprofit are present. If the variance of nonprofit slopes (0.006896 in 
Model 9) were not different from zero, cross-level interaction should not be conducted (Aguinis, 
Gottfredson, & Culpepper, 2013). Therefore, the model is also built based on Model (9) of 
random coefficients. Equation (13) combines equations (6) and (8), and the coefficient 𝛾1100 is 
                                                          
31 (𝑒0.003 − 1) × 100 
32 The range for market share after centering ranges from -62.79 to 22.84. Therefore, the difference is  
𝑒10.673+22.84×0.003 − 𝑒10.673−62.79×0.003 
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what needs to test hypothesis 3. The focal variable is nonprofit differential, and the moderator is 
commercialism.  
 𝑌𝑖(𝑗1,𝑗2,𝑗3) = 𝛾0000 + 𝛾0100𝑓𝑝𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑗1 + 𝛾0200𝑓𝑒𝑚_𝑝𝑐𝑡𝑗2
+ 𝛾1000𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖(𝑗1,𝑗2,𝑗3)
+ 𝛾1100𝑓𝑝𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑗1𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖(𝑗1,𝑗2,𝑗3)
+ 𝛽2(𝑗1,𝑗2,𝑘3)𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖(𝑗1,𝑗2,𝑗3) + ∑ 𝛽𝑛(𝑗1,𝑗2,𝑗3)𝑋𝑛𝑖(𝑗1,𝑗2,𝑗3)
11
𝑛=3
+ (𝑟1(𝑗1) + 𝑟1(𝑗2))𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖(𝑗1,𝑗2,𝑗3) + 𝑟0(𝑗1) + 𝑟0(𝑗2) + 𝑟0(𝑗3)
+ 𝑒𝑖(𝑗1,𝑗2,𝑗3) 
(13) 
On Level-2, each industry has a specific random intercept and a random slope. Random 
slopes of nonprofit on the industry and occupation levels show that for each industry and 
occupation, the nonprofit wage differential is different after controlling all variables and Level-2 
factors. The random intercepts are the unexplained but explicit parts on the corresponding levels 
to demonstrate the inter-industry and inter-occupation wage differentials (Aguinis et al., 2013).  
The cross-level interaction indicates that the industry pay advantage for nonprofits 
depends on the for-profit share of workers. In Model (10), a 1 percentage point increase in 
commercialism increases the annual pay by 0.3 percent for for-profit workers, but the increase 
for nonprofit workers is only 0.2 percent. In other words, in nonprofit dominant industries, 
nonprofits have industry pay advantage, and in for-profit dominant industries, for-profits have 
industry pay advantage. 
Based on the hypothesis, organizations in nonprofit dominant industries are less likely to 
generate a surplus from commercial revenue than for-profits dominant industries. Due to the 
concern of social goal and service quality, nonprofit organizations charge less for services than 
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for-profits. In addition, nonprofits face more scrutiny and less autonomy than nonprofits in 
disposing of the surplus. All of these contribute to the differentiated effect of commercialism on 
pay between for-profit and nonprofit.     
 
Table 11. Testing Hypothesis 3 
Fixed effects part  
Natural log of annual income 
(10) 
For-profit share of workers  0.003*** 
 (3.890) 
Nonprofit  -0.057*** 
 (-4.099) 
Female percentage by occupation -0.001 
 (-1.447) 
Female  -0.185*** 
 (-272.933) 
Years of education  0.073*** 
 (468.672) 
Latino  -0.063*** 
 (-57.059) 
Black  -0.093*** 
 (-90.399) 
Asian  -0.029*** 
 (-21.798) 
Other races -0.066*** 
 (-32.352) 




Work experience  0.011*** 
 (449.154) 
Work experience squared -0.053*** 
 (-266.867) 
Work hours per week 0.013*** 
 (342.442) 




Random effects part Variance  
Industry (Intercept)  0.015671 
Nonprofit 0.006122 
Occupation (Intercept) 0.052733 
Nonprofit 0.005735 
State (intercept) 0.011388 
Residual  0.225067 
Observations 3,017,110 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 4,066,118 
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 4,066,415 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses *p**p***p<0.01 
 
Testing Hypothesis 4. 
Hypothesis 4 examines the moderating effect of commercialism on the manager-staff pay 
gap. It is expected that commercialism increases the pay of managers more than non-managerial 
staff. The models are built based on Model (9) with random intercepts on the state, industry, and 
occupation levels, and random slopes of nonprofit on industry and occupation levels.  
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In Model (11), managerial professionals earn 22 percent more than white-collar workers 
and 46 percent more than blue-collar workers, holding other variables and Level-2 variability 
constant. Model (12) shows that the pay gap between managers and non-managerial staff is 
narrower than the for-profit sector, although it is not statistically significant. This result does not 
contradict previous findings that managers donate more than other workers in the nonprofit 
sector (clerical workers in Preston, 1989). The reason is that industry and occupation differences 
have been removed from the fixed coefficient estimate in Model (12).   
Model (13) explores a variety of scenarios among occupation type (manager, white-collar 
worker, blue-collar worker), sector difference, and commercialism effect. The manager is the 
focal variable (Jaccard & Turrisi, 2003), nonprofit is the first-order moderator, and 
commercialism is the second-order moderator. Although minimal, the moderating effects of 
commercialism on the occupation pay gap and sectoral-occupation pay gap are significant. 
The first-order moderating effects show that the nonprofit pay is more equitable (though 
not significant) because the high-earning managers get less pay (-0.017), and the low-earning 
blue-collar workers get more pay (0.011) in the nonprofit sector than the for-profit sector. The 
second-order moderating effects, that is, the commercialism effects, show that in more 
commercialized industries, nonprofit managers get even lower pay (-0.0003), and nonprofit blue-
collar workers get even higher pay (0.001). It means that the sectoral wage gap for managers is 
larger than the sectoral wage gap for blue-collar workers in more commercialized industries.   
 
  
Table 12. Testing hypothesis 4 
 Natural log of annual income 
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Fixed effects part (11) (12) (13) 
For-profit share of workers  0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (3.538) (3.537) (3.951) 
Nonprofit  -0.058*** -0.059*** -0.058*** 
 (-3.999) (-4.055) (-4.254) 
Manager 0.220*** 0.224*** 0.223*** 
 (3.744) (3.684) (3.676) 
Blue-collar worker -0.243*** -0.248*** -0.244*** 
 (-9.586) (-9.632) (-9.480) 
Female  -0.185*** -0.185*** -0.185*** 
 (-272.947) (-272.942) (-272.826) 
Female percentage by occupation -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 (-6.377) (-6.379) (-6.368) 
Years of education  0.073*** 0.073*** 0.073*** 
 (468.590) (468.589) (468.362) 
Latino  -0.063*** -0.063*** -0.063*** 
 (-57.057) (-57.055) (-56.996) 
Black  -0.093*** -0.093*** -0.093*** 
 (-90.395) (-90.394) (-90.374) 
Asian  -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.029*** 
 (-21.794) (-21.796) (-21.808) 
Other races  -0.066*** -0.066*** -0.066*** 
 (-32.352) (-32.352) (-32.352) 
Speak English 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.045*** 
 (44.647) (44.641) (44.445) 
Work experience  0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 
 (449.153) (449.152) (448.933) 
Work experience squared  -0.053*** -0.053*** -0.053*** 
 (-266.866) (-266.868) (-266.876) 
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Work hours per week 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 
 (342.437) (342.438) (342.449) 
For-profit share of workers × nonprofit   -0.001** 
   (-2.276) 
For-profit share of workers × manager   -0.0005*** 
   (-7.217) 
Nonprofit × manager  -0.005 -0.017 
  (-0.212) (-0.695) 
For-profit share of workers × blue-collar   -0.0003*** 
   (-5.685) 
Nonprofit × blue-collar  0.012 0.011 
  (1.111) (0.977) 
For-profit share of workers × nonprofit × manager   -0.0003** 
   (-2.317) 
For-profit share of workers × nonprofit × blue-collar   0.001*** 
   (5.223) 
Constant 10.725*** 10.726*** 10.726*** 
 (382.494) (382.250) (382.584) 
Random effects part Variance   
Industry (Intercept)  0.015712 0.015712 0.015653 
Nonprofit 0.006909 0.006907 0.005972 
Occupation (Intercept) 0.037703 0.037714 0.037756 
Nonprofit 0.005742 0.005762 0.005800 
State (intercept) 0.011392 0.011389 0.011391 
Residual  0.225067 0.225067 0.225058 
Observations 3,017,110 3,017,110 3,017,110 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 4,066,020 4,066,035 4,066,990 




To facilitate the understanding of the coefficients, I graph three scenarios: low market 
share, medium market share, and high market share of for-profit workers (Figure 6). 
Commercialism increases the wage for all three groups, but the increasing rates for managers and 
white-collar workers are lower than that for blue-collar workers. The differing effect leads to a 
larger sector pay gap for managers and white-collar workers in for-profit dominant industries. 
Therefore, Hypothesis 4, commercialism increases the pay of managers more than for non-
managerial workers is not supported. 
Two potential explanations might account for the disagreement between the hypothesis 
and findings. The tax-exempt status of nonprofits does not allow exorbitant salaries (Hallock, 
2000; Hansmann, 1980). Managers are a high-earning group, and the increase in their salary is 
more sensitive than blue-collar and white-collar workers in nonprofit organizations. The other 
reason might relate to the donate labor theory. Even in for-profit dominant industries where 
managerial professionals are more valued, altruistically motivated managers might choose to 




Figure 6. Commercialism effect on occupation types 
 
Testing Hypothesis 5. 
Hypothesis 5 examines the moderating effect of commercialism on the gender pay gap in 
both sectors. It is expected to increase the pay of men more than women. The correlation 
coefficients in Table (6) suggest a composition effect of gender pay in the nonprofit sector. 
Nonprofit is negatively related to male (-0.105) and positively related to the female percentage 
(0.153), which means men are less likely to be nonprofit workers and nonprofits have larger 
female worker populations. Furthermore, commercialism is negatively related to the female 
percentage (-0.311). 
The models are also built based on Model (9) with the same random intercepts and 
random slopes. Overall, females earn 19 percent less than comparable males (Model 9). A 
supplementary analysis33 of gender random effects on both industry and occupation levels shows 
that some industries and occupations are more women-friendly than others. However, due to the 
large size of the fixed coefficient of females, even in women-friendly industries and occupations, 
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women still earn less than men. Model (14) shows that the gender pay gap is smaller in the 
nonprofit sector by 7 percentage points than the for-profit sector. In Model (15) of the three-way 
interaction, the focal variable is female, the first order moderator is nonprofit, and the second-
order moderator is commercialism. The first-order moderating effect shows more gender-pay 
equity in the nonprofit sector (0.039). The second-order moderating effect shows that in more 
commercialized industries, gender equity in nonprofit is strengthened (0.001). Furthermore, 
women in more commercialized industries are paid less than less commercialized industries.  
 
Table 13. Testing hypothesis 5 
 Natural log of annual income  
Fixed effects part (9) (14) (15) 
For-profit share of workers 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (3.537) (3.597) (4.028) 
Female percentage -0.001 -0.001** -0.001** 
 (-1.445) (-2.217) (-2.129) 
Nonprofit  -0.057*** -0.054*** -0.051*** 
 (-3.893) (-3.760) (-3.687) 
Female  -0.185*** -0.183*** -0.173*** 
 (-272.933) (-269.322) (-214.237) 
Years of education  0.073*** 0.073*** 0.073*** 
 (468.674) (467.849) (466.470) 
Latino  -0.063*** -0.063*** -0.063*** 
 (-57.061) (-57.133) (-57.234) 
Black  -0.093*** -0.093*** -0.092*** 
 (-90.402) (-90.203) (-89.762) 
Asian  -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.028*** 
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 (-21.799) (-21.681) (-21.142) 
Other races  -0.066*** -0.065*** -0.065*** 
 (-32.353) (-32.248) (-32.095) 
Speak English  0.045*** 0.045*** 0.046*** 
 (44.654) (44.703) (44.952) 
Work experience  0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 
 (449.153) (449.437) (449.442) 
Work experience squared -0.053*** -0.053*** -0.053*** 
 (-266.867) (-267.199) (-267.573) 
Work hours per week 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 
 (342.442) (341.999) (341.448) 
For-profit share of workers × nonprofit   -0.001** 
   (-2.391) 
For-profit share of workers × female   -0.002*** 
   (-51.135) 
Nonprofit × female  0.074*** 0.039*** 
  (46.178) (18.376) 
For-profit share of workers × nonprofit × female   0.001*** 
   (16.166) 
Constant 10.673*** 10.672*** 10.670*** 
 (374.288) (374.360) (374.942) 
Random effects part Variance  
Industry (Intercept)  0.015718 0.015704 0.015594 
Nonprofit 0.006896 0.006578 0.005992 
Occupation (Intercept) 0.052737 0.052813 0.052851 
Nonprofit 0.005739 0.006171 0.006003 
State (intercept) 0.011391 0.011376 0.011368 
Residual  0.225067 0.224907 0.224695 
Observations 3,017,110 3,017,110 3,017,110 
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Akaike Inf. Crit. 4,066,108 4,063,990 4,061,180 
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 4,066,393 4,064,287 4,061,516 
Note: *p**p***p<0.01 
 
Similarly, I graph three scenarios to facilitate the interpretation of the results: low, 
medium, and high for-profit share of workers (Figure 7). Commercialism increases the gender 
pay gap for both sectors. The commercialism effect is smaller in the nonprofit sector than in the 
for-profit sector, leading to a larger sector pay gap, which supports Hypothesis 5. 
 
 
Figure 7. Commercialism effect on gender pay gap 
 
5.3 Assumption checking. 
Multilevel models are an integrated analysis of variance and regression analysis based on 
several assumptions, including correct functional form, normality, independent observations and 
errors, and constant variance of residuals. Violating these assumptions may result in 
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In terms of functional forms, I have checked linearity using LOESS smoothing for 
several variables and decided to use the quadratic form for work experience in the models. Here 
are several diagnostic plots for assumptions related to residuals based on Model (9). First, Level-
1 residuals are assumed to be normally distributed and have a zero mean (Figure 8).  
 
Figure 8. Histogram of Level-1 residuals: normal distribution 
 
Figure 9 is the normal quantile-quantile plot based on the actual residuals divided by their 
theoretical quantiles. The plot is approximately linear, showing that the residual is almost 





Figure 9. Level-1 residual normality 
 
Secondly, Level-2 residuals are assumed to be multivariate normal and also have means 
of zero. Level-2 diagnosis is more problematic. The residual of random intercept on the industry 
level is normally distributed (Figures 10), but the residual of random slope shows that industries 
are heavily right-skewed because all the plots are above the diagonal line (Figure 11). The reason 
is that nonprofits only concentrate in several narrowly defined industries. To understand how the 
estimate changes, I have done more analyses by segmenting the dataset into dataset (1) with for-
profit under 60% (9 industries), dataset (2) with for-profit share under 86% (18 industries), and 
dataset (3) with for-profit share over 86% (20 industries). The results show that there is a 
donative labor effect for nonprofit workers except for the dataset for the top 9 industries 
dominated by nonprofits where the donative labor effect is not significant (Appendix G). Table 





Figure 10. Residual normality of random intercept on the industry level 
 
Figure 11. Residual normality of random slope on the industry level 
 




Figure 12. Standardized residuals versus fitted value by industry 
Comparing to the industry level, the distribution of residuals on the occupation level is 
quite normal, except for a few outliers (Figure 13). 
 
Figure 13. Level-2 residual normality on the occupation level  
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5.4 Random effects of the nonprofit wage differential.  
Previous empirical studies of discrete industries and occupations indicate that nonprofit 
pay differential varies across industries and occupations. Random effects of nonprofit wage 
differential are the random slopes for the nonprofit variable specified on the industry and 
occupation levels. On the industry level, 𝑟0(𝑗1) and 𝑟1(𝑗1) in equation (7) represent intercepts and 
slopes, respectively. Their dispersions are quantified as the variance, which corresponds to 
0.015718 and 0.006898 in Model (9). On the occupation level, 𝑟0(𝑗2) and 𝑟1(𝑗2) represent 
intercepts and slopes. Their variances are 0.052737 and 0.005739, respectively. The state-level 
only has random intercepts. So, I will not discuss it.  
Random effects of nonprofit on the industry level.  
Model (9), the full model with all predictors and nonprofit random effects on Level-2, 
produces the unbiased and efficient estimates for all specified variables excluding effects from 
industry, occupation, and state levels. Fixed coefficients are used to test the hypotheses. The 
random effects of nonprofit are the residuals of nonprofit on industry and occupation levels 
controlling for all the variables in the model, Level-1 errors, and the state-level effects.  
R allows extracting the exact values for all intercepts and slopes, presented in Appendices 
D and E together with the for-profit share of workers and the female percentage by occupation. 
Caterpillar plot (Figures 13 and 14) is usually used to compare random-effect parameters and 
demonstrate the variability of the fixed coefficient. The more observations in each category, the 




Figure 14. Random effects of nonprofit pay differential on the industry level 
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On the industry level, the random intercepts (left panel in Figure 14) is the residual 
variability of the industry wage. They show how much each industry deviates from the constant 
(10.673) in the model. The random slopes (right panel on Figure 14) are the differences in 
sectoral pay differential on the industry level, holding constant the occupation effect. It indicates 
how much each industry deviates from the fixed coefficient for nonprofit (-0.057).  
The public utility industry (2210) has the highest industry-level pay. The predicted 
annual earning for an average white male for-profit worker in the public utility industry is 10.973 
(10.673+0.3) (Appendix D), net of occupation and state effects.  Nonprofits have an industry 
disadvantage of negative 5.4 percent in this industry. Together with the donative labor effects, a 
nonprofit worker earns 11 percent less than a comparable for-profit worker in this industry, 
conditional on occupation pay differences.  
Child daycare services (6244) is the lowest-paying industry. An average white male for-
profit worker in this industry is expected to earn 10.413 (10.673-0.26), net of occupation and 
state effects.  Nonprofit has 8 percent industry advantage in child daycare services. A nonprofit 
worker is expected to earn 2.3 percent (-0.057+0.08) more than a for-profit worker in this 
industry, conditional on occupation pay differences.  
The following industries have the largest industry disadvantage for nonprofits: religious 
film and video (5121) with 20 percent less than the for-profit, crime prevention (5411) with 
negative 19 percent, libraries and archives (5141) with negative 15 percent, performing arts and 
spectator sports (7110) and radio and television broadcasting (5131) with negative 13 percent. 
These are industry disadvantages in addition to the negative 5.7 percent donative labor effect, 
excluding the occupation effect.  
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On the other end, the following industries have the largest industry advantage in pay for 
nonprofits: college and universities (6112) and hospitals (6220) over 10 percent industry 
advantage for nonprofits; insurance providers (5241), rehabilitative care (6213), elementary and 
secondary schools (6111), daycare centers (6244), and museums and art galleries (7121) have 
over 8 percent. These are industry advantages in addition to a negative 5.7 percent donative labor 
effect, excluding the occupation effect. 
Random effects of nonprofit on the occupation level. 
The variance of the random intercept on the occupation level is 0.052737, and the 
variance of the nonprofit random slope is 0.005739 (Model 9). The left panel on Figure (15) 
shows how much the occupation wage deviates from the constant, holding constant all variables, 
industry and state effects. The right panel shows the sectoral pay differential on the occupation 
level, controlling for the industry effect. 
In detail, around 70 occupations have almost no sectoral pay difference (-0.01 to 0.01), 
and 206 occupations have the nonprofit wage differential between -0.05 and 0.05 in addition to 
the fixed coefficient of -0.057, net of the industry effect. There are several outliers. The 
occupation with the largest occupation advantage for nonprofit workers is musicians or 
composers (occupation code:186). Musicians have a 27 percent occupation pay advantage for 
nonprofits over for-profits. Adding altruistic motivation effect and occupation advantage 
together, nonprofit musicians earn 21.3 (27-5.7) more than comparable for-profit musicians, 









Following musicians are bank tellers (383) and dentists (85) with 23 percent, taxi cab 
drivers and chauffeurs (809) with 16 percent, supervisors of cleaning and building (448) and 
ushers (502) with 12 percent occupation advantage for nonprofits. The five occupations with 
largest occupation pay disadvantages for nonprofits are lawyers (178) and financial services sales 
occupations (255) with 22 percent, actors, directors and producers (187) with 19 percent, 
business and promotion agents (34) with 17 percent, airplane pilots and navigators (226) with 14 
percent less than for-profits. Taking lawyers as an example, adding their altruism motivation 
effect to the occupational disadvantage, nonprofit lawyers earn 28 percent less than for-profit 
lawyers, conditional on industry effects. 
Occupation disadvantage for nonprofits does not necessarily mean it is a low-paying 
occupation. Due to the extensive list of occupations, I selected occupations at both ends (Table 
14) to illustrate. Although lawyers (occupation code 178) have the extreme occupation 
disadvantage for nonprofits, the lawyer occupation is one of the highest-paying occupations. The 
lawyer occupation enjoys a pay of 55 percentage points above the grand mean, which is 
equivalent to 11.22 (=10.673+0.55) per year for a white male average for-profit lawyer, net of 
industry and state effects, and a comparable nonprofit lawyer is expected to earn 28 percent (-
0.2231-0.057) less.  
Table 14. Nonprofit random effects on selected occupations 
OCC1990 Occupation title Intercept Nonprofit difference 
4 Chief executives and public administrator 0.7899 -0.0495 
34 Business and promotion agents 0.2353 -0.1637 
84 Physicians 0.7344 -0.0480 
85 Dentists 0.3956 0.2283 
96 Pharmacists 0.6509 -0.0089 
87 Optometrists 0.6498 -0.0628 
66 Actuaries 0.6284 -0.0789 
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88 Podiatrists 0.5718 -0.0973 
178 Lawyers 0.5477 -0.2213 
187 Actors, directors, producers 0.1759 -0.1846 
226 Airplane pilots and navigators 0.4076 -0.1422 
255 Financial services sales occupations 0.3987 -0.2188 
186 Musician or composer -0.0044 0.2678 
383 Bank tellers -0.3397 0.2294 
448 Supervisors of cleaning and building service -0.0574 0.1224 
809 Taxicab drivers and chauffeurs -0.5859 0.1579 
 
On the contrary, taxi cab drivers (809) enjoy a considerable occupation advantage for 
nonprofits, but it is the lowest-paying occupation. As an occupation, taxi drivers earn 59 
percentage points below the average (constant) per year, net of industry and state effects. A 
nonprofit taxi driver earns 10.2 percent (0.1579-0.057) more than a comparable for-profit taxi 
cab driver. The highest-paying occupations include chief executives and public administrators 
(4), physicians (84), dentists (85), and pharmacists (96). It is common to see nonprofits to have 
occupation advantages in low-paying occupations and occupation disadvantages in high-paying 
occupations, although there are exceptions such as dentists.  
Nonprofit random effects inventory. 
The nonprofit wage differential varies across industries and occupations. Among all the 
nonprofit workers, although they all work for nonprofits, how much more they earn than 
comparable for-profit workers depends on the industry and the occupation they work for. The 
total nonprofit pay differential is the sum of donative labor effects and industry and occupation 
differences. Mathematically, it is reflected in the equation 𝛽1(𝑗1,𝑗2,𝑗3) = 𝛾1000 + 𝑟1(𝑗1) + 𝑟1(𝑗2). 
Random effects of the nonprofit pay differential are the residuals on industry and occupation 
levels of the nonprofit fixed coefficient, net of other effects such as gender, race, education, and 
state. Cross-classified multilevel modeling estimates the effect of industry and occupation 
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separately without the confounding effect of the other, which means the modeling process 
produces an exhaustive inventory of nonprofit wage differentials. We can thus compute the 
nonprofit wage differential for each industry and occupation or each combination of industry and 
occupation. Appendices D and E provide detailed information.  
I illustrate how it works using a coordinate system (Figure 16) with selected industries 
and occupations. Studies find that registered nurses are paid equally or slightly better in the 
nonprofit sector than in the for-profit. King and Lewis (2017) find a 3.9 percent premium for 
nonprofit registered nurses with all industries combined. Holtmann and Idson (1993) study the 
registered nurse in the nursing facility industry to find a 3 percent nonprofit advantage. The top 
three industries for registered nurses in the dissertation data are hospitals (6220), nursing 
facilities (6231), and insurance providers (5241). They make up 83% of the total registered nurse 
occupation. Locating in Figure 16, the industry advantages for these three industries are 0.102, 
0.052, and 0.087, respectively, which means the final differences in pay for nonprofit registered 
nurses are 4 percent in hospitals, negative 1 percent for nursing care facilities, and 2.4 percent for 
insurance providers industries. These results include the -5.7 percent donative labor effects.   
Managers in nonprofits get a pay lower than for-profit by 5 to 20 percent (Preston, 1989; 
Roomkin & Weisbrod, 1999). Figure (16) shows a 5 percent for a specific type of managers, 
CEOs and public administrators. The occupation disadvantage for nonprofits in addition to -5.7 
percent donative labor effect, adding to a pay 10.7 percent lower than the for-profit managers. 
Lawyers earn 20% less (Weisbrod, 1983) or more than 40% less (Frank, 1996) in nonprofits than 
in for-profits. Figure (16) shows a negative 22 percent occupation wage difference for nonprofit 
lawyers in addition to -5.7 percent donative labor effect, which is close to 30 percent lower than 




Figure 16. Coordinates of nonprofit wage differential across industries and occupations 
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In terms of industry, Preston (1988) finds a 0-10 percent nonprofit pay advantage in the 
daycare industry. In my dataset, under the child daycare industry, there are 151 occupation 
groups. Top three occupations: kindergarten and earlier school teachers, childcare workers, and 
managers in education and related field, make up 80 percent of the total employment under the 
childcare industry. The occupation differentials for the three occupations are 1.23, 3.35, and 2.29 
percent, respectively. In the Figure, nonprofits have an 8.4 percent industry advantage. Adding to 
the donative labor effect, the nonprofit wage differentials for these three occupations in child 
daycare centers are 4 percent, 6 percent, and 5 percent, respectively.  
The model analyzes the economy-wide data that include all industries and occupations 
and produces results consistent with previous research findings based on discrete industries or 
occupations. Therefore, the model reveals the complex structure of nonprofit wage differential, 
as well as provides a nuanced explanation of the seemingly contradictory and mixed findings in 
prevailing researches.    
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5.5 Hypotheses Testing: Measures 2-4 from SOI data 
Commercialism has effects on pay and nonprofit pay differential because its focus on 
efficiency and cost minimization leads to changes in the work environment and behaviors of 
organizations. Measure 1, derived from frequencies of for-profit workers from the dataset, shows 
as a compositional effect. As a contrast, measures 2-4, the percentage of commercial revenue and 
percentage of program service revenue (Child, 2010; Foster & Bradach, 2005; Kerlin & Pollak, 
2011), and inversed fundraising efforts are integral variables substantively describing the 
industry features. 
These measures are computed solely based on IRS filing by nonprofit organizations. I 
only keep nonprofit workers in the dataset, yielding a sample with 664,646 observations in the 
same number of 308 occupations, 38 industries, and 51 states. Accordingly, I deleted the 
nonprofit variable. Therefore, there is no need to examine the random effects of the sectoral pay 
differential on the industry and occupation levels.  
The unconditional model shows a slightly higher variability on the Level-2 than the full 
dataset. The industry level explains 7.4 percent of the total variance and occupation level 
explains 31 percent, compared with 7.3 percent by industry and 28 percent by occupation in the 
full dataset, respectively. The state-level variance remains less than 3 percent.  
Table (15) is the descriptive statistics for centered variables (except for the dependent 
variable) in the nonprofit dataset. Commercial revenue and program service revenue make up 
more than 90 percent of the total revenue in these industries. Compared with them, the range of 





Table 15. Summary for the nonprofit dataset (Total observations: 664,646) 
VARIABLES Mean  min max Std. Dev. 
Natural log of annual income 10.83 8.00 13.56 0.63 
Female percentage by occupation 0.68 0.00 1.00 0.22 
Female  0.68 0.00 1.00 0.46 
Years of education 15.47 0.00 20.00 2.45 
Latino  0.06 0.00 1.00 0.24 
White  0.80 0.00 1.00 0.40 
Black  0.08 0.00 1.00 0.27 
Asian  0.05 0.00 1.00 0.21 
Other races 0.02 0.00 1.00 0.14 
Manager 0.16 0.00 1.00 0.36 
White-collar worker 0.70 0.00 1.00 0.46 
Blue-collar worker 0.14 0.00 1.00 0.35 
Work hours 43.20 35.00 99.00 7.74 
Work experience  22.74 -5.00 59.00 11.70 
English speaking level (1-4) 3.97 1.00 4.00 0.21 
Percentage of fundraising expense 0.01 0.00 0.09 0.01 
Percentage of commercial revenue 0.81 0.27 1.21 0.17 
Percentage of program service revenue  0.76 0.01 0.94 0.20 
Volunteer total by industry (log) 13.47 1.95 15.88 2.53 
Trend of fundraising expense percentage 0.17 -1.66 2.00 0.51 
 
 
The correlation for all four measures (Table 4) shows that correlations of the dependent 
variable with the percentages of commercial revenue and program service revenue are very 
weak. Fundraising expense percentage measures the commitment of not engaging in a 
commercial approach. Despite its small range, it has a larger and negative relationship with 
annual income than the other two measures. Surprisingly, the natural log of volunteer total is 
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positively related to the annual income of full-time nonprofit workers. All three measures are 
industry aggregate percentages from 2000 to 2012, and volunteer data are industry aggregate 
from 2008 to 2012 due to data availability.   
I tested these measures with the full set of variables (Table 16). The results show that the 
percentages of commercial revenue and program service revenue are positive but not significant. 
The fundraising efforts measure is the total fundraising expense in 13 years, divided by total 
expense. To consider the potential trend of fundraising efforts, I generated a trend variable34 in 
the models. The fundraising effort is negatively related to the outcome variable. As the 
percentage of fundraising expense increases by 1 percentage points, salary is estimated to reduce 
by 3 percent (Model S3). Considering the range of the measure is around 9 percentage points 
(Table 15), the difference in the highest and lowest industry pay is less than 30%. It shows that 
traditional nonprofits that rely on donative funding pay less than commercialized nonprofits that 
engage less in fundraising activities. The result aligns with my earlier argument that revenue 
percentages measure the results of commercialization, whereas fundraising efforts measure the 
intention to commercialize that determines organizations’ subsequent behaviors. In the following 
models, I only used fundraising efforts as the key independent variable. 
I also attach Model (9) in the full dataset in column 4 as a comparison. Female 
percentage by occupation reduces salary by 0.1 percent, but it is not significant in the full 
dataset. The effect of work hours is lower in the nonprofit sector than the full dataset. The return 
on education is 0.8 percentage points higher than the data for both sectors. The gender and racial 
equity are obvious in nonprofit workers. The gender pay gap is narrower by 6 percentage points 
                                                          






than the full dataset. All racial groups have a smaller pay difference in pay than Whites, 
compared with the full data. The natural log of the volunteer total by industry is not significant in 
all models.  
 
Table 16. Test of measures and testing Hypothesis 2  
 Natural log of annual income 
 (S1) (S2) (S3) (9) 
Percentage of commercial revenue 0.001    
 (1.318)    
Percentage of PSR  0.001   
  (1.432)   
Percentage of fundraising expense   -0.030***  
   (-2.897)  
For-profit share of workers    0.003*** 
    (3.522) 
Female percentage by occupation -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001 
 (-2.508) (-2.508) (-2.507) (-1.451) 
Volunteer total by industry (log) -0.009 -0.009 -0.006  
 (-1.425) (-1.441) (-0.920)  
Nonprofit     -0.057*** 
    (-3.893) 
Female  -0.133*** -0.133*** -0.133*** -0.185*** 
 (-105.864) (-105.865) (-105.866) (-272.933) 
Black  -0.044*** -0.044*** -0.044*** -0.093*** 
 (-22.340) (-22.340) (-22.344) (-90.402) 
Asian  -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.029*** 
 (-5.714) (-5.714) (-5.715) (-21.799) 
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Latino  -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.063*** 
 (-6.015) (-6.015) (-6.019) (-57.061) 
Other races  -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.066*** 
 (-9.500) (-9.500) (-9.501) (-32.353) 
Years of education 0.081*** 0.081*** 0.081*** 0.073*** 
 (266.078) (266.077) (266.084) (468.674) 
Work experience  0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 
 (218.369) (218.370) (218.366) (449.153) 
Work experience squared -0.048*** -0.048*** -0.048*** -0.053*** 
 (-125.040) (-125.040) (-125.039) (-266.867) 
Work hours per week 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.013*** 
 (107.678) (107.678) (107.681) (342.442) 
Speak English  0.052*** 0.052*** 0.052*** 0.045*** 
 (20.379) (20.378) (20.383) (44.654) 
Trend of fundraising percentage   0.011  
   (0.439)  
Constant 10.671*** 10.671*** 10.671*** 10.673*** 
 (363.516) (364.423) (379.819) (374.288) 
Random coefficients  No  No  No  Yes  
Observations 664,646 664,646 664,646 3,017,110 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 718,560 718,560 718,556 4,066,108 




With no random coefficient, the models are simpler. I only used fundraising effort 
measure to test of Hypothesis 4 on manager-staff pay equity and Hypothesis 5 on gender pay 
equity (Table 17). Findings are consistent with the previous models. Managers earn 46 percent 
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more than blue-collar workers (Model S4). Nonprofits engaging in more fundraising have a 
narrower occupation pay gap, which is not big but significant (Model S5). It shows that the 
choice of reliance on donative revenue or commercial revenue does have an impact on pay to 
nonprofit workers.  
 
Table 17. Modeling commercialism effects on the gender pay gap and manager-staff pay gap  
 Natural log of annual income 
 (S4) (S5) (S6) 
Percentage of fundraising expense -0.031*** -0.028*** -0.030*** 
 (-2.906) (-2.628) (-2.877) 
Manager  0.233*** 0.227***  
 (3.800) (3.694)  
Blue-collar worker -0.223*** -0.218***  
 (-8.128) (-7.925)  
Female percentage by occupation -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.001** 
 (-6.826) (-6.777) (-2.504) 
Volunteer total by industry (log) -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 
 (-0.916) (-0.941) (-0.917) 
Female -0.133*** -0.133*** -0.132*** 
 (-105.878) (-106.138) (-100.535) 
Black  -0.044*** -0.044*** -0.044*** 
 (-22.333) (-22.272) (-22.321) 
Asian  -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.015*** 
 (-5.714) (-5.711) (-5.735) 
Latino  -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** 
 (-6.017) (-5.979) (-6.038) 
121 
 
Other races  -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.036*** 
 (-9.503) (-9.474) (-9.503) 
Years of education 0.081*** 0.081*** 0.081*** 
 (265.943) (266.137) (265.946) 
Work experience  0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 
 (218.365) (218.349) (218.366) 
Work experience squared -0.048*** -0.048*** -0.048*** 
 (-125.038) (-125.065) (-125.048) 
Work hours per week 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
 (107.666) (107.734) (107.717) 
Trend of fundraising percentage  0.011 0.011 0.011 
 (0.439) (0.434) (0.444) 
Speak English 0.052*** 0.052*** 0.052*** 
 (20.364) (20.279) (20.391) 
Percentage of fundraising expense × manager   -0.014***  
  (-10.280)  
Percentage of fundraising expense × blue-collar  0.009***  
  (6.098)  
Percentage of fundraising expense × female   0.003*** 
   (3.058) 
Constant 10.738*** 10.739*** 10.671*** 
 (382.194) (381.256) (379.968) 
Observations 664,646 664,646 664,646 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 718,489 718,319 718,561 





Model (S6) shows that in nonprofits that engage in less commercial approaches, the 
gender pay gap is narrower, although the size is not large. Therefore, both datasets show that 
either measured as the compositional effect or the contextual effect, commercialism increases 
pay and also increase pay gaps between genders and occupation types. 
5.6 Sensitivity Analysis 
To check the robustness and consistency of the estimates, I add different structures on 
Level-2 to compare the fixed effects of the nonprofit coefficient. Then, I use different subsets of 
the full data to run four selected models to check the consistency of the nonprofit coefficient.   
Different level-2 structures.  
In Table 18, Model (9) is the model I used for results in the dissertation. Model (T1) 
considers nonprofit wage differential also randomly varies on the state level in addition to 
industry and occupation levels. It reports a 4.7 percent negative nonprofit wage differential, 
reducing the size of nonprofit fixed effects by 1 percentage points.   
Leete (2001) argues that nonprofit status, industry, occupation cannot be independently 
determined. Therefore, I created Model (T2) by adding an interaction term between industries 
and occupations as a control. It generates 38 industries, 308 occupations, 7,872 industry-
occupation cells, and 51 states on Level-2.  In Model (T3), nonprofit is specified to vary across 
the interaction cells. The effects of the interaction cells are rather small, similar to Leete's (2001) 
conclusion. The coefficient for nonprofit remains to be robust to these changes. Even the strictest 
control still reports a 4.7 percent negative wage differential on average for nonprofit workers, net 





Table 18. Random slope coefficients on different levels 
 Natural log of annual income 
Fixed effects part (9) (T1) (T2) (T3) 
For-profit share of workers 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (3.537) (3.554) (3.887) (3.979) 
Female percentage by occupation -0.001 -0.001 -0.0004 -0.0003 
 (-1.445) (-1.450) (-0.906) (-0.763) 
Nonprofit  -0.057*** -0.047*** -0.050*** -0.047*** 
 (-3.893) (-3.120) (-3.950) (-4.115) 
Female  -0.185*** -0.185*** -0.182*** -0.182*** 
 (-272.933) (-272.696) (-268.881) (-268.653) 
Years of education 0.073*** 0.073*** 0.070*** 0.070*** 
 (468.674) (468.388) (451.999) (451.929) 
Latino  -0.063*** -0.064*** -0.060*** -0.060*** 
 (-57.061) (-57.446) (-54.413) (-54.396) 
Black  -0.093*** -0.093*** -0.087*** -0.087*** 
 (-90.402) (-90.831) (-85.321) (-85.175) 
Asian  -0.029*** -0.030*** -0.029*** -0.029*** 
 (-21.799) (-22.194) (-21.597) (-21.582) 
Other races  -0.066*** -0.066*** -0.063*** -0.063*** 
 (-32.353) (-32.550) (-31.227) (-31.190) 
Speak English 0.045*** 0.046*** 0.042*** 0.042*** 
 (44.654) (45.161) (41.934) (41.815) 
Work experience  0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 
 (449.153) (449.266) (448.990) (449.056) 
Work experience squared -0.053*** -0.053*** -0.052*** -0.052*** 
 (-266.867) (-266.927) (-263.397) (-263.339) 
Work hours per week 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 
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 (342.442) (341.644) (342.644) (342.410) 
Constant 10.673*** 10.673*** 10.679*** 10.680*** 
 (374.288) (374.238) (393.187) (394.085) 
Random effects part Variance  
Industry (Intercept)  0.015718 0.015693 0.012761 0.012666 
Nonprofit 0.006896 0.006829 0.005300 0.004288 
Occupation (Intercept) 0.052737 0.052765 0.053803 0.053664 
Nonprofit 0.005739 0.005789 0.003195 0.002041 
Industry×occupation (Intercept)   0.011163 0.010701 
Nonprofit    0.003886 
State (intercept) 0.011391 0.011431 0.011063 0.011054 
Nonprofit  0.000741   
Residual  0.225067 0.224876 0.219502 0.219306 
Observations 3,017,110 3,017,110 3,017,110 3,017,110 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 4,066,108 4,063,689 3,998,534 3,996,937 




Beyond the small numeric difference, it is useful to think about the selection of 
coefficients for interpretation based on the purpose of the research. If the purpose is to predict, 
maybe Model (T3) should be selected because it controls more variability and yields more 
precision. However, Models (T2) and (T3) lack the theoretical foundation so far. With industry-
occupation cells, the model aims to gauge the between-cell differences. In other words, Model 
(T3) cares about the difference in pay between any combinations of industry and occupation such 
as a social worker in the university industry and a subject instructor in the hospital industry, or 
the pay difference between a manager in a credit union and an artist in arts organizations. There 
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is not enough theoretical or practical underpinning of why the examples mentioned above are 
important to study. Model (T1) can be a choice to examine how nonprofit pay differential varies 
across different states in addition to the random effects on industry and occupation levels if one’s 
interest also includes the state level. In summary, Model (9) provides the estimates that are in 
line with current nonprofit theories given my purpose is to understand and explain the nonprofit 
pay differentials on industry and occupation levels.  
Different datasets.  
The first dataset is the full data without industries of hospital (6220) and higher education 
(6112).  Table (19) shows that hospital industry (6220) makes up 16 percent of the sample, and 
higher education makes up another 4.12 percent. In total, they make up 20 percent of the total 
sample with different proportions of nonprofit and for-profit workers. These industries not only 
are large in size, but also occupy the higher end of industry wage differential: the nonprofit wage 
advantage over for-profit is 10.20 percent for hospitals, and 10.70 percent for higher education 
and universities (Appendix D).  
 





For-profit employees Nonprofit employees 
Frequency industry % overall % Frequency  industry % overall % 
6112 124,307 48,165 38.75 1.60 76,142 61.25 2.52 
6220 479,007 252,313 52.56 8.36 226,694 47.33 7.51 










The second dataset is the one-year data Census 2000 with a sample size of 649,227, 
which is 21.52 percent of the dataset used in the dissertation. The third dataset is the same 
dataset, but with the original 58 industry categories from ACS without combining into 38 
categories. The major difference between the 38 industries and 58 industries lies in “public 
utilities” where six categories are combined into one, and “transportation” where nine categories 
ranging from air transportation, truck transportation to pipeline transportation and services 
incidental to transportation are combined into one category (Appendix B).   
Table (20) shows how variance components change across different datasets. Whether 
having the “outlier” industries does not seem to affect the variance components, but having more 
industry categories increases the variance on the industry level.   
 
Table 20. Comparing variance components (IUCC) 
 The proportion of variance on each level 
 
38 industries No hospital and 
higher education 
Census 2000 58 industries 
Industry [7.3%] [7.16%] [6.81%] [10.5%] 
Occupation [28%] [27.64%] [25.00%] [26.1%] 
State [2.8%] [2.82%] [3.25%] [2.6%] 
Residual 0.28486 0.29838 0.26634 0.28052 
Constant 10.589*** 10.592*** 10.584*** 10.642*** 
 (269.161) (260.576) (287.944) (277.167) 
Observations 3,017,110 2,423,796 649,227 3,017,110 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 4,776,157 3,933,485 985,622 4,729,958 




Next, I compared random intercept models (Table 21). Assuming that the nonprofit wage 
differential does not vary across industries and occupations, the commercialism effect remains 
similar, and the nonprofit pay differential is under 1 percent except for the dataset without 
hospitals and higher education.   Without hospitals and universities, even though we assume 
nonprofit pay differential is the same across the rest 36 industries, nonprofit workers earn 3 
percent less than the for-profit workers. It reflects the overwhelming impact of these two 
industries on the economy-wide nonprofit wage differential estimate due to their large industry 
sizes and industry pay advantages for nonprofits.   
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Table 21. Comparing models with no random slopes 














For-profit share of 
workers 
0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.003*** 
(4.213) (4.035) (4.493) (4.505) (4.944) (4.970) 
Female percentage by 
occupation 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.001*** -0.001 -0.001 -0.00001 
(-1.521) (-1.300) (-2.812) (-1.161) (-1.298) (-0.026) 
Nonprofit  0.002*** -0.030*** -0.008*** 0.007*** 0.010*** -0.001 
 (2.891) (-28.381) (-4.649) (9.188) (13.139) (-0.958) 
Female  -0.187*** -0.197*** -0.199*** -0.184*** -0.158*** -0.193*** 
 (-276.068) (-254.826) (-138.037) (-271.682) (-236.715) (-463.042) 
Years of education 0.073*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.068*** 0.062*** 
 (469.262) (411.452) (216.209) (464.580) (461.408) (714.735) 
Latino  -0.065*** -0.073*** -0.049*** -0.072*** -0.035*** -0.053*** 
 (-58.414) (-58.487) (-18.974) (-67.001) (-28.958) (-72.420) 
Black  -0.095*** -0.104*** -0.059*** -0.093*** -0.062*** -0.103*** 
 (-92.220) (-88.045) (-27.331) (-91.134) (-61.282) (-151.374) 
Asian  -0.030*** -0.035*** -0.034*** -0.039*** -0.005*** -0.016*** 
 (-22.173) (-21.640) (-10.345) (-29.690) (-3.318) (-17.770) 
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Other races  -0.067*** -0.071*** -0.071*** -0.067*** -0.059*** -0.072*** 
 (-32.827) (-30.747) (-16.862) (-33.299) (-30.718) (-57.598) 
Speak English 0.046*** 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.037*** 0.020*** 0.051*** 
 (44.993) (40.148) (19.443) (18.206) (24.324) (109.259) 
Work experience 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.013*** 0.010*** 
 (448.690) (380.215) (212.464) (439.095) (548.223) (690.076) 
Work experience 
squared 
-0.053*** -0.052*** -0.052*** -0.053*** -0.061*** -0.052*** 
(-267.026) (-229.762) (-115.216) (-268.668) (-331.493) (-444.157) 
Work hours per week 0.013*** 0.015*** 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.877***35 0.015*** 
 (345.041) (342.001) (156.982) (333.049) (1,132.333) (643.305) 
Work weeks per year     0.241***  
     (1,006.384)  
Constant 10.682*** 10.679*** 10.660*** 10.728*** 10.415*** 10.736*** 
 (368.283) (362.015) (400.583) (373.906) (354.715) (519.903) 
Random coefficients No   No No  No  No No 
Observations 3,017,110 2,413,796 649,227 3,017,110 4,306,670 8,131,265 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 4,078,169 3,366,409 839,050 4,049,456 7,122,774 10,649,186 
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 4,078,401 3,366,638 839,254 4,049,689 7,123,026 10,649,436 
Note: *p**p***p<0.01 
 
                                                          
35 “Work hours per week” variable in this model is log form in this model because this dataset includes part-time workers.  
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Models in Table (22) are different from Table (21) by specifying random coefficients for 
nonprofit on industry and occupation levels. With the random effects of nonprofits, coefficients 
for commercialism and nonprofit are highly consistent across different datasets. The large-size 
industry outliers do not seem to matter much because the variability on Level-2 (including 
industry level) is removed. Despite the consistency, there is a noticeable difference in the 





Table 22. Comparing random slope models on different datasets 














For-profit share of 
workers 
0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 
(3.537) (3.704) (4.032) (3.966) (4.516) (3.650) 
Female percentage by 
occupation 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.001** -0.001 -0.001 -0.0001 
(-1.445) (-1.193) (-2.502) (-1.237) (-1.391) (-0.333) 
Nonprofit  -0.057*** -0.052*** -0.052*** -0.043*** -0.061*** -0.069*** 
 (-3.893) (-3.740) (-3.232) (-3.734) (-5.075) (-10.712) 
Female  -0.185*** -0.195*** -0.197*** -0.182*** -0.157*** -0.191*** 
 (-272.933) (-252.379) (-136.445) (-268.797) (-234.088) (-460.075) 
Years of education 0.073*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.068*** 0.062*** 
 (468.674) (411.713) (215.958) (464.257) (460.124) (713.869) 
Latino  -0.063*** -0.072*** -0.048*** -0.071*** -0.034*** -0.052*** 
 (-57.061) (-57.638) (-18.383) (-65.443) (-28.086) (-71.475) 
Black  -0.093*** -0.103*** -0.057*** -0.091*** -0.060*** -0.101*** 
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 (-90.402) (-87.243) (-26.225) (-89.215) (-59.519) (-149.700) 
Asian  -0.029*** -0.035*** -0.033*** -0.039*** -0.004*** -0.015*** 
 (-21.799) (-21.575) (-10.135) (-29.216) (-3.007) (-17.215) 
Other races -0.066*** -0.070*** -0.070*** -0.066*** -0.058*** -0.072*** 
 (-32.353) (-30.469) (-16.557) (-32.785) (-30.263) (-57.189) 
Speak English 0.045*** 0.044*** 0.045*** 0.037*** 0.020*** 0.051*** 
 (44.654) (39.168) (19.234) (18.168) (24.131) (109.008) 
Work experience  0.011*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.013*** 0.010*** 
 (449.153) (380.659) (213.024) (439.536) (547.803) (689.900) 
Work experience 
squared 
-0.053*** -0.052*** -0.052*** -0.053*** -0.060*** -0.052*** 
(-266.867) (-229.639) (-115.305) (-268.437) (-330.790) (-443.701) 
Work hours per week 0.013*** 0.015*** 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.874*** 0.015*** 
 (342.442) (342.092) (155.657) (330.879) (1,127.351) (642.373) 
Work weeks per year     0.241***  
     (1,007.241)  
Constant 10.673*** 10.674*** 10.654*** 10.722*** 10.408*** 10.734*** 
 (374.288) (365.038) (409.194) (376.069) (356.224) (518.523) 
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Random coefficients Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 3,017,110 2,413,796 649,227 3,017,110 4,306,670 8,131,265 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 4,066,108 3,358,306 836,488 4,038,292 7,110,175 10,632,677 





The following table shows that the average salary for “transportation” in original 
categories varies with a wide range of 10.25 ($28,283) and 11.26 ($77,653). “Truck 
transportation” makes up 45 percent of the large category. The more categories, the more 
between-group variance is captured on Level-2. Thus, there should be comparatively less 
difference (more accuracy) on Level-1 estimates. 
 
Industry in 58 categories 
Mean of 




income Frequencies  
481 Air transportation 10.96651 44,360 
   
482 Rail transportation 11.10162 25,362 
   
483 Water transportation 11.03975 4,777 
   
484 Truck transportation 10.73268 120,687 
   
4853 Taxi and limousine service 10.25499 6,428 4800 10.80458 267,260 
485M Bus service and urban transit 10.56718 16,309 
   
486 Pipeline transportation 11.25552 5,248 
   
487 Scenic and sightseeing 
transportation 10.59979 1,515 
   
488 Services incidental to 
transportation 10.76195 42,574 
   
 
 
On the one hand, this is the condition when I need to merge ACS data to SOI data 
because SOI has only one category of “transportation.” On the other hand, the theoretical 
argument on the measurability of service quality, efficiency, and commercialism prefers 
combined 38 industry categories to the 58 categories. No matter it is air transportation, rail 
transportation, or taxi services, they are not different in terms of the potential to commercialize. 
In other words, the 38-category model presents the results that are better explained by theories. 
I have restricted the analysis to full-time workers based on the consideration of 
motivation sorting. Other studies, such as Ruhm and Borkoski (2003), suggest that the nonprofit 
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sector has more part-time workers. Hirsch (2005) find that part-time workers often have 
compensation penalty because of interruption of tenure and work experience. Hence, including 
part-time workers in the study might strengthen the negative nonprofit wage differential, which, 
however, may not necessarily relate to the donative labor effect. My analysis of the dataset that 
includes part-time workers shows that, controlling for work hours per week and work weeks per 
year, nonprofit workers earn 6.1 percent less than comparable for-profit workers (Table 22).  
The dissertation data only kept 58 industries. I also did a supplementary analysis using 
the full list of 289 industries in the ACS (with the same model) estimates a negative 7 percent 
nonprofit wage differential (Table 22).    
Table (23) compares commercialism effect on the manager-staff pay gap in the two 
sectors. Coefficients for constituent variables of commercialism, nonprofit, managers, and blue-
collar worker are similar across different datasets. However, interaction effects are different. In 
the dataset with 58 industries, commercialism is not significant. The sectoral difference in 
occupation types is only significant in Census 2000 at a 10 percent level.  The three-way 
interaction effects are significant in three large datasets at a 1 percent level and only significant 
at a 10% level in Census 2000. Therefore, cautions are needed in interpreting the three-way 
interaction effects on occupation types. 
 
Table 23. Testing manager-staff pay gap across different datasets 










For-profit share of workers 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 
 (3.951) (4.026) (4.506) (4.146) 
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Nonprofit  -0.058*** -0.046*** -0.056*** -0.046*** 
 (-4.254) (-4.142) (-3.661) (-4.059) 
Manager 0.223*** 0.211*** 0.201*** 0.229*** 
 (3.676) (3.377) (3.805) (3.903) 
Blue-collar worker -0.244*** -0.251*** -0.185*** -0.254*** 
 (-9.480) (-9.469) (-8.050) (-10.203) 
For-profit share of workers × 
nonprofit 
-0.001** -0.001* -0.001** -0.001 
 (-2.276) (-1.933) (-2.120) (1.431) 
For-profit share of workers × manager -0.0005*** -0.0003*** -0.0004*** 0.0001 
 (-7.217) (-3.697) (-3.124) (1.091) 
Nonprofit × manager -0.017 -0.030 -0.041* -0.015 
 (-0.695) (-1.155) (-1.779) (-0.646) 
For-profit share of workers × blue-
collar 
-0.0003*** 0.0001 -0.0003*** -0.0001** 
 (-5.685) (0.784) (-3.403) (-2.432) 
Nonprofit × blue-collar 0.011 0.017 0.022* 0.019* 
 (0.977) (1.434) (1.735) (1.722) 
For-profit share of workers × 
nonprofit × manager 
-0.0003** 0.001*** -0.0005* -0.001*** 
 (-2.317) (5.373) (-1.901) (-4.517) 
For-profit share of workers × 
nonprofit × blue-collar 
0.001*** -0.001*** 0.0004* 0.001*** 
 (5.223) (-3.676) (1.907) (4.562) 
Female  -0.185*** -0.195*** -0.197*** -0.182*** 
 (-272.826) (-252.407) (-136.405) (-268.708) 
Female percentage by occupation -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.003*** 
 (-6.368) (-6.046) (-6.542) (-6.476) 
Years of education  0.073*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 
 (468.362) (411.464) (215.609) (464.138) 
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Latino  -0.063*** -0.072*** -0.048*** -0.071*** 
 (-56.996) (-57.616) (-18.346) (-65.383) 
Black  -0.093*** -0.103*** -0.057*** -0.091*** 
 (-90.374) (-87.228) (-26.207) (-89.190) 
Asian  -0.029*** -0.035*** -0.033*** -0.039*** 
 (-21.808) (-21.563) (-10.131) (-29.214) 
Other races -0.066*** -0.070*** -0.070*** -0.066*** 
 (-32.352) (-30.463) (-16.555) (-32.790) 
Speak English 0.045*** 0.044*** 0.045*** 0.037*** 
 (44.445) (39.163) (19.120) (18.005) 
Work experience  0.011*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 
 (448.933) (380.598) (212.958) (439.413) 
Work experience squared  -0.053*** -0.052*** -0.052*** -0.053*** 
 (-266.876) (-229.640) (-115.321) (-268.448) 
Work hours per week 0.013*** 0.015*** 0.012*** 0.013*** 
 (342.449) (342.098) (155.644) (330.865) 
Constant 10.726*** 10.727*** 10.701*** 10.776*** 
 (382.584) (372.267) (414.492) (385.577) 
Random coefficients Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 3,017,110 2,413,796 649,227 3,017,110 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 4,065,990 3,358,287 836,482 4,038,238 
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 4,066,390 3,358,680 836,835 4,038,638 
Note: *p**p***p<0.01 
 
The last comparison is the commercialism effect on the gender pay gap between the two 
sectors (Table 24). Both commercialism and nonprofit have significant moderating effects on the 
gender pay gap. Three-way interaction terms are highly consistent across different datasets, 
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showing greater gender pay equity in the nonprofit sector and enlarging sector gap of gender pay 
due to commercialism.  
Table 24. Testing the gender pay gap across different datasets 










For-profit share of workers 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 
 (4.028) (4.127) (4.569) (4.302) 
Nonprofit  -0.051*** -0.047*** -0.048*** -0.038*** 
 (-3.687) (-3.545) (-3.162) (-3.368) 
Female  -0.173*** -0.175*** -0.183*** -0.181*** 
 (-214.237) (-176.423) (-102.772) (-227.388) 
For-profit share of workers × 
nonprofit 
-0.001** -0.001* -0.001** -0.001 
 (-2.391) (-1.798) (-2.155) (-1.552) 
For-profit share of workers × female -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.002*** 
 (-51.135) (-35.196) (-18.041) (-46.462) 
Nonprofit × female 0.039*** 0.048*** 0.047*** 0.040*** 
 (18.376) (18.996) (10.138) (16.638) 
For-profit share of workers × 
nonprofit × female 
0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (16.166) (10.177) (6.110) (12.500) 
Female percentage by occupation  -0.001** -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001* 
 (-2.129) (-2.165) (-3.391) (-1.702) 
Years of education  0.073*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 
 (466.470) (410.258) (215.241) (462.354) 
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Latino  -0.063*** -0.072*** -0.048*** -0.071*** 
 (-57.234) (-57.869) (-18.468) (-65.640) 
Black  -0.092*** -0.102*** -0.056*** -0.091*** 
 (-89.762) (-86.628) (-25.994) (-88.629) 
Asian  -0.028*** -0.034*** -0.033*** -0.038*** 
 (-21.142) (-21.297) (-9.941) (-28.678) 
Other races  -0.065*** -0.070*** -0.070*** -0.066*** 
 (-32.095) (-30.332) (-16.462) (-32.546) 
Speak English 0.046*** 0.044*** 0.045*** 0.038*** 
 (44.952) (39.365) (19.331) (18.376) 
Work experience  0.011*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 
 (449.442) (380.881) (212.861) (439.710) 
Work experience squared  -0.053*** -0.052*** -0.052*** -0.053*** 
 (-267.573) (-230.087) (-115.670) (-269.027) 
Work hours per week 0.013*** 0.015*** 0.012*** 0.013*** 
 (341.448) (341.474) (155.232) (330.112) 
Constant 10.670*** 10.671*** 10.651*** 10.718*** 
 (374.942) (364.642) (409.888) (377.678) 
Random coefficients Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 3,017,110 2,413,796 649,227 3,017,110 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 4,061,180 3,355,506 835,707 4,034,256 





To summarize the sensitivity tests, as long as the models include random coefficients of 
nonprofit on industry and occupation levels, the estimates are robust. Even if including the 
random effects on the incomprehensible level, there is a significant 4.7 percentage negative 
nonprofit wage differential on average. Across different datasets, minor disparities occur 
between the 38 industries and 58 industries. 
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Chapter VI. Discussions and Conclusion 
To answer the theoretical questions about whether altruistically motivated workers donate 
their labor to nonprofits and what is the effect of commercialism, I have analyzed cross-sectional 
data pooled from 12 years of American Community Survey and Census 2000. Donative labor 
effect has been assessed through multi-level random effects modeling. The effect of 
commercialism has been assessed through different measures. Then, I have run a series of 
sensitivity analyses to check the consistency of the results. In this chapter, I recapitulate the main 
finding, building on which I discuss the implications, contributions, and limitations of the 
research. 
Summary of findings  
Whether nonprofit workers earn more than for-profit workers has been an unsettled 
question for long. Findings of negative nonprofit pay differentials (Handy et al., 2007; Preston, 
1990a; Weisbrod, 1983) have been continuously compromised by counter-findings (Holtmann & 
Idson, 1993; King & Lewis, 2017; Preston, 1988) or findings of equal pay (Ben-Ner et al., 2011; 
Hirsch et al., 2018; Leete, 2001). In the meantime, multiple industry and economy-wide studies 
acknowledge significantly positive or negative differentials in some industries.  
These studies have laid a great foundation and also made a strong appeal for further 
inquiry on the disagreement of findings. Results of discrete industries or occupations cannot be 
inferred to other industries or occupations because the research findings are contradictory. The 
assumption in economy-wide studies that nonprofit pay differential is the same across industries 
and occupations leads to a confounded estimate that there is no donative labor effect. My 
dissertation addresses these conflicts by asking what is the fixed coefficient of nonprofit wage 
differential that is global to all nonprofit workers and what is the random effect that is local to 
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different groups: industries and occupations. Put it another way, I examine the nonprofit wage 
differential as a composite of nonprofit effect, industry effect, and occupation effect.    
The reframing of nonprofit wage differential as a composite is grounded in theories that 
explain phenomena on different levels, namely, donative labor theory on the individual level, 
attenuated property rights theory on the organizational level, and efficiency wage theory on the 
firm or industry level. I deconstructed the theory on their background, empirical evidence, and 
levels of explanation. Based on the explanatory level of theories, I developed my hypotheses and 
tested them using CCREM.  
The meaning of random effects. 
Comparing Model (7) with only Level-1 variables and Model 8 with all variables 
suggests that commercialism reduces the industry wage dispersion by 5 percentage points. The 
inter-industry wage differentials, or the rank of industry pay (left panel of Figure 14), is 
important when we consider pay equity. Holding constant all variables, Level-1 errors, 
occupation and state effects in the model, the dispersion of industry-level pay is between -0.26 
and 0.30 around the mean (10.73). The random slope model (Model 9) shows that random 
intercepts are negatively correlated with the nonprofit random slopes on the industry level, 
meaning that industries where nonprofits pay more than the for-profits are usually low-pay 
industries. For instance, several frequently studied industries with positive nonprofit wage 
differentials, such as day-care centers, residential care facilities, nursing facilities, are among the 
lowest-paying industries below the average (Figure 14). In many other higher-pay industries such 
as rehabilitation centers and libraries, nonprofits have large negative pay differentials.  
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Effects of commercialism. 
Industries are the contexts that have different attributes such as competition level, entry 
and funding requirement, commercialism, types of services, and revenue sources. All of these 
can affect the organization actors in the industry. The dissertation examines the effects of 
commercialism. Either measured as the for-profit share of workers or inverse of fundraising 
efforts, commercialism increases pay because of its potential focus on efficiency and cost 
minimization, which triggers the compensating wage mechanism.  Commercialism intervenes the 
nonprofit wage differential through changing behaviors of organizations that strive to 
commercialize.  As explained by compensating wage theory, less pleasant working conditions 
invoke higher pay. The effects of fundraising efforts on decreasing pay (for only nonprofit 
worker dataset) appear to be stronger than the effects of the for-profit share of workers (for all 
full-time workers).  
The compensating wage mechanism is further confirmed in models with the moderating 
effect of commercialism. The nonprofit sector is reputed to have more pay equity in the gender 
pay difference and the manager-staff pay difference. Commercialism moderates the pay equity as 
well as the sector pay differential. The pay gap between nonprofits and for-profits is larger in 
more commercialized industries than less commercialized ones. In more commercialized 
industries, the gender pay gap and manager-staff pay gap are wider. 
Effects of donative labor. 
Nonprofit organizations generally serve the public interest and social missions. Thus, 
nonprofits often attract altruistically motivated workers who are willing to sacrifice personal 
benefits to produce positive social externalities. On average, the effect of donative labor is that 
nonprofit workers earn 5.7 percent less than comparable for-profit workers controlling for 
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industry, occupation, and state effects. Sensitivity tests show that it is between negative 4.7 
percent and negative 5.7 percent.  
Implications  
Donative labor under the mask. The inability to test theories has practical and policy 
implications. Contradictory or divergent results generate uncertainty, doubt, questioning on 
nonprofits as a sector. Confounding industry and occupation contexts make nonprofits “for-
profits in disguise” (Holtmann & Idson, 1993; Roomkin & Weisbrod, 1999; Weisbrod, 1988), 
leading to the illusion that altruism does not exist and nonprofit workers do not donate their labor 
to nonprofits (Ruhm & Borkoski, 2003), which compromises the legitimacy of the nonprofit 
sector.   
My findings reveal that altruism and motivation sorting lead to lower pay for nonprofit 
workers than comparable for-profit workers. It is part of the total nonprofit wage differential in 
addition to the effects on industry and occupation levels. Decomposing sources of effects suggest 
that, instead of asking why there is an inconsistency of the sectoral pay differential, we should 
ask why there is an industry or occupation difference. Asking the right question could restore the 
legitimacy of nonprofit to their constituents, including clients, policymakers, and other 
stakeholders, as well as developing more insightful research directions.  
Commercialism hurts under the mask. Salamon (1993, 1999, 2015) argue that, facing 
“fiscal squeeze” of government budget and “economic crisis” of competing with the for-profit 
firms to serve similar clients, nonprofits not only develop resilience to sustains the growth of the 
sector through commercialization, but also suffers from erosion of values that nonprofits hold 
dear such as democracy and citizenship (Eikenberry & Kluver, 2004). In the case of pay 
differential, commercialism increases the pay to both for-profit and nonprofit workers because 
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the deprivation of pleasant working conditions as a result of efficiency pursuit gets compensated 
as a monetary reward. However, commercialism does not increase the pay equally. It increases 
pay more for men and managers in the for-profit sector, leading to a widening horizontal sectoral 
pay gap for employees with the same job and a widening vertical wage dispersion and inequality 
for employees on different occupation types (Gupta, Conroy, & Delery, 2012). Wage dispersion 
and inequality might affect employee satisfaction (Pfeffer & Langton, 1993), service quality, and 
work efforts (Hamann & Ren, 2013).   
Rethinking efficiency. Organizations with high efficiency can achieve more with the 
same resources. Therefore, efficiency is desired in many areas, such as operational efficiency, 
financial efficiency, and programmatic efficiency (Callen, Klein, & Tinkelman, 2003; 
Eikenberry & Kluver, 2004; Frumkin & Andre-Clark, 2000). On the contrary, inefficiency is a 
word with negative connotation under the prevalent commercialized discourse, and “inefficient” 
nonprofits might be perceived as inferior to “efficient” organizations. To commercialize and 
adopt a business mindset might improve the image of the organization of being more efficient as 
well as bring some immediate benefits. However, commercialism might work as a double-edged 
sword for nonprofits to lose their visions and values. Frumkin and Andre-Clark (2000) argue that 
the value-driven approach is the competitive edge for nonprofits to sustain better outcomes, 
rather than a superficial imitation of efficiency strategies. In the overwhelming commercialism 
context, it is useful to be aware of the unanticipated consequence of the behaviors of the 
organization. After all, nonprofit survive “not despite but because of their notorious lack of 
efficiency” (Seibel, 2013, p. 107) due to their special social functions between the market and the 
government.   
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Contributions   
In the dissertation, I have analyzed economy-wide data to examine the nature and 
magnitude of nonprofit wage differential relative to the for-profit sector. Building on existing 
studies, I have contributed to re-conceptualizing the issue under the multilevel theoretical and 
analytical framework, providing nationally representative and exhaustive estimates of the 
nonprofit pay differential, and establishing empirical linkage of commercialism to pay in the 
nonprofit sector.   
Multilevel conceptualization of the nonprofit pay is rooted in different explanatory levels 
of theories relevant to the nonprofit pay. Donative wage theory is about one specific nature, 
tendency, or trait owned by individuals: altruism motivation. On the organizational level, theory 
differentiates nonprofit organizations by the tax-exempt status and non-distribution constraints, 
which is related to attenuated property rights. On the industry level, industries dominated by for-
profits gravitate more on profit and efficiency, whereas industries dominated by nonprofits lean 
more towards social capital building and inefficiency. Therefore, nonprofit wage differential can 
be examined from the individual level, organizational level, and industry level. In the 
dissertation, constrained by the data availability, I examined pay differential on the individual 
level and industry level, and find empirical support to donative labor hypothesis and 
compensating wage theory.   
Although the actualization of altruism does not have to depend on the industry or 
occupation, industries and occupations present as an important context for employment and wage 
setting. Applying CCREM, I have been able to estimate an average donative labor effect as well 
as the full array of industry and occupation effects. Acknowledging the variability on industry 
and occupation levels is important to dispel the misperception that nonprofit workers in some 
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industries are “less altruistic” than others because effects from different sources (industry, 
occupation, and individual) are decomposed. The resultant inventory of nonprofit wage 
differentials across industries and occupations can be used for reference and corroboration for 
future nonprofit wage study.  
The effects of commercialism have been examined in other areas, such as financial health 
or nonprofit mission drift. I have extended the definition and measure of commercialism in the 
context of the sectoral pay differentials. Taking advantage of detailed human capital and 
demographic information from ACS and Census data, I have tested different commercialism 
measures generated from SOI data. Finding of this part helps elucidate the meaning of 
commercialism. Treating commercialism as intent rather than a result seems more relevant to the 
sectoral pay differential study. As an inverse proxy for commercialism, fundraising efforts 
predict lower pay for workers. Measured as a compositional effect, commercialism – the for-
profit share of workers – increases employee salary. Commercialism affects pay due to its 
associated focus on efficiency and cost minimization mindset and potential subsequent change 
work environment and management practices. The consistent effects of commercialism in its 
compositional and substantive forms have advanced our knowledge about the relationship 
between commercialism and pay. 
Limitations and gaps for future study 
My dissertation has tested and lent support to donative labor theory, compensating wage 
theory, and possibly efficiency wage theory. Corroborating the random effects of nonprofit wage 
differential across industries and occupations with previous studies shows that the estimates are 
reliable. There are several limitations or gaps that future researches might address.  
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I have modeled the random effects of nonprofit pay differential on the industry level but 
have not offered an explanation. Past researches have tried to explain the positive nonprofit pay 
differential through attenuated property rights theory (Preston, 1988). However, it cannot explain 
why nonprofits with the same non-distribution constraints pay less than for-profits in other 
industries. Similarly, Jones's (2015) application of supply and demand of altruistic workers on 
the industry level cannot explain why, in industries where the supply is not enough, the sectoral 
pay differential is not zero when nonprofit and for-profits compete for same-type of workers. 
The majority of nonprofit pay studies mentioned the efficiency wage theory, but few 
tested it. A major reason might be limited data since the application of efficiency wage is on the 
firm and industry levels. The data generation process in the multilevel modeling makes it 
possible to make the try because it can explicitly model the industry level variability. My 
tentative explanation for the random effects of nonprofit pay differential is that the sector 
dominates the industry pays higher than the other sector. Future studies could consider the 
relationship between organization size and pay on the industry level because large organizations 
-- no matter whether it is nonprofit or for-profit -- usually pay higher, which is related to the 
difficulty in supervision. That large organizations dominate an industry seems common. In 2015, 
210,670 nonprofits (66.9 percent) had expenses lower than $500,000, but they only composed 2 
percent of the total public charity expenditures. In contrast, only 5.3 percent of organizations 
have expenses over $10 million, but they account for 87.7 percent of expenditures of public 
charity (McKeever, 2018). Similarly, more commercialized industries, which are dominated by 
for-profits, are more likely to see larger for-profit firms than nonprofits. 
The dissertation does not cover the organizational level analysis due to the lack of 
organization data. It means I did not examine hypotheses that might be originated from 
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attenuated property rights theory, such as what Preston (1988) and Byrne (2014) do.  
Organizational level data only exist in limited scenarios such as hospitals (Roomkin & Weisbrod, 
1999), nursing home, childcare centers (Ben-Ner et al., 2011). It might remain challenging to 
have nationally representative data that also contains information of individuals for control. 
Another limitation relates to the pattern of the variation on the occupation level. In 
addition to the inter-industry dispersion, I have modeled the size and range of inter-occupation 
wage dispersion as residuals after controlling human capital, demographic background, industry, 
and state effects. Ability bias explains part of the variability on the occupation level, but 
remarkable wage dispersion (random intercept) and nonprofit wage differentials (random slope) 
are present. The dispersion on the occupation level can be tested with information on job skill 
requirements and work conditions. Hirsch (2005) has insightful discussions on the application of 
occupation variables. Future studies can examine the occupation wage dispersion with more 
occupation level variables.  
Commercialism effect on pay is built on compensating wage theory with the rationale 
that commercialized industries have less desirable working conditions than less commercialized 
industries. Commercialism is measured as the percentage of for-profit workers as well as the 
inverse percentage of fundraising expenses in the total expenses. Both measures confirm the 
effect of commercialism to increase pay. However, the argument is mostly based on the review 
of the literature and entails some assumptions. Future studies could explore what changes are to 
the work conditions and management practices as a result of commercialism. In addition, both 
measures might be subject to measurement errors. By limiting the 289 industries in ACS data to 
58 industries, the measurement error of the for-profit share of workers is reduced. The measure 
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of fundraising efforts might have more measurement errors. More than half of the industries have 
very minimal fundraising expenses, which may not differentiate the industries well.  
Conclusion  
Nonprofit pay study is an important topic in two senses. The nonprofit sector employs a 
large number of workers. Most services provided nonprofits are labor-intensive and require close 
human engagement. Nonprofit pay study is thus an informative avenue to understand the 
nonprofit sector. Secondly, the nonprofit pay study is not a new area. However, findings in 
current studies contradict one another on whether nonprofits pay better than for-profit 
organizations. The discordance in findings suggests a disconnection between theoretical 
predictions and empirical evidence. From the perspective of knowledge building, more research 
efforts and empirical evidence are needed to either offer support to theories or to falsify theories.   
With this in mind, I employ a multilevel approach to deconstruct theories and analyze 
nationally representative economy-wide data to reveal a panorama view of nonprofit pay 
differentials relative to the for-profit sector. By controlling the occupation and state effects, I 
have analyzed and presented how nonprofit pay differentials are situated in the inter-industry pay 
dispersion. The finding offers a comprehensive view of the nonprofit pay differential. For 
instance, industries where nonprofits have positive differential are often low-paying industries 
such as childcare centers. By removing differences in higher-level structures (industries, 
occupations, and state), the CCREM models produce a negative 5.7 percent differential for 
nonprofits, which I argue as donative labor effect. By examining the industries through the lens 
of commercialism, I have found support in compensating wage theory and confirmed the 
moderating effect of commercialism on the gender pay gap and the manager-staff pay gap.  
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My endeavor not only contributes to a coordinated explanation of theories on differential 
levels, but also establishes an exhaustive inventory of nonprofit pay differential as a composite 
of industry effect, occupation effect, and individual effect. In the meantime, I have listed 






Appendix A. Data cleaning process 
 
Steps Nonprofit For-profit Total 
1. Combined datasets in 13 years 1,758,404  (4.32%) 14,307,394 (35.11%) 40,745,671  
(9 categories)* 
    
2. Keep full-time adult workers in 
51 states (16=<age=<65) (weeks 
working = 50-52 weeks) 
898,515 (7.81%) 7,556,504 (65.67%) 11,506,431  
(9 categories) 
    
3. Keep only for-profit and 
nonprofit 
898,515 (10.63%) 7,556,504 (89.37%) 8,455,019 
    
4. Drop observations with imputed 
variables (incwage, age, sex, 
race, ind, occ, workhours, 
classwork) 
883,716 (10.65%) 7,411,542 (89.35%) 8,295,258 
    
5. Keep 58 industries  664,820 (22.03%) 2,353,305  (77.97%) 3,018,125 
    
6. Drop occupation with no 
nonprofit presence  
664,820 (%) 2,353,109 (77.97%) 3,017,929 
    
7. Drop if log(income)<8 664,662 (22.03%) 2,352,570 (77.97%) 3,017,232 
    
8. Drop several occupations with 
merge problem 
664,646 (22.03%) 2,352,464 (99.97%) 3,017,110 
* 9 categories: N/A, self-employed (not incorporated), self-employed (incorporated), for-profit, nonprofit, the 
federal government, state government, local government, unpaid family workers.  
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Appendix B. Industry categories between ACS and SOI 
Industry (58 categories) 
NAICS 
in ACS 
NAICS in SOI Combined title 
Combined 
industry code 
Support activities for agriculture and forestry 115 
115000, 115110, 
115210 
Food and agricultural programs 
 
1150 
Electric power generation, transmission and distribution 2211P 






Natural gas distribution 2212P 
Sewage treatment facilities 22132 
Water, steam, air conditioning, and irrigation systems 2213M 
Electric and gas, and other combinations 221MP 
Not specified utilities 22S 
Air transportation 481 









Rail transportation 482 
Water transportation 483 
Truck transportation 484 
Taxi and limousine service 4853 
Bus service and urban transit 485M 
Pipeline transportation 486 
Scenic and sightseeing transportation 487 
Services incidental to transportation 488 
Newspaper publishers 51111 
511100 




Periodical, book, and directory publishers  5111Z 
Motion pictures and video industries 5121 
512110 Religious film & video 
 
5121 
Sound recording industries 5122 
Radio and television broadcasting, telecommunication 513M 
513110, 513120, 
513300 




Other information services 51412 514120 Libraries and Archives  
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Industry (58 categories) 
NAICS 
in ACS 
NAICS in SOI Combined title 
Combined 
industry code 
Undefined  5141Z 5141 
Savings institutions, including credit unions 5221M 
522130 Credit unions  
 
5221 
Non-depository credit and related activities 522M 
Insurance carriers and related activities 524 
524110, 524113, 
524114 
Insurance providers  
5241 
Banking and related activities 52M1 
522000 Financial institutions  
 
5220 
Securities, commodities, funds, trusts, and other financial 
investments 
52M2 
Real estate 531 531390 Real estate associations  5313 
Legal services 5411 541199 
Crime prevention, rehabilitation, 
law enforcement, inmate support  
5411 
Management, scientific and technical consulting services 5416 541618 
Management & technical 
assistance  
5416 
Scientific research and development services 5417 541710, 541720  Research institute 5417 
Veterinary services 54194 541940 Veterinary Services 5419 
Employment services 5613 561310 Employment services 5613 
Elementary and secondary schools 6111 611110 
Elementary and secondary 
schools 
6111 
Colleges, universities, and professional schools, including junior 
colleges 
611M1 611210, 611310 
Two-year college and higher 
education  
6112 
Business, technical, and trade schools and training 611M2 611510 
Vocational & Technical Schools 
+ Business, technical, and trade 
schools and training 
 
6115 
Other schools, instruction and educational services 611M3 
611000, 
611610, 611620, 
611699, 611710  
Other schools, instruction and 
educational services 
6116 
Office of chiropractors 62131 
621340 Rehabilitative care 
 
6213 
Offices of optometrists 62132 
Offices of other health practitioners 6213ZM 
Outpatient care centers 6214 
621410, 621420, 
621491, 621498 




Industry (58 categories) 
NAICS 
in ACS 
NAICS in SOI Combined title 
Combined 
industry code 
Home health care services 6216 621610 Home health care 6216 
Other health care services 621M 
621910, 621911, 
621999 
Other health care services  
6219 





Nursing care facilities 6231 623110 Nursing facilities, hospices 6231 
Residential care facilities, except skilled nursing facilities 623M 
632220, 623311, 
623312, 623990 
Residential care facilities 
6322 
Individual and family services 6241 
624100, 624110, 
624120, 624190 
Individual and family services 
6241 




Community food and housing 
6242 
Vocational rehabilitation services 6243 624310 
Vocational Counseling, 
Employment, Job Training 
6243 
Child day care services 6244 624410 Day care centers  6244 
Performing arts, spectator sports, and related industries 711 
711100, 711110, 
711120, 711130 
Performing arts, spectator sports, 
and related industries 
7111 
Museums, art galleries, historical sites, and similar institutions 712 
712110, 712120, 
712130, 712190 
Museums, art galleries, historical 
sites 
7121 
Other amusement, gambling, and recreation industries 713Z 713940, 713990 
Other amusement, gambling, and 
recreation industries 
7139 
Traveler accommodation 7211 721199 All other traveler accommodation 7211 
Recreational vehicle parks and camps, and rooming and boarding 
houses 
721M 721214 Recreational and vacation camps 
7212 
Funeral homes, cemeteries and crematories 8122 812220 Cemeteries 8122 




Appendix C. Variable selection models  
 Natural log of annual income 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
For-profit share 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (3.609) (3.498) (2.700) (3.155) 
Female percentage -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (-1.448) (-1.226) (-1.448) (-1.437) 
Nonprofit  -0.057*** -0.049*** -0.057*** -0.049*** 
 (-3.932) (-3.547) (-3.932) (-3.543) 
Female  -0.185*** -0.186*** -0.185*** -0.186*** 
 (-272.934) (-272.825) (-272.933) (-272.825) 
Years of education 0.073*** 0.073*** 0.073*** 0.073*** 
 (468.676) (467.171) (468.677) (467.180) 
Latino  -0.063*** -0.063*** -0.063*** -0.063*** 
 (-57.061) (-57.015) (-57.061) (-57.015) 
Black  -0.093*** -0.093*** -0.093*** -0.093*** 
 (-90.402) (-90.341) (-90.402) (-90.342) 
Asian  -0.029*** -0.030*** -0.029*** -0.030*** 
 (-21.799) (-21.898) (-21.799) (-21.897) 
Other races -0.066*** -0.066*** -0.066*** -0.066*** 
 (-32.353) (-32.316) (-32.353) (-32.316) 
Speak English 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.045*** 
 (44.654) (44.384) (44.654) (44.383) 
Work experience  0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 
 (449.154) (447.659) (449.154) (447.658) 
Work experience squared -0.053*** -0.053*** -0.053*** -0.053*** 
 (-266.868) (-265.419) (-266.868) (-265.419) 
Work hours per week 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 
 (342.443) (341.053) (342.443) (341.053) 
Female percentage squared   -0.062   
  (-0.344)   
For-profit share squared    0.180  
   (0.492)  
Trend of for-profit share     0.119 
    (0.593) 
Random slope of nonprofit Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 10.673*** 10.674*** 10.662*** 10.664*** 
 (378.535) (330.193) (300.269) (355.658) 
Observations 3,017,110 2,997,875 3,017,110 2,997,875 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 4,065,931 4,035,721 4,065,933 4,035,720 




Appendix D. Industry information and estimates 


















Food and agricultural programs 1150 6,791 274 7,065 0.96 -0.0636 -0.0400 
Public utilities  2210 94,027 8,782 102,809 0.91 0.3029 -0.0528 
Transportation 4800 262,258 5,002 267,260 0.98 0.0616 0.0401 
Newspaper, periodical, book, and database 
Publishers 
5111 56,619 2,550 59,169 0.96 -0.0114 0.0226 
Religious film & video 5121 17,939 975 18,914 0.95 0.0069 -0.2033 
Radio and television broadcasting, 
telecommunication 
5131 12,348 605 12,953 0.95 0.0429 -0.1259 
Libraries and Archives 5141 5,500 782 6,282 0.88 0.0978 -0.1529 
Financial institutions  5220 293,501 5,048 298,549 0.98 0.1735 0.0526 
Credit unions 5221 89,632 14,837 104,469 0.86 0.1088 -0.0572 
Insurance providers 5241 219,292 15,488 234,780 0.93 0.1690 0.0863 
Real estate associations  5313 111,532 6,295 117,827 0.95 -0.0185 -0.0459 
Crime prevention, rehabilitation, law 
enforcement, inmate support  
5411 106,522 3,490 110,012 0.97 0.0639 -0.1906 
Management & technical assistance  5416 80,616 2,483 83,099 0.97 0.1467 -0.0792 
Research institute 5417 35,676 11,946 47,622 0.75 0.2492 -0.0222 
Veterinary Services 5419 17,225 466 17,691 0.97 -0.1857 0.0076 
Employment services 5613 37,954 1,990 39,944 0.95 -0.0962 -0.0782 
Elementary and secondary schools 6111 50,435 79,531 129,966 0.39 -0.0239 0.0843 
Two-year college and higher education  6112 48,165 76,142 124,307 0.39 0.0633 0.1070 
Vocational & Technical Schools + Business, 
technical, and trade schools and training 
6115 5,413 1,215 6,628 0.82 -0.0056 -0.0331 
Other schools, instruction and educational 
services 
6116 10,908 6,436 17,344 0.63 0.0157 0.0386 
Rehabilitative care 6213 18,122 1,377 19,499 0.93 -0.1023 0.0845 
Outpatient care centers 6214 51,963 26,499 78,462 0.66 0.0167 0.00251 
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Home health care 6216 35,611 8,421 44,032 0.81 -0.1091 0.07954 
Other health care services  6219 63,838 21,087 84,925 0.75 0.0942 0.06394 
Hospitals 6220 252,313 226,694 479,007 0.53 0.1310 0.10195 
Nursing facilities, hospices 6231 93,572 25,215 118,787 0.79 -0.0665 0.05238 
Residential care facilities 6232 27,745 19,189 46,934 0.59 -0.1039 0.03939 
Individual and family services 6241 17,032 38,714 55,746 0.31 -0.0254 0.07480 
Community food and housing 6242 871 5,843 6,714 0.13 0.0314 -0.01528 
Vocational Counseling, Employment, Job 
Training 
6243 3,291 6,565 9,856 0.33 -0.0459 -0.02934 
Day care centers  6244 33,363 16,130 49,493 0.67 -0.2622 0.08409 
Performing arts, spectator sports, and related 
industries 
7110 15,055 4,048 19,103 0.79 -0.0064 -0.12637 
Museums, art galleries, historical sites 7121 1,922 7,935 9,857 0.19 0.0320 0.08194 
Other amusement, gambling, and recreation 
industries 
7139 73,021 7,224 80,245 0.91 -0.1015 0.05072 
All other traveler accommodation 7211 82,663 1,169 83,832 0.99 -0.1093 0.02065 
Recreational and vacation camps 7212 1,853 2,015 3,868 0.48 -0.2227 -0.00513 
Cemeteries 8122 7,520 787 8,307 0.91 -0.0632 0.07182 
Other personal service, animal training  8129 10,356 1,397 11,753 0.88 -0.1844 0.01001 
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4 Chief executives and public administrators 33,213 30.74 0.7899 -0.0495 
7 Financial managers 79,015 55.13 0.3175 0.0608 
8 
Human resources and labor relations 
managers 
14,600 67.02 0.3610 -0.0066 
13 
Managers and specialists in marketing, 
advertising, and public relation 
35,835 56.2 0.3594 -0.0957 
14 Managers in education and related fields 36,354 66.27 0.2246 0.0236 
15 Managers of medicine and health occupations  43,430 70.5 0.3821 0.0167 
17 
Managers of food-serving and lodging 
establishments 
12,888 51.39 0.0933 0.0440 
18 Managers of properties and real estate 29,481 57.82 0.1298 0.0131 
19 Funeral directors 3,029 21.23 0.0938 -0.0571 
21 Managers of service organizations 17,796 68.31 0.2448 -0.0366 
22 Managers and administrators 134,089 40.59 0.3396 -0.0510 
23 Accountants and audit 60,733 60.85 0.2173 0.0106 
24 Insurance underwriter 10,847 66.95 0.1779 -0.0492 
25 Other financial specialists 70,709 44.8 0.2561 -0.1348 
26 Management analysts 28,550 42.1 0.3737 -0.1268 
27 Personnel, HR, training 33,459 73.7 0.2250 -0.0679 
28 
Purchasing agents and buyers, of farm 
products 
5 80 0.2395 -0.0229 
29 Buyers, wholesale and retail trade 73 54.79 -0.2697 0.0532 
33 Purchasing managers, agents and buyers 9,033 55.03 0.1275 -0.0574 
34 Business and promotion agents 1,674 44.38 0.2353 -0.1637 
35 Construction inspectors 444 15.99 -0.0382 0.0724 
36 Inspectors and compliance officers 6,457 62.03 0.2546 0.0415 
37 Management support occupations 6,635 67.66 0.1462 -0.0061 
43 Architects 862 23.55 0.3956 -0.0388 
44 Aerospace engineer 537 11.73 0.3166 0.0451 
45 Metallurgical and material engineers 94 21.28 0.1941 -0.0099 
47 Petroleum, mining engineers 119 10.08 0.4441 -0.0684 
48 Chemical engineers 213 14.08 0.2352 -0.0555 
53 Civil engineers 1,171 9.91 0.2474 -0.0544 
55 Electrical engineer 4,427 10.19 0.2489 0.0570 
56 Industrial engineers 1,359 23.84 0.2443 0.0756 
57 Mechanical engineers 1,280 5.55 0.2178 -0.0107 
59 Not-elsewhere-classified engineers 8,932 12.36 0.2680 0.0561 
64 Computer systems analysts 59,613 33.81 0.2431 -0.0018 
65 
Operations and system researchers and 
analysts 
5,404 45.36 0.2152 0.0774 
66 Actuaries 2,580 32.29 0.6284 -0.0789 
68 Mathematicians and mathematical scientists 1,607 46.73 0.2935 -0.0678 
69 Physicists and astronomers 584 16.61 0.2013 -0.0372 
73 Chemists 2,011 37.54 0.0479 -0.0924 
74 Atmospheric and space scientists 172 18.02 0.1759 -0.0262 
75 Geologists 1,580 29.24 0.0343 -0.0920 
76 Physical scientists, n. e. .c 8,449 39.82 0.0593 -0.1319 
77 Agricultural and food scientists 646 25.85 0.0066 -0.0704 
78 Biological scientists 2,803 50.95 0.0205 -0.1289 














83 Medical scientists 6,740 50.88 0.0807 -0.0767 
84 Physicians 35,000 36.17 0.7344 -0.0480 
85 Dentists 289 42.21 0.3956 0.2283 
86 Veterinarians 4,048 60.97 0.4891 -0.1371 
87 Optometrists 991 41.57 0.6498 -0.0628 
88 Podiatrists 259 28.96 0.5718 -0.0973 
89 Other health and therapy 1,137 31.93 0.1206 0.0341 
95 Registered nurses 193,429 89.7 0.4253 -0.0006 
96 Pharmacists 6,540 52.91 0.6509 -0.0089 
97 Dietitians and nutritionists 4,252 91.06 0.0849 0.0180 
98 Respiratory therapist 8,728 60.84 0.2529 -0.0252 
99 Occupational therapists 5,958 85.99 0.4444 -0.0959 
103 Physical therapists 17,653 66.34 0.3399 -0.0305 
104 Speech therapists 4,282 91.55 0.4150 -0.0919 
105 Therapists, n.e.c 8,186 76.03 0.1298 -0.0589 
106 Physicians' assistant 4,322 61.2 0.4496 -0.0120 
154 Subject instructors (HS/college) 41,473 45.86 0.0501 0.0767 
155 Kindergarten and earlier school teachers 21,822 97.98 -0.1208 0.0126 
156 Primary school teachers 52,857 77.14 0.0679 -0.0323 
157 Secondary school teachers 12,247 54.01 0.0858 -0.0402 
158 Special education teachers 2,790 84.98 0.0877 0.0182 
159 Teachers, n.e.c 25,472 72.86 -0.1365 -0.0539 
163 Vocational and educational counselors  24,480 69.2 -0.0126 -0.0232 
164 Librarians 3,730 76.51 -0.0070 0.0334 
165 Archivists and curators 2,003 60.91 0.0086 0.1115 
166 Economists, market researchers 6,729 57.13 0.3142 -0.0301 
167 Psychologists 4,390 63.64 0.0846 0.0067 
169 Social scientists, n.e.c 1,249 54.04 -0.0380 0.0630 
173 Urban and regional planners 149 41.61 0.2726 0.0278 
174 Social workers 34,900 81.27 0.0597 -0.0129 
175 Recreation workers 10,494 64.74 -0.1063 -0.0238 
176 Clergy and religious workers 1,660 36.99 -0.2378 0.0250 
178 Lawyers 46,026 34.89 0.5477 -0.2213 
183 Writers and authors 3,894 55.08 0.0992 0.0542 
184 Technical writers 1,546 59.57 0.1638 -0.0050 
185 Designers 8,283 50.79 0.0637 0.0395 
186 Musician or composer 952 26.37 -0.0044 0.2678 
187 Actors, directors, producers 5,356 38.85 0.1759 -0.1846 
188 
Art makers: painters, sculptors, craft-artists, 
and print-makers 
2,722 34.42 0.1454 -0.1244 
189 Photographers 1,201 23.98 -0.0933 0.0583 
193 Dancers 253 80.63 0.0300 -0.1094 
194 Art/entertainment performers 1,464 54.51 -0.0467 -0.1098 
195 Editors and reporters 16,347 46.23 0.0656 0.0384 
198 Announcers 761 18.53 -0.1184 -0.0156 
199 Athletes, sports instructors 6,117 21.4 -0.0251 -0.0948 
203 Clinical laboratory technicians 22,721 74.44 0.0703 0.0549 
204 Dental hygienists 97 90.72 0.2884 0.0407 
205 Health record tech specialists 7,009 91.51 -0.1189 0.0191 
206 Radiologic tech specialists 21,480 68.96 0.2935 0.0213 
207 Licensed practical nurses 38,739 91.36 0.0867 -0.0213 
208 Health technologists 18,455 45.98 -0.0817 0.0541 














217 Drafters 989 23.05 0.0008 0.0193 
218 Surveyors, cartographers 692 23.99 -0.0534 0.0285 
223 Biological technician 878 47.49 -0.0403 -0.0880 
224 Chemical technicians 597 29.82 -0.0742 -0.0587 
225 Other science technic 213 22.54 0.1451 -0.0109 
226 Airplane pilots and navigators 8,012 4.44 0.4076 -0.1442 
227 Air traffic controllers 830 24.7 0.1662 -0.0912 
228 Broadcast equipment operators  2,324 10.11 0.0047 0.0047 
229 Computer software developers 33,888 27.32 0.3733 -0.0321 
233 
Programmers of numerically controlled 
machines tools 
71 12.68 -0.0682 0.0140 
234 Legal assistants, paralegals 34,663 86.41 0.0394 0.0544 
243 Supervisors and proprietors of sales jobs 34,448 51.15 0.3012 -0.0832 
253 Insurance sales occupations 37,249 52.66 0.0825 0.0087 
254 Real estate sales occupations  25,486 51.03 0.1612 0.0480 
255 Financial services sales occupations  26,680 33.11 0.3987 -0.2188 
256 Advertising and related sales jobs 7,476 59.46 0.2385 -0.0162 
258 Sales engineers 129 8.53 0.3199 -0.0487 
274 Salespersons, n.e.c 21,935 48.29 0.2488 0.0723 
275 Retail sales clerks 1,981 55.33 0.1477 -0.1130 
276 Cashiers 9,622 70.41 -0.1920 0.0284 
277 
Door-to-door sales, street sales, and news 
vendors 
1,070 38.32 -0.4421 0.0071 
283 Sales demonstrators /promoters / models 130 50.77 0.1347 -0.0733 
303 Office supervisors 50,260 73.82 0.0954 0.0564 
308 Computer and peripheral equipment operators 4,819 53.02 -0.0519 0.0766 
313 Secretaries 118,840 96.78 -0.0436 0.0178 
315 Typists 8,830 90.4 -0.1206 0.0532 
316 Interviewers, enumerators and surveyors  10,363 83.05 -0.1138 -0.0267 
317 Hotel clerks 5,977 65.42 -0.3530 0.0425 
318 Transportation ticket and reservation agents 8,325 60.72 -0.0493 0.0269 
319 Receptionists 26,563 92.85 -0.2162 0.0555 
326 Correspondence and order clerks 1,540 70.06 -0.1374 0.0085 
328 Human resources clerk 1,272 91.67 -0.0166 0.0548 
329 Library assistants 1,265 77.79 -0.2398 -0.0388 
335 File clerks 8,610 79.9 -0.1664 0.0846 
336 Records clerks 4,993 86.42 -0.0136 0.0302 
337 Bookkeepers and accounting clerks 37,599 86.54 -0.0485 0.1008 
338 Payroll and timekeeping clerks 5,042 90.08 0.0377 0.0534 
344 
Billing clerks and related financial records 
processing 
16,916 90.58 -0.0919 -0.0100 
347 Office machine operators 1,225 66.12 -0.3151 0.0884 
348 Telephone operators 2,294 87.45 -0.2248 0.0325 
349 Other telecom operators 209 60.29 -0.0006 0.0474 
356 Mail clerks, outside of post office 2,885 47.9 -0.3583 0.0479 
357 Messengers 2,338 24.68 -0.3945 -0.0310 
359 Dispatchers 8,343 42.62 -0.1487 -0.0351 
364 Shipping and receiving clerks 4,670 29.76 -0.2395 -0.0445 
365 Stock and inventory clerks 6,223 42.46 -0.2020 -0.0173 
366 Meter readers 2,095 16.95 -0.2460 0.0247 
368 Weighers, measurers, and checkers 838 45.11 -0.0597 0.0148 
373 
Material recording, scheduling, production, 
planning, and expediting clerks 















Insurance adjusters, examiners, and 
investigators 
51,278 72.13 -0.0469 -0.0403 
376 Customer service reps 62,792 76.14 -0.1063 0.0539 
377 Eligibility clerks for government programs 544 86.58 -0.0464 0.0287 
378 Bill and account collectors 7,011 74.18 -0.1107 0.0373 
379 General office clerks 26,772 86.33 -0.1415 0.0564 
383 Bank tellers 29,299 89 -0.3397 0.2294 
384 Proofreaders 381 71.92 -0.2120 0.0607 
385 Data entry keyers 12,128 83.6 -0.1955 0.0813 
386 Statistical clerks 741 67.88 0.0419 0.0194 
389 Administrative support jobs 20,435 79.81 -0.0045 0.0451 
405 
Housekeepers, maids, butlers, stewards, and 
lodging quarters cleaners 
30,791 83.67 -0.2981 -0.0446 
415 Supervisors of guards 1,822 13.78 -0.0028 0.0111 
417 Firefighting, prevention 260 8.85 -0.0167 -0.0042 
418 Police, detectives, and private investigators 2,424 47.65 0.0244 0.1013 
423 Other law enforcement 48 43.75 -0.1588 0.0130 
425 Crossing guards and bridge tenders 58 32.76 -0.1774 0.0119 
426 Guards, watchmen, doorkeepers 13,214 18.67 -0.2517 0.0412 
427 Protective services 693 47.04 -0.4349 0.0632 
434 Bartenders 2,672 38.59 -0.2114 -0.1239 
435 Waiter/waitress 5,103 61.41 -0.1439 -0.0630 
436 Cooks, variously defined 26,291 53.44 -0.1866 -0.0117 
439 Kitchen workers 194 72.16 -0.3343 0.0556 
443 Waiter's assistant 7,054 63.48 -0.2949 -0.0600 
444 Miscellaneous food prep worker 4,537 55.74 -0.3288 -0.0700 
445 Dental assistants 301 94.35 -0.0736 -0.0080 
446 Health aides, except nursing  28,132 87.11 -0.1518 0.0367 
447 Nursing aides, orderlies and attendants  110,958 86.28 -0.2403 0.0419 
448 Supervisors of cleaning and building services 6,863 49.69 -0.0574 0.1224 
453 Janitors 37,710 18.29 -0.2532 0.0553 
454 Elevator operators 677 8.57 -0.0456 -0.0440 
455 Pest control occupations 71 9.86 -0.1605 0.0217 
456 Supervisors of person 3,710 46.93 0.1001 -0.0395 
457 Barbers 17 41.18 -0.1328 0.0167 
458 Hairdressers and cosmetologists  974 94.56 -0.0210 -0.0576 
459 Recreation facility attendants  9,100 46.23 -0.0305 -0.1235 
461 Guides 545 40.92 -0.3764 0.0884 
462 Ushers 502 30.88 -0.3139 0.1199 
463 Public transportation 6,829 54.34 -0.0475 0.0214 
464 Baggage porters 3,777 18.32 -0.2709 0.0827 
465 Welfare service aides 6,545 78.87 -0.0397 -0.0066 
468 Childcare workers 18,735 90.73 -0.2033 0.0324 
469 Personal service occupations  3,624 57.45 -0.1930 -0.0126 
473 Farmers (owners and tenants) 219 19.63 0.0445 -0.1160 
475 Farm managers, except 247 21.86 0.0364 -0.0466 
479 Farm workers 2,418 25.64 -0.2424 0.1166 
485 Supervisors of agricultural occupations  2,162 4.39 0.0504 0.0201 
486 Gardeners and grounds 9,103 6.13 -0.2774 0.0469 
487 Animal caretakers except farms 3,881 73.43 -0.1682 0.0445 
488 Graders and sorters of agricultural products  186 68.82 -0.2259 0.0355 
489 Inspectors of agricultural products  22 36.36 -0.0676 0.0218 














498 Fishers, hunters, and kindred 70 2.86 -0.2280 0.0567 
503 Supervisors of mechanics and repairers  8,855 5 0.1003 0.0033 
505 Automobile mechanics 1,691 1.83 -0.0766 0.0897 
507 Bus, truck, and stationary engine mechanics 8,200 0.87 -0.0645 0.0666 
508 Aircraft mechanics 8,734 2.78 0.1348 -0.0520 
509 Small engine repairer 295 1.36 -0.0121 0.0044 
514 Auto body repairers 199 3.02 -0.0791 0.0726 
516 
Heavy equipment and farm equipment 
mechanics  
2,814 1.35 0.0655 -0.0281 
518 Industrial machinery repairers 2,683 2.98 0.0386 -0.0297 
519 Machinery maintenance 369 2.98 -0.1551 0.0392 
523 Repairers of industrial electrical equipment 1,001 2.9 0.1081 0.0029 
525 Repairers of data processing equipment 3,317 20.17 0.0546 0.0243 
526 Repairers of household appliance  201 3.48 -0.0852 -0.0144 
527 Telecom and line installers 2,536 7.97 0.0183 0.0782 
533 Repairers of electric equipment 532 4.32 0.1248 -0.0339 
534 Heating, air conditioning mechanics  2,243 1.52 0.0407 0.0232 
535 Precision makers, repairers 1,509 17.03 0.0787 -0.0340 
536 Locksmiths and safe repairers  240 5 0.0227 0.0293 
539 Repairers of mechanic 944 7.31 -0.0573 -0.0484 
543 Elevator installers and repairers  54 1.85 0.2666 -0.0090 
544 Millwrights 215 1.86 0.0951 0.0033 
549 Mechanics and repairers 15,574 3.09 -0.1141 0.0352 
558 Supervisors of construction work 2,467 3.73 0.1641 -0.0194 
563 Masons, tilers, and carpet installers 135 4.44 -0.1136 0.0167 
567 Carpenters 2,635 2.28 -0.0737 0.0556 
573 Drywall installers 40 10 -0.0774 0.0054 
575 Electricians 6,252 2.38 0.0745 0.0262 
577 Electric power installers  9,727 1.12 0.1850 0.0457 
579 Painters, construction and maintenance  1,925 5.51 -0.1776 0.0951 
583 Paperhangers 10 10 0.0458 -0.0049 
585 Plumbers, pipe fitter 3,589 2.06 -0.0085 0.0337 
593 Insulation workers 405 40.25 -0.1998 -0.0728 
594 
Paving, surfacing, and tamping equipment 
operators  
11 18.18 -0.0921 0.0032 
595 Roofers and slaters 32 6.25 0.0520 0.0012 
596 Sheet metal duct installers 317 1.89 0.0618 -0.0115 
597 Structural metal work 80 3.75 -0.0533 0.0084 
599 Construction trades 121 4.96 -0.2362 -0.0067 
615 Explosives workers 29 3.45 -0.0557 -0.0028 
628 Production supervisor 9,782 21.43 0.1484 -0.0136 
637 Machinists 1,054 3.61 0.1185 0.0431 
643 Boilermakers 171 1.75 0.0572 -0.0297 
649 Engravers 25 16 0.0750 -0.0081 
658 Furniture and wood finishers 15 6.67 -0.0739 -0.0437 
666 Dressmakers and seams 98 82.65 -0.2571 0.0359 
668 Upholsterers 57 22.81 -0.0014 0.0064 
669 Shoe repairers 8 12.5 -0.3016 0.0388 
675 Hand molders and shapers  62 8.06 -0.0832 0.0481 
677 Optical goods workers 1,172 79.18 0.0152 0.0532 
678 
Dental laboratory and medical appliance 
technicians  
17,335 78.76 -0.0354 -0.0011 














686 Butchers and meat cutters 57 17.54 -0.1933 0.0610 
687 Bakers 435 58.39 -0.1815 -0.0659 
688 Batch food makers 30 50 -0.2947 0.0332 
694 Water and sewage treatment plant operators  1,938 4.13 -0.2794 0.0807 
695 Power plant operators 4,863 6.29 0.2244 0.0144 
696 Plant and system operators  4,135 2.25 0.1005 0.0309 
699 Other plant and system operators  764 7.46 0.0323 -0.0922 
706 Punching and stamping press operatives 72 12.5 -0.2158 0.0183 
708 Drilling and boring machine operators  9 22.22 -0.1339 0.0333 
709 Grinding, abrading, buffing workers 33 18.18 -0.0528 -0.0045 
723 Metal platers 10 10 -0.0364 0.0142 
726 
Wood lathe, routing, and planning machine 
operators  
607 5.93 0.1268 -0.0035 
727 Sawing machine operators  14 50 -0.1953 0.0241 
733 Other woodworking machine operators  37 2.7 -0.4042 0.0015 
734 Printing machine operators  414 22.71 -0.1117 0.0019 
736 Typesetters and compositors  2,983 27.02 -0.0941 -0.0765 
743 Textile cutting machine operators  9 22.22 -0.0740 0.0043 
744 Textile sewing machine operators  167 86.83 -0.1286 -0.0584 
745 Shoemaking machine operators 4 25 -0.0556 0.0157 
747 Pressing machine operators (clothing)  103 47.57 -0.2472 -0.0234 
748 Laundry workers 3,797 81.12 -0.3499 -0.0025 
749 Miscellaneous textile machine 45 26.67 -0.1298 0.0378 
754 Packers, fillers, and wrappers  188 56.38 -0.3470 0.0070 
755 Extruding and forming machine operators  61 19.67 -0.2264 0.0001 
756 Mixing and blending machine operatives  135 22.96 -0.2230 -0.0298 
757 Separating, filtering 161 26.71 0.0138 0.0272 
759 Painting machine operators 345 9.28 -0.0853 0.0201 
764 
Washing, cleaning, and pickling machine 
operators  
27 37.04 -0.0789 0.0001 
765 Paper folding machine operators  69 33.33 -0.3476 0.0328 
766 Furnace, kiln, and oven operators  171 57.31 -0.1518 -0.0237 
769 Slicing and cutting machine operators  124 24.19 -0.3102 0.0004 
773 Motion picture projectionists  231 14.72 -0.3908 0.1155 
774 Photographic process 1,015 48.37 -0.0461 0.0198 
779 Machine operators 5,257 29.1 -0.1621 -0.0213 
783 Welders and metal cut 2,413 2.32 0.0827 0.0730 
785 Assemblers of electric equipment 1,680 40.48 -0.3256 -0.0416 
799 Graders and sorters in manufacturing  5,411 33.54 0.0133 0.0672 
803 Supervisors of motor vehicle transportation  8,523 18.2 0.0471 -0.0554 
804 Truck, delivery, and tractor drivers  89,990 3.83 -0.1798 -0.0731 
808 Bus drivers 10,636 34.23 -0.3329 0.0228 
809 Taxi cab drivers and chauffeurs  8,379 15.5 -0.5859 0.1579 
813 Parking lot attendant 2,076 12.14 -0.4132 -0.0164 
823 Railroad conductors and yardmasters  4,238 3.92 0.2275 -0.0266 
824 Locomotive operators 5,307 2.68 0.2735 -0.0487 
825 Railroad brake, couplers  489 1.84 0.2348 -0.0319 
829 Ship crews and marine engineers   2,320 3.32 0.0359 0.0256 
844 
Operating engineers of construction 
equipment 














848 Crane, derrick, winch and hoist operators  496 2.42 0.2040 0.0005 
853 Excavating and loading machine operators  236 2.12 -0.0656 0.0330 
859 Miscellaneous material moving occupations  477 3.56 0.0976 0.0005 
865 Helpers, construction 103 12.62 -0.2142 0.0531 
866 Helpers, surveyors 108 4.63 -0.2949 0.0503 
869 Construction laborers 1,957 3.37 -0.1519 -0.0055 
874 Production helpers 194 25.77 -0.2012 0.0253 
875 Garbage and recyclable material collectors  213 13.62 -0.4718 -0.0254 
878 Machine feeders and offbearers  128 45.31 -0.1624 0.0172 
883 Freight, stock, and material handlers  940 10.32 -0.1791 0.0802 
885 
Garage and service station related 
occupations  
219 9.13 -0.2974 0.0221 
887 Vehicle washers and equipment cleaners  1,256 27.79 -0.3463 -0.0137 
888 Packers and packagers 1,592 54.46 -0.4743 -0.0964 




Appendix F. Compare nonprofit random intercept model and random slope model 
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max 
Df 2 20.000 2.828 18 19 21 22 
AIC 2 4,071,958.000 8,523.939 4,065,931.000 4,068,945.000 4,074,972.000 4,077,986.000 
BIC 2 4,072,217.000 8,487.397 4,066,215.000 4,069,216.000 4,075,217.000 4,078,218.000 
logLik 2 -2,035,959.000 4,264.798 -2,038,975.000 -2,037,467.000 -2,034,451.000 -2,032,943.000 
deviance 2 4,071,918.000 8,529.596 4,065,887.000 4,068,903.000 4,074,934.000 4,077,950.000 
Chisq 1 12,062.670  12,062.670 12,062.670 12,062.670 12,062.670 
Chi Df 1 4.000  4.000 4.000 4.000 4.000 
Pr(> Chisq) 1 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: 
Model 1:  
lmer(lnincwage ~ 1 + fpsctxt100 + FEMctxt100 + nonprofitC + female + edyrsC + latinoC + blackC + asianC + othraceC + speakengC + expC + 
expsq100th + hourwkC +  (1 |Industry) + (1 |Occupation) + (1|State), acs38, REML = FALSE 
Model 2:  
lmer(lnincwage ~ 1 + fpsctxt100 + FEMctxt100 + nonprofitC + female + edyrsC + latinoC + blackC + asianC + othraceC + speakengC + expC + 
expsq100th + hourwkC +  (1 + nonprofitC | Industry) + (1 + nonprofitC | Occupation) + (1 | State), acs38, REML = FALSE) 
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Appendix G. Compare estimates with fewer industries 





FC RC FC RC  FC RC 





38 industries (all) 
NP workers 462,628 (53.4%) 598,462 (41.6%) 66,184 (4.2%) 664,646 (22%) 
fpsctxt100 0.002 -0.0001 0.004*** 0.003** 0.005 0.005 0.004*** 0.003*** 
 (0.724) (-0.073) (2.708) (2.279) (0.552) (0.520) (4.213) (3.537) 
FEMctxt100 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (-2.810) (-2.687) (-3.487) (-3.283) (-1.216) (-1.604) (-1.521) (-1.445) 
nonprofitC 0.044*** -0.010 0.015*** -0.033** -0.060*** -0.072*** 0.002*** -0.057*** 
 (45.489) (-0.534) (18.892) (-2.003) (-29.393) (-3.490) (2.891) (-3.893) 
femaleC -0.130*** -0.129*** -0.146*** -0.143*** -0.215*** -0.214*** -0.187*** -0.185*** 
 (-114.615) (-114.212) (-157.099) (-154.280) (-220.014) (-219.354) (-276.068) (-272.933) 
edyrsC 0.076*** 0.076*** 0.075*** 0.075*** 0.071*** 0.071*** 0.073*** 0.073*** 
 (279.299) (277.932) (353.433) (352.352) (313.692) (314.045) (469.262) (468.674) 
latinoC -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.041*** -0.040*** -0.081*** -0.080*** -0.065*** -0.063*** 
 (-7.113) (-6.993) (-27.438) (-26.398) (-50.839) (-50.502) (-58.414) (-57.061) 
blackC -0.040*** -0.039*** -0.057*** -0.055*** -0.125*** -0.125*** -0.095*** -0.093*** 
 (-24.621) (-24.224) (-44.663) (-43.418) (-77.460) (-77.372) (-92.220) (-90.402) 
asianC -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.037*** -0.037*** -0.030*** -0.029*** 
 (-6.519) (-6.684) (-10.335) (-10.614) (-18.154) (-18.129) (-22.173) (-21.799) 
othraceC -0.040*** -0.040*** -0.051*** -0.050*** -0.075*** -0.074*** -0.067*** -0.066*** 
 (-11.519) (-11.522) (-18.799) (-18.549) (-25.328) (-25.135) (-32.827) (-32.353) 
speakengC 0.040*** 0.041*** 0.049*** 0.048*** 0.046*** 0.045*** 0.046*** 0.045*** 
 (20.779) (21.034) (33.577) (32.903) (31.971) (31.859) (44.993) (44.654) 
expC 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 
 (244.435) (244.407) (313.477) (313.746) (328.158) (328.734) (448.690) (449.153) 
expsq100th -0.046*** -0.046*** -0.047*** -0.047*** -0.059*** -0.059*** -0.053*** -0.053*** 
 (-139.894) (-139.922) (-176.207) (-175.689) (-201.457) (-201.632) (-267.026) (-266.867) 
hourwkC 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 
 (103.794) (102.999) (174.085) (172.046) (296.607) (295.467) (345.041) (342.442) 
Constant 10.545*** 10.547*** 10.624*** 10.617*** 10.740*** 10.740*** 10.682*** 10.673*** 
 (249.057) (250.547) (301.279) (311.415) (281.886) (281.843) (368.277) (374.288) 
Observations 866,255 866,255 1,437,120 1,437,120 1,579,990 1,579,990 3,017,110 3,017,110 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 954,819 952,669 1,701,295 1,693,066 2,313,073 2,310,106 4,078,169 4,066,108 
Bayesian Inf. 
Crit. 






Appendix H. Linearity check of for-profit share of workers and annual income 
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